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I. Introduction
Equality has been the central issue of American constitutional law in the
twentieth century, and Brown v. Board of Education' has been the central
case. The emphasis that constitutional scholars have given to Brown has
resulted, however, in their losing sight of a richer and fuller portrait of
equality. This Article seeks to recover the portrait that we have lost.
My approach in the Article will be to examine in detail an extensive
body of twentieth-century New York case law concerning equality issues.
These New York cases constitute a central part of the equality story,
especially for the decades prior to Brown. These New York cases establish
that Brown did not mark the beginning of modern equality law, but only a
shift in its direction, albeit a very important shift.
The Article is divided into three main analytical parts. Part I considers
the emergence in the late 1930s of today's conception of equality. Until
then, people conceptualized equality in class-centered and geographicallyoriented terms. In American history, for example, concern about inequality
arising from class distinctions can be traced back to the political thought of
early Federalists, who often worried that wealthy property holders would be
victimized in the political process by masses of the poor.2 Class-centered
equality analysis also appeared at the heart of the debates over the abolition
of slavery, in which opponents of slavery typically focused on the need to
eliminate an underclass of slaves without seeing any corresponding need to
end the racism and racial prejudice in which anti-slavery advocates

1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 103 (1993);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 403-13
(1969).
2.
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themselves participated.3 Another large body of nineteenth and early
twentieth-century equality doctrine, reflected in numerous Supreme Court
opimons, 4 concerned discrimination by one state against another or against
residents of the other.
In contrast, by the end of the 1930s, equality jurisprudence had begun
to focus on what remains the paradigmatic concern of egalitarians todayhow to address and remedy problems that arise when a culturally or
ethnically distinctive minority finds itself disadvantaged in its relationship to
mainstream social groups and turns to law to remedy the disadvantage. Part
I of this Article will trace how cultural and ethnic discrimination emerged as
the central issue influencing the development of equality jurisprudence
during the 1920s and the 1930s. Then the Article will turn to the starkly
different approaches toward ending such discrimnation adopted by New
York courts during the next four decades. Part II will focus on the first of
these approaches, while Part H will focus on the second.
Part II will show that, at first, equality was seen as an eventual goal
toward which society as a whole should strive without the judiciary playing
any special or Immediate role in its attainment. Until approximately 1960,
New York judges believed that their primary mandate was to enable the
legislature to take steps that would enhance the well-being of subordinated
groups. Under special circumstances, some judges would exceed this
mandate in order to interpret state constitutional and legislative provisions
m a fashion that would give subordinated classes weapons against municipalities or other entities seeking to maintain their subordination. Or, they
would manipulate legal rules to give victims of prejudice and discrimination
weapons that they could use m their efforts to enter the mainstream of New
York's political, economic, and social life. These same judges, however,
consistently refused to hold that subordinated individuals possessed a
constitutionally derived right to equality that the courts would enforce. Even
more significantly, judges prior to the 1960s did not believe that an equal
3. See RAoUL BERGER, GOvERNmENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 10-16, 90-91 (1977); HARRY V JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE
DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES INTHE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 377-86
(1959); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 71-80, 96-104 (1988).
4. See Baldwin v Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Public Util. Comm'n v Attleboro
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927); Allgeyer v Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839). Another leading case decided by a Supreme Court Justice on circuit was Corfield v
Coryell, 6 F Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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society required people with different cultural values to interact on an equal
basis; equality required only that subordinated groups be given the
opportunity to shed their existing identities and to assume the identity of their
oppressors. Equality, in short, meant the gradual assimilation of diverse
groups into a pre-existing cultural mainstream.
Following the decision in Brown, understandings of equality began to
change in ways that Part M will elaborate. After 1960, equality was
transformed into a judicially protected, formal legal right. Litigation for the
purpose of obtaining a judicial order protecting a legal right to equality
became commonplace. Assimilation, m turn, came to be viewed as a
problematic vision of equality Although some people continued to adhere
to that vision even after 1960, an alternative approach, which is best
described as multicultural, arose. This new multicultural approach cherished
racial, religious, ethmc, gender, and other distinctions and proposed to
organize society along group lines m a manner that allowed each group to
achieve an equal share of wealth and power. In connection with this new
approach to equality, subordinated groups began presenting their demands
for equality more forcefully During the decades m the middle of the
twentieth century, when equality meant assimilation, those wanting to
assimilate typically made polite requests for admission into the mainstream.
But later, when multiculturalism came into vogue, people making egalitarian
demands frequently presented them in a manner that appeared offensive and
occasionally even threatemng to dominant groups.
As I elaborate on these developments in the pages below, this Article
will, I believe, offer a paradigm for thinking about twentieth-century
constitutional law that is somewhat different from the current received
wisdom. I make no claim, however, that normative debates about constitutional law should immediately be reframed to-fit within the lenses of my New
York paradigm rather than the existing conventional one. My claim is a
much more limited one: namely, that the current wisdom, which is derived
from close analysis of a small number of leading cases decided in the highly
rarified setting of the United States Supreme Court, presents a distorted
picture of the twentieth-century development of constitutional principles of
equality In particular, the current wisdom loses sight of a vibrant body of
New York law that emerged in the middle of the twentieth century and
contributed significantly to some peoples' attainment of their goal of
equality, even while refusing to grant them a right to equality If, as seems
likely, other states adopted doctrinal approaches to equality similar to that of
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mid-century New York,' the state law that contemporary constitutional
scholarship has tended to ignore may be important to a fuller understanding
of equality m the United States.

The main task of tins Article is to recover this body of state constitutional law Once the forgotten law has been exhumed, it then will be
possible to begin comparing a richer vision of equality to the more traditional

analysis of equal protection doctrine derived from Supreme Court cases
decided from 1960 to today The result of the comparison, I believe, will
raise questions which, when addressed by other scholars, may eventually
lead to the rejection of much of our contemporary constitutional wisdom and
to the construction of a new and more appropriate paradigm within which to

continue our contemporary constitutional debates.
IL Equality as the Protection of Ethnic and CulturalMinorities
During the early 1920s, a new conception of equality that required the
protection of ethimc and cultural minorities began to enter New York politics.

As it did, older concerns about class conflict lost their hold on New Yorkers'
imaginations with the result that by the end of the 1930s, the newer

conception had become triumphant. At least three developments contributed
to this result.
A. EuropeanMinonties in the Aftermath of World War I
The first development was an outgrowth of the efforts -of American

diplomats in the aftermath of World War I to draft peace treaties for Central
and Eastern Europe establishing national boundaries along ethnic and
5. There is much reason for thinking that New York law may have been similar to the
law of other states during the period under study in this Article. For most of that period, New
York was the most populous state and the economic and cultural leader of the nation. It was
also, in one important respect, more typical of the nation as a whole than was any other single
state: with its metropolitan center on the Atlantic coast, its upstate industrial cities little
different from those of the Midwest, its expanding suburbs, and its rural farmlands and
environmentally protected woodlands, New York contained locales similar to those in all the
rest of the nation except the Deep South and the Far West. One would accordingly expect to
find a wider variety of the socio-political forces that shape law in New York than in other
jurisdictions. Of course, those forces might converge differently in New York than elsewhere,
and thus we cannot be certain that the law in New York was typical of that in other
jurisdictions. But at least until scholars examine in detail states, such as California, Texas,
and a southeastern state like Georgia, the conclusions about New York law explicated by this
Article should serve as preliminary hypotheses about more general nationwide developments
in the concept of equality on the state level.
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cultural lines. Unfortunately, this effort at national self-determination was
less than totally successful. It often proved impossible to disentangle
minorities living in the midst of majorities, and when disentanglement was
impossible, the diplomats found themselves confronted with disappointed
peoples who not only had been demed their own nation-state, but also had
good reason to fear oppression by groups living among them m greater
numbers. Even when they were unable to grant any relief to the disappointed minorities, the diplomats who were redrawing the map of Europe
could not avoid realizing that the minorities had legitimate complaints. Nor
could they avoid the recognition that similar ethnic and cultural minorities
6
living in the United States had similar complaints.
B. The Attainment of PoliticalPowerby
American Immigrant Groups
The second development contributing to a new conception of equality
occurred when urban Immigrant minorities began to attain significant
political power in the 1920s, as first Alfred E. Smith, then Franklin D
Roosevelt, and later Herbert H. Lehman won and held onto the governor's
chair from 1923 through 1942. The new politics created by Smith and his
successors made no effort to separate issues of class from those of ethmcity
and culture, but instead moved back and forth freely among them. For
example, Smith, who had been born and raised in the immigrant ghettos of
Manhattan's Lower East Side, tended to emphasize ethncity and culture. He
thereby convinced immigrants and their descendents that he "was one of
them, up from the city streets, and his career was the living demonstration
of the falsity of the accusations against them."7 In the words of one 1927
commentator, "[tihe enormous mass of immigrants rightly look[ed] upon him
as their mouthpiece," as "he proclaim[ed] a new Americanism in which the
Nordic Protestant tradition count[ed] for nothing. "' Under Smith's
leadership, "the foreign population [felt] for the first time that
[it had]
access to power and honours. "

As a result, Smith was able in 1922 to

assemble the Catholic, Jewish, and liberal patrician coalition that he,
Roosevelt, and Lehman personified and that kept them and the Democratic
6. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1297-99 (1982).
7 OSCAR HANDLIN, AL SMITH AND His AMERICA 82-83 (1958).
8. ANDRE SIEGFRIED, AMERICA COMES OF AGE (1927), quoted in MATTHEw
JOSEPHSON & HANNAH JOSEPHSON, AL SMITH: HERO OF THE CITIES at v (1969).

9.

Id.
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Party m power in New York and the nation for two decades.' 0 Even in his
losing bid for the Presidency m 1928, Smith proved so attractive to the urban
masses that for the first time m history, the Democratic Party won a plurality
of the votes m the nation's twelve largest cities.'
Roosevelt and Lehman continued Smith's practice Of courting the urban
immigrant vote, although FDR's appeals, m particular, were cast more in
in the forgotten man at
terms of class than ethnicity Placing his "faith
the bottom of the economic pyramid,""2 Roosevelt argued that it was the
"responsibility of the State" to aid "large numbers of men and women
incapable of supporting either themselves or their families because of
circumstances beyond their control" and that aid should be granted "not as
a matter of charity but as a matter of social duty "13 Lehman similarly spoke
on behalf of immigrants when he urged that "group isolation" was "no
possible in a well ordered body politic. "4 He firmly "insisted
longer
that freedom and liberty, political and economic self-determination must
never tolerate artificial barriers of race, creed, color, sex or geography "15
Although the Democratic Party's rhetoric began to contain at least some
appeals along ethnic lines, its legislative program focused almost entirely on
the regulation and redistribution of wealth. The three Democratic
governors - Smith, Roosevelt, and Lehman - all used their power to obtain

enactment of regulatory and social legislation that redistributed wealth and
power from established WASP elites to their lower class constituencies.
Smith began the process. "If he was noted for one thing throughout the
nation, it was for legislation he had proposed or encouraged which provided
workmen's compensation, shortened the workweek for men, women, and
children, safeguarded working conditions, and provided for the widows and
orphans of the working class."16 Smith was also a pioneer in highway
10. See NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL PATRICK MoYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT:
THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS, AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY 169 (1963).
11. See JOSEPHSON &JOSEPHSON, supra note 8, at 399.
12. Franklin D. Roosevelt, National Radio Address (April 7, 1932) quoted in FRANK
FRIEDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEvELT: THE TRIUMPH 261 (1956).
13. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Legislature (August 28, 1931) quoted in

supra note 12, at 217
Herbert H. Lehman, Speech at St. Bonaventure College (1934), quoted in ALLAN
NEVINS, HERBERT H. LEHMAN AND HIS ERA 155 (1963).
15. George Meany, Forewordto ROBERT P INGALLS, HERBERT H. LEHMAN AND NEW
YORK'S LITTLE NEW DEAL at vii (1975).
16. RICHARD O'CONNOR, THE FIRST HuRRAH: A BIOGRAPHY OF ALFRED E. SMITH 168
(1970).
FRIEDEL,

14.
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construction,17 public housing," and the elimination of railroad grade
crossings.19 As governor, Roosevelt continued Smith's approach by
supporting old-age pensions, public power, and unemployment relief."°
Lehman added such items as public housing, regulation of the dairy industry,
unemployment insurance, and utility regulation.21
The established elites and business interests that bore the brunt of tius
new social legislation, of course, fought back. Relying on constitutional
claims about the limited nature of the police power, they brought a series of
cases that sought to invalidate statutes either on their face or as applied to
particular plaintiffs. Thus, New York gave birth to a series of important
police power cases that typically, although not invariably, overruled claims
of deprivation of property rights, sustained the constitutionality of redistributive regulatory and social legislation, and thereby advanced the redistributional goals of Governors Smith, Roosevelt, and Lehman and their Democratic supporters. Even today, similar police power cases continue to
proliferate at the state level and to set the framework for much regulatory
law
I do not plan to discuss these cases in the present Article, however:
first, because they require far more extensive analysis than I can possibly
give them here; and second, because in essence they define equality in the
context of class conflict and understand the remedy for inequality to be
redistribution of wealth. I mean to focus instead on lines of cases that were
peripheral to the great police power struggle of the 1920s and the 1930s, but
nonetheless comprise the third factor contributing to the emergence of a new
concept of equality that sought to provide a cure for discrimination against
ethnic and cultural minorities.
C. The Persistenceof Ethnic and CulturalDiscrimnation
These cases arose because Jewish and Roman Catholic immigrants and
their descendants, who "had been under attack, in the long debate over
immigration restriction," continued to be "stigmatized as members of inferior
races, barred from desirable trades, and challenged as to their capacity for
17 See JOSEPHSON & JOSEPHSON, supra note 8, at 214.
18. See id. at 329-31.
19.

See O'CONNOR, supra note 16, at 160.

20. See FRiEDEL, supra note 12, at 41-46, 100-19, 217-27
21.

See INGALLS, supra note 15, at 249-55; NEviNs, supra note 14, at 141-42, 167-
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citizensip."I Regrettably, the cases made no effort to halt the discrinmnation. Consider, for example, Judd v Board of Education.' It held state
legislation authorizing local school districts to provide free transportation to
students in parochial schools unconstitutional on the ground that "denominathe
tional and sectarian schools" were "no part of and [were] not within
case,
In
an
earlier
money
I
system of common schools" funded by public
the appellate division likewise had struck down state legislation authorizing
local school boards to provide free books to students after one board had
attempted to use tls law to give books to students attending a Roman
Catholic parochial school.'
Even more important were cases dealing with what we would now label
free speech and search and seizure issues. Their outcomes also reflected
deep and longstanding patterns of discrimmation against Roman Catholics
and Jews. These cases are especially important to the story that this Article
relates because the issues they raised were central to the discussions of the
late 1930s, in which today's conception of equality, with its central focus on
discrimination against ethnic and cultural minorities, took shape.
1. The Free Speech Cases
Gitlow v New York' is the most famous of the free speech cases. In
July 1919, less than two years after the Bolshevik coup in St. Petersburg,
Gitlow published "the Left Wing Manifesto" m a publication "devoted to the
international Communumst struggle. " 27 After expressing support for the
22. HANDLIN, supra note 7, at 82-83.
23.

278 N.Y 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).

24. Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y 200, 205-06, 15 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1938).
25. See Smith v Donahue, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1922). But see
People et rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927) (sustaining legislation
permitting children in public schools to be released for one-half hour each week to attend
religious instruction); Miami Military Inst. v. Leff, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (Buffalo City Ct. 1926)

(holding that private boarding school had breached its contract with Jewish student when it
demanded that he attend Christian religious services on Sunday and then expelled him for
failing to do so). For a case legitimating gender as distinguished from religious subordination, see In re Grilli, 179 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1920) (declaring that
Nineteenth Amendment's conferral on women of right to vote conferred no corresponding
right to sit on juries).
26. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
27 People v. Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. 783,786 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1921), aft'd, 234 N.Y
132, 136 N.E. 317 (1922), aff'd sub nom. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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extremist "policy of the Russian and German Communumsts," the manifesto
observed "that strikes [were] developing which verge[d] on revolutionary
action, and in which the suggestion of proletarian dictatorship [was]
apparent, [as] the striker workers tr[ied] to usurp the functions of
municipal government. "I The centerpiece of the manifesto, however, was
in which 'the proletariat as a class alone
its call for "a new state
29
counts.'" The new state would be achieved by "starting with strikes of
protest, developing into 'mass political strikes, and then into revolutionary
mass action"' and ultimately by "the introduction of 'the transition
proletarian state, functioning as a revolutionary dictatorship,' which [was]
necessary 'to coerce and suppress the bourgeois"' who were to be
"completely expropriated 'economically and politically '"30
Unless the elite judges who sat on the courts that heard Gitlow's case
had been prepared to treat the manifesto as "a mere academic and harmless
discussion," they had little choice but to fear it as "advocacy of action by
one class, which would destroy the rights of all other classes." 31 They took
seriously the call to recast America on the model of Russia, where, they
noted, "the most barbaric punishment, torture, cruelty, and suffering are
inflicted upon the bourgeois" and where those who did not submit were
"either starved to death or shot. "32 The judges also understood that, in the
minds of the revolutionaries, their success in Russia depended on their
spreading "the revolutionary struggle world-wide," especially into Western
"industrial centers, where the proletariat greatly outnumber[ed] the
bourgeois. 33 In sum, the judges found Gitlow and his fellow revolutionaries to be "positively dangerous men" who "intend[ed] to destroy the state,
murder whole classes of citizens, [and] rob them of their property "34
Difficult as it may be after observing the whimper with which
communism died in Red Square during the summer of 1991, we need to

28. Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. at 788.
29. Id. at 789.

30. Id. at 789-90.
31. People v Gitlow, 234 N.Y 132, 149, 136 N.E. 317, 324 (1922) (Hiscock, C.J.,
concurring), aff'd sub nom. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
32. Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. at 791-93.
33. Id. at 791-93.
34. Thomas C. Mackey, The Lost Court Documents of Benjamin Gitlow and James
Larkin Before the New York City Magistrates' Court, 1919, 69 N.Y.U.L. REv 421, 433
(1994).
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treat this rhetoric seriously even though it is utterly foreign to our
sensibilities. The judges writing these words without the benefit of our
seventy years of hindsight may well have quivered beneath the fear they
expressed; even if they did not, they must have assumed that their stated
fears would strike a chord in the relatively sophisticated audience that reads
judicial reports. Indeed, the judges had every reason to rely on the
persuasiveness of their rhetoric because it fit within a traditional conceptualization of equality derived from a focus on issues of class conflict.
At the same time that we take seriously the articulated rhetoric of these
judges, however, we must also be aware of their almost indistinguishable
anti-Semitic subtext. The fact is that Gitlow and other cases from the
period involved overlapping dischmination on both class and religious
grounds. Jews, for example, were seen by many in the 1920s, as several
historians have noted, as "inflamed radical[s] responsible for Communist
[and] a vast conspiracy designed to
revolution in eastern Europe
enslave America."35 As the appellate division observed, radical "doctrines
[were] principally advocated by those who come from Russia and
bordering countries and their descendants," as did Gitlow himself and the
majority of then recent Jewish immigrants.36 Because the United States and
New York, in particular, had become "the abiding place of foreigners who,
without understanding our institutions, had brought with them views and
prejudices
and doctrines which, if put into effect, would subvert
organized government,137 strong action was needed. When a man as
prominent as Henry Ford could issue repeated warnings against the
"'Jewish menace" and a man as cultivated as Henry James could express
shock at the "'Hebrew conquest of New York"' that was transforming the
city into a "'new Jerusalem,'" 38 it is not surprising that a group of Ku Klux
Klansmen in 1924 could, under apparent police protection, kidnap a Jewish
pharmacist in a village twenty-five miles outside New York and order him
to relocate to the city 39 Nor is it surprising that when a Catholic church
35.

OSCAR HANDLIN, RACE AND NATIONALITY INAMERICAN LIFE 173-74 (1948). On

the connection of Jews to socialist movements, see also GLAZER &MOYNIHAN, supra note 10,
at 169.
36.
37
38.
39.

Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S. at 791.
Id. at 792-93.
HOWARD M. SACHAR, THE COURSE OF MODERN JEWISH HISTORY 339, 341 (1958).
See Menaced by Klan, Druggistto Move, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 5, 1924, at 36; Heidi

Fried, Early Jewish Settlement in Nassau County: The Communities, the People, the
Synagogues 3 (unpublished M.A. thesis, Hofstra University).
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was built two years later m the inmediately adjacent village, a cross was
burned in its parking lot. After all, as a minister had recently told a Klan
rally, the Catholic Church was merely a political party in disguise bent on
destroying American liberty I
The Supreme Court of the United States was not much different from
the WASP elite of New York and the rest of the country Feeling as
threatened as their brethren below, a seven-justice majority m Gitlow v New
York4 agreed that a "single revolutionary spark [could] kindle a fire that,
smoldering for a time, [could] burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration." 42 The majority also agreed that it was necessary and
appropriate for government "to extinguish the spark without waiting until it
has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration." 4 3 Even a justice
as liberal as Harlan F Stone, the former dean of Columbia Law School and
future author of United States v CaroleneProducts Co., 4 could join in an
opinion focused like Gitlow on the repression of class conflict.
Indeed, only four of the twenty-four judges who sat in the Gitlow case
at all levels were sufficiently unafraid to dissent; they probably shared what
is in retrospect the sage view of Justice Holmes that "whatever may be
thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a
present conflagration" given "the admittedly small minority who shared" its
views. 45 Several years after the threat of anarchy had passed, the few
dissenters could focus with precision on the bad grammar of the manifesto
or, in the case of the two dissenters on the New York Court of Appeals, on
the fact that the statute under which Gitlow was convicted prohibited only
anarchy and not revolutionary socialism.' But for people closer to the class
40. See Long Island Sees Biggest Klan Crowd, N.Y TIMES, June 22, 1923, at 1;
Merrick Historical Society, Transcript of Interview Tapes of Miss Katherine Reif 9 (1976)
(transcript in Merrick Public Library, Merrick, N.Y.). Other well-known opportunities for
expression of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant prejudices during the 1920s included the Sacco
and Vanzetti case, see PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETrI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND
173-77, 201-03 (1991); HERBERT B. EHRMANN, THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: COMMONWEALTH v SACCO AND VANzETTI 117-18, 134-37, 288 (1969), and the 1928 presidential
election campaign. See JOSEPHSON & JOSEPHSON, supra note 8, at 358-66, 380-94;
O'CONNOR, supra note 16, at 206-19.
41. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
42. Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669 (1925).
43. Id.
44. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
45. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
46. See People v Gitlow, 234 N.Y 134, 154, 136 N.E. 317, 326 (1922), aff'd sub nom.
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struggles of 1919, the communist hope of immediate success, on the one
hand, and the fear of it, on the other, threatened class violence and made
repression of the lower classes seem appropriate.
Gitlow was no isolated case.47 Although it arose out of earlier facts,
Lonch v State" similarly involved a "threatening crowd" of perhaps as
many as 2,000 strikers and sympathizers, who were hurling "stones, bricks,
and other missiles" at about seventy-five policemen and National Guard
troops, who opened fire and wounded an innocent bystander.4 9 Several years
later, People v Makvrta ° sustained the conviction of a defendant who had
distributed a circular urging workers to "speak to our ruling class the only
language they understand," "[d]isregard, disobey, break every injunction,"
and "[t]reat every injunction as a scrap of paper."" Radical action was
needed because
[d]eadly blows [were] now being struck against every working man and
working class family
by the capitalist dictatorship.
The same
capitalist courts and judges who murdered Sacco and Vanzetti, who
[were] keeping Mooney and Billings in the California jails, [were] now
handing down injunction orders to jail the miners of Colorado, to evict the
miners of Ohio, to starve the miners of Pennsylvania, to terrorize and
smash the union ranks of the New York traction workers. 2
In the face of tus call for disobedience to court orders, the appellate division
quoted the language of the Gitlow majority, which outlawed "action by mass
strike, whereby government is crippled, the administration of justice
paralyzed, and the health, morals, and welfare of a community endangered
for the purpose of bringing about a revolution in the state, "5 and
affirmed the defendant's conviction.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals approved a New York City ordinance
requiring a permit to expound atheism in public streets out of fear that the
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

47 Two earlier cases circumscribing radical speech during the World War I era were
Frama v. United States, 255 F 28 (2d Cir. 1918), and Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 246
F 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (reversing now classic, speech-protective district court opinion of
Learned Hand); cf.Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F 535 (S.D.N.Y 1917) (requiring
postmaster to deliver copies of radical magazine).
48. 184 N.Y.S. 818 (Ct. Cl. 1920).
49. Lorich v State, 184 N.Y.S. 818, 818-19 (Ct. Cl. 1920).
50. 231 N.Y.S. 279 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1928).
51. People v Makvirta, 231 N.Y.S. 279, 282 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1928).

52. Id. at 280-82.
53. Id. at 283-84 (quoting Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
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"passion, rancor, and malice sometimes aroused by sectarian religious

controversies and attacks on religion seem[ed] to justify especial supervision.I' It also upheld a Mount Vernon ordinance prohibiting any assemblies
on city streets - an ordinance that the mayor planned to enforce by "grant[ing] no further permits for Socialists' meeting[s],"s5 while the appellate
division sustained a judgment against another defendant for "addressing
[an] assemblage in favor of Socialism."56 Even somewhat innocuous
picketing in support of a "Rent Strike Against Fire Trap Conditions" led in
1934 to the conviction of a woman for disorderly conduct because "the
lawful and orderly manner of the tenants was to file their complaints with"
an appropriate city agency rather than picket.' For judges of the 1920s and
1930s, polite presentation of grievances was the only appropriate way for an
underclass to make its case.58
The New York courts similarly pursued a policy of repressing speech

that threatened the peace and security of elites in a series of noncriminal
54. People v. Smith, 263 N.Y 255, 257, 188 N.E. 745, 746 (1934).
55. People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y 96, 102, 133 N.E. 364, 366 (1921).
56. City of Buffalo v. Till, 182 N.Y.S. 418, 424 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1920).
57 People v. Kopezak, 274 N.Y.S. 629, 631-32 (Special Sess. N.Y County 1934),
aff'd, 266 N.Y 565, 195 N.E. 202 (1935); see also People v. Caponigri, 6 N.Y.S.2d 577
(Magis. Ct. Kings County 1938) (conviction for using loud speaker system on Coney Island
boardwalk).
58. It should be noted in fairness to the judges that they stood steadfastly against the
threat of street violence whether it originated from the radical left or the radical right. In
particular, they were as ready to help suppress the Ku Klux Klan as socialist labor groups.
Thus, they reversed a conviction against a woman who was distributing an NAACP pamphlet
entitled, "Stop the Ku Klux Klan Propaganda in New York," on the ground that the Klan was
"stirring up
prejudices and animosities against certain races and religions in this country"
and that it "would be a dangerous and un-American thing to sustain an interpretation of a city
ordinance which would prohibit the free distribution by a body of citizens of a pamphlet
setting forth their views against what they believed to be a movement subversive of their rights
as citizens." People v. Johnson, 191 N.Y.S. 750 (General Sess. N.Y County 1921). Even
more important, the state courts and ultimately the United States Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state statute requiring secret societies such as the Klan to provide the
secretary of state with a list of their members and officers. People ex reL Bryant v Sheriff
of Erie County, 206 N.Y.S. 533 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1924), 4'd sub nom. People ex rel.
Bryant v. Zimmerman, 210 N.Y.S. 269 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1925), a'd,241 N.Y 405, 150
N.E. 497 (1926), aff'd, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). Observing that the Klan "was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews and Negroes and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices," 278 U.S. at 76, the Justices implicitly approved the lower court's holding that the
legislature had "to protect
its citizens from malicious discrimination and wanton
intimidation." 210 N.Y.S. at 273. It was "not required to await active violations before
enacting legislation," but could "anticipate them." 206 N.Y.S. at 535.
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cases. Thus, they sustained the refusal of the Secretary of State to amend the
certificate of incorporation of the Lithuanian Workers' Literature Society

when they found that it consisted of socialists who favored "the attainment
of the desired revolution by forcible means" and concluded that no court

could "approve the formation or the existence of any society which, m its
declared objects, embraces the purpose to overthrow by force organized
government in this country " Likewise, they sustained an injunction against

the American Socialist Society's operation of the Rand School of Social
Science on the ground that it was "within the power of the Legislature to

enact statutes

to prevent the teaching of doctrines advocating the

destruction of the state by force" and that the Rand School had not estab-

lished that it did not teach such doctrines.'

Finally, they sustained

censorship of radical newspapers such as Benjamin Gitlow's Revolutionary

Age6 and even of motion picture newsreels.62
2. Police Searches and Brutality
Repression of the urban, immigrant underclasses during the 1920s and
1930s occurred not only m the context of freedom of expression, but also in
reference to rules of constitutional criminal procedure.

The impact was

especially visible in Prohibition cases. The Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act - products of the Puritan progressivism of WASP elites 63 altered a good deal of legal doctrine,' and immigrant underclasses in New
59. In re Lithuanian Workers' Literature Soc., 187 N.Y.S. 612, 615, 617 (App. Div
-2d Dep't 1921).
60. People v. American Socialist Soc., 195 N.Y.S. 801, 806 (App. Div 1st Dep't
1922).
61. See Gitlow v. Kiely, 44 F.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y 1930), aff'd, 49 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir.
1931).
62. See Pathe Exch., Inc. v. Cobb, 195 N.Y.S. 661 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1922), af4'd,
236 N.Y. 539, 142 N.E. 274 (1923). For another case possibly supportive of censorship, see
Lucomsky v Palmer, 252 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1931) (upholding refusal of
periodical publishers to deal with plaintiff as distributor). The pattern of censorship began to
ease only in the late 1930s in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See People v
Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Special Sess. App. Part 1939); People v. Banks, 6 N.Y.S.2d
41 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County 1938).
63. See NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL. AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN PROHIBITION 88-117 (1976); K. AUSTIN KERR, ORGANIZED FOR PROHIBITION: A
NEW HISTORY OF THE ANTI-SALOON LEAGUE 7-9, 36-37 (1985); JAMES H. TIMBERLAKE,
PROHIBITION AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT, 1900-1920, at 80-83 (1963).
64. See, e.g., Boer v. Garcia, 193 N.Y.S. 814, 815 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1922)
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York resisted the alterations. In response, many judges, believing that they
could "not
tolerate
nullification, in particular sections or by
special classes," of the constitution, which was "the creature and will of the
people," '65 began to cut back on the procedural protections accorded to
Prohibition's violators. For example, they declared that a violator of the
prohibition laws would not be subjected to double jeopardy by being
prosecuted in both federal and state court.66 In addition, both federal and
state cases ruled that liquor could be seized under defective search
warrants6 7 or even without a warrant.68

What has since become the most important issue in search and seizure
law - whether the fruits of a warrantless search are admissible in
evidence - arose in numerous Prohibition cases. But the issue was not
definitively decided until People v Defore.69 Although not a Prohibition
case, Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote his opinion with Prohibition very
much in mind only three years after the New York legislature had nullified
(making unregulated transshipment of liquors from Havanna to Netherlands via New York
illegal), f'd, 204 N.Y.S. 895 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1924), 4'd,240 N.Y 9, 147 N.E. 231
(1925); People v Cook, 188 N.Y.S. 291, 294 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1921) (subjecting people
unlawfully in possession of liquor to prosecutions in state court under state law), af"d,236
N.Y 505, 142 N.E. 260 (1923).
65. People v. Wade, 214 N.Y.S. 187, 189 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County) & supplemented
by, 214 N.Y.S. 781 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County), rev'd on other grounds, 217 N.Y.S. 486
(N.Y Sp. Sess. 1926).
66. See Wade, 214 N.Y.S. at 782-83.
67 See People v Three 100-Gallon Stills, 197 N.Y.S. 882, 883 (Kings County Ct.
1922); People v 738 Bottles of Intoxicating Liquor, 190 N.Y.S. 477, 480 (Saratoga County
Ct. 1921).
68. See United States v Two Soaking Units and Various Other Articles, 48 F.2d 107,
109-10 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 284 U.S. 627 (1931); Stork Restaurant Corp. v McCampbell,
55 F.2d 687, 689 (S.D.N.Y 1932); United States V Maggio, 51 F.2d 397, 399 (W.D.N.Y
1931); People v Diamond, 233 N.Y 130, 135-36, 135 N.E. 200, 202-03 (1922) (dictum).
Cf.Lee Kwong Nom v. United States, 20 F.2d 470, 472 (2d Cir. 1927) (upholding seizure
of opium). But the officer making the seizure had to make a return thereof with reasonable
promptness or the seizure was void. See In re No. 32 East Sixty-Seventh Street, Borough of
Manhattan, City of New York, 96 F.2d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1938); Diamond,233 N.Y at 13536, 135 N.E. at 202-03. Documents and papers, however, could not be seized, and courts
would compel their return, see In re No. 191 Front Street, Borough of Manhattan, City of
New York, 5 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1924); United States v Kraus, 270 F 578, 580-81
(S.D.N.Y 1921), unless suit for the return thereof was brought against an official who did
not have custody See Weinstein v Attorney General of the United States, 271 F 673, 675
(2d Cir. 1921).
69. 242 N.Y 13, 150 N.E. 585"(1926).

CHANGING MEANING OFEQUALITY

federal policy by repealing the state's laws cruninalizing possession of
alcoholic beverages.7" Defore, in effect, was an anti-nullification opinion
that rejected the exclusionary rule because it would have given the "pettiest

peace officer
power, through overzeal or indiscretion, to confer
immunity upon the offender for crimes the most flagitious." 7 Although
Cardozo recognized that "unless the evidence is excluded," the statutory
protection against warrantless searches could become "a form and its
protection an illusion,"72 he still declined to create a system in which the
"criminal" went "free because the constable [had] blundered"73 or which
otherwise effectively failed to enforce sovereign law
D The 1938 Convention and the Emergence of a
New Conception of Equality
The Defore case did not, however, satisfactorily resolve the exclusionary rule issue. On the contrary, Defore raised issues of inequality and
repression that would not disappear. Ultimately, Defore induced New
York liberals to separate clearly their concerns about ethnic and cultural
discrimination from issues of class conflict, and thereby to articulate a new
vision of equality as the protection of discrete ethnic and cultural minorities.
70. See JOSEPHSON & JOSEPSHON, supra note 8, at 291-96.
71. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 23, 150 N.E. 585, 588, cert. dented, 270 U.S. 657
(1926).
72. Id. at 24, 150 N.E. at 589.
73. Id. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587 Later cases held not only that a warrantless search did
not preclude the use of evidence, but also that it gave no basis for the owner of what had been
seized to demand its return. See People v. Hawkins, 230 N.Y.S. 152, 154 (Niagara County
Ct. 1928). Cf.Triangle Mint Corp. v Horgan, 233 N.Y.S. 570, 575 (Kings County Mun.
Ct. 1929) (slot machines illegal and hence not returnable whether or not seized unlawfully by
police); see also Times Amusement Corp. v. Moss, 290 N.Y.S. 794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County)
(license commissioner has discretion to deny license for pinball machines used in conjunction
with the giving of prizes, thereby making them unlawful), aft'd, 287 N.Y.S. 327 (App. Div.
1st Dep't 1936). Unlike the state courts, the federal courts adhered consistently throughout
the period to the exclusionary rule. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); Gouled
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921). But evidence unlawfully seized by a state official
was admissible in federal court. See Katz v. United States, 7 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1925);
Schroeder v. United States, 7 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1925).
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Despite the unanimous defeat they had suffered in the Court of
Appeals, representatives of urban labor and immigrant groups continued
their fight and made Defore a special target at New York State's 1938
Constitutional Convention. At the behest of George Meany, president of
the state Federation of Labor, a proposal was introduced on the convention
floor to incorporate into the state constitution a rule excluding the fruits of
any unlawful search or wiretap from evidence in a criminal case.74 The
proposal, which was ultimately defeated on a vote of 72 in favor and 89
opposed,' was hotly debated, with both sides aware that its passage would
determine whether or not a constitutional provision against warrantless
searches and wiretaps, on which they both agreed, would be effectively
enforced.
Opponents of the exclusionary proposal did "not like these New Deal
crackpots to write us a Constitution"76 and in the process to ignore the
opponents' practical concerns and fears that an exclusionary rule would
give tight-knit, especially Italian, immigrant communities an increased
capacity to nullify Puritamcal law-enforcement machinery 7' As Hamilton
Fish, a Republican elder statesman who, in his own words, had "learned
all
[his] political principles back in 1912 at the feet of Theodore
Roosevelt," declaimed, the Convention was "playing with fire" in a state
that was "at war with organized crime[ - u]nscrupulous, clever, backed
by great wealth. "78 To adopt the exclusionary rule would offer "a cloak"
and "a hideout" for criminals and lead to "the greatest single celebration
in the City of New York among the crooks and gangdom and racketeers
that was ever known in that city

"9

From "far and wide," he added, "all

the other racketeers and murderers and kidnappers and embezzlers [would]
all collect
to celebrate this famous victory of the forces of evil. "8"
Other delegates, who did not want to see the erection of new "walls of

74.

See

RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,

1938, at 395, 404 (1938) [hereinafter RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; see

also id. at 513-14.
75. See id. at 879. On an earlier tentative vote, the margin had been 67 in favor and 84
opposed. See id. at 616.

76.
77
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 612.
See GLAZER & MOYNIHAN, supra note 10, at 196-97, 210-12.
RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 607
Id. at 606.
Id. at 606-07
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technicality" that would "form a chief defense for organized crime,"8' gave
examples of murderers and other violent criminals who might have escaped
conviction but for the use of unlawfully obtained evidence.' The leading
opponent of the exclusionary proposal, however, was Manhattan District
Attorney Thomas E. Dewey, who had built his political career on his
successful prosecution of organized crime and had played a leading role in
securing legislation that made criminal prosecution easier and pumshment
more severe.'
He made the main point clearly and succinctly The
exclusionary proposal, according to Dewey, would "protect no one except
the guilty criminal" and would "subject them [i.e., the people of the state]
to the depredations of organized crime."I
Supporters of the proposal, like the opponents, also made their point
by way of examples. One example involved a member of President
Franklin D Roosevelt's Cabinet who tapped the wires of his supporters;
a second, wiretapping by a prosecutor investigating ambulance chasing in
New York City; and a third, "political persecution" through wiretapping
of a "priest who was interested in certain phases of charity, certainly not
a criminal, surely an innocent man. "I But more was at stake for
supporters of the exclusionary rule than the use of wiretapping in an
investigation of ambulance chasing or even of an innocent priest. They
worried about "the threats which dictatorship countries [were] making
against Democratic countries" and about "the dangers which [were]
threatening our people throughout the entire world today '" 6 The "working
man, the American Federation of Labor, the laboring people, the honest
business man, the private citizen," who would be "protected in the privacy
of

[their] homes" and "office[s] and business[es],

'"

supported

adoption of an exclusionary rule because it would "re-affirm our faith in
democracy;
. preserve the principles upon which that democracy is
found[ed], and
strengthen so far as we can, the basic principles of a

81.

Id. at 522.

82. See id. at 468.
83. See Lawrence Fleischer, Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren: The Rise of the
Twentieth Century Urban Prosecutor,28 CAL. W L. Ray 1 (1991-92).
84.

RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 405, 407

85. Id. at 461-62.
86. Id. at 462.
87 Id. at 577
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free people. "8 "In a world gone mad in the direction of dictatorship" and
in the "suppression of democratic rights," there was "no more important
consideration facing the Constitutional Convention" than "to preserve and
strengthen all the guaranties contained in the Bill of Rights. "89
Nothing so far quoted fully captures, however, why organized labor
and its urban immigrant members deemed an exclusionary rule of such
"great importance" that they vowed to "press for
its passage. '
Nothing yet explains why urban members of the New Deal coalition should
have been so much more concerned about the "suppression of democratic
rights" and protection of the Bill of Rights than their Republican opponents. Nothing accounts for why the debate over the exclusionary rule
became such a central focus of concern at the 1938 Constitutional
Convention.
The debate became so important because it served as a surrogate for
what one Republican delegate in his speech against the exclusionary rule
labelled a struggle "of law and order against lawlessness," between "real
Americans
[who] stand for law and order" and "those using lawless
means to seek some advantage over their fellow citizens."" In particular,
the Republican delegate expressed his concern about the "temporary
periods of disorder and lawlessness" that "several communities" had
recently experienced - "experiences" that were "distasteful and objectionable to the vast majority of our people. "I
Although the delegate's meaning may not be entirely clear to today's
reader, it was crystal clear to his listeners. By his reference to "temporary
periods of disorder and lawlessness," the delegate could have been
referring to nothing other than recent strikes and labor unrest associated
especially with the CIO's organization of the auto and steel industries. 93
Unionism was, of course, one "lawless means" that "real Americans"
feared others would use to "seek some advantage over their fellow

88. Id. at 463.

89. Id. at 514.
90. Id. at 515.
91. Id. at 546-47
92. Id. at 547
93. See PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 492-522 (1964); see
also SIDNEY LENS, THE LABOR WARS FROM THE MOLLY MAGUIRES TO THE SITDOWNS 291321 (1973). For a contemporaneous account, see BENJAMIN STOLBERG, THE STORY OF THE

CIO 156-86 (1938).
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citizens." But it was not the only "lawless means" used by organized labor
and its immigrant supporters to attain their ends. Even more significant
was the lawlessness that old-line Republicans found in the redistributive
legislation of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and Governor
Herbert Lehman's Little New Deal.
Equally revealing from an opposite perspective was the speech of the
Convention's Harlem delegate, who focused on the relationship between
racial discrunmination and police brutality He told, for example, of one
innocent man who was arrested without a warrant and taken "to the 135th
Street Police Station," where the police "proceeded to work on him. "9
The delegate reported that when the police saw "an individual of negro
origin fairly well. dressed and out in the day time," they would "suspect"
him as "a policy collector" and would "push him into a hallway, strip him
of his clothes, take off his shoes even, in quest of policy slips," and when
they found none, "push him out. "9 There was also "the case of a poor
home m her bed late at night" while "her husband
woman with a child
[was] out at work." 96 When the police broke in, "the children [became]
hysterical" and she became "sick."' Even though the police found
nothing, there was "[n]o one" who was "going to pay for it." 98 There were
"thousands of other cases, thousands and thousands where illegal evidence
[was] not found, where illegal searches [were] permitted day after day and
no evidence [was] obtained. ,99
A report to Mayor LaGuardia on a 1935 not in Harlem continued the
tale. It told of how "the police of Harlem" often invaded "the personal
when white and colored people [were] seen
rights of its citizens
consorting together." Although the report indicated that police interference
was most likely when "a colored man [was] with a white woman," it told
of one case of a man who was arrested "because he was walking with a
colored woman" and held "until he could prove to the officer that he was
a colored man." The report also brought out the fact that "the police
attempted to unpress" on whites "by words and acts of brutality that whites
were not to associate with 'the black bastards in Harlem."' Although the
94.
95.
96.
97
98.
99.

RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 74, at 488.

Id.
Id. at 487
Id. at 487-88.
Id.
Id. at 487
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"citizens of Harlem" appreciated that "the slight regard
shown for
their lives [was] due not only to the fact that they [were] Negroes, but also
to the fact that they [were] poor and propertyless and therefore defenseless," they understood at the same time that something in addition to
economic justice was at stake. They knew that they had to put an end not
merely to their poverty but also to "the estimation of the police" that "the
life of a Negro [was] cheap. ""°

Examination of tis rhetoric makes it clear that today's conception of
equality had begun to enter political discourse and to divide Democrats
from Republicans and liberals from conservatives, in a significant way
Republicans, who at least in New York tended to represent "real Amencans" of WASP extraction, conjoined majoritarian political power, labor
activism, and actual crime as forms of lawlessness that Democrats would
use to deprive them of the independence, wealth, and social pre-eminence
that they had always enjoyed. They feared an egalitarian revolution earned
out under the forms of government, but in the end not radically different
from the violent one that Benjamin Gitlow and his fellow Bolsheviks had
plotted in 1919 In contrast, the Democrats, who represented urban
Catholic and Jewish immigrants and their descendents, feared in the year
of Knstallnachtthat Nazi-like repression might spread to America through
police and other abuses of governmental power. Ultimately, the core issue
m the 1938 debate over the exclusionary rule was whether urban Catholics
and Jews and perhaps even blacks would gain an equal share of the
American dream or whether WASP elites would keep them in subordination.
The entry into politics of today's conception of equality was marked
even more clearly by another suggested amendment to the state's Bill of
Rights. As originally proposed, the new amendment to the Bill simply
declared that "[n]o person shall be demed the equal protection of the laws
of this State or any subdivision thereof." ' I' This proposal was scarcely
debated on its way to passage, but one extraordinary speech by Senator
Robert F Wagner bears quotation at length. In a prophecy of the future
course of equal protection jurisprudence, Wagner declared:

100. The Complete Report of Mayor LaGuardia'sCommission on the Harlem Riot of
March 19, 1935, in MASS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 1, 116, 120-21 (Robert M. Fogelson &
Richard E. Rubenstein eds., 1969).
101. RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supranote 74, at 1120.
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As we reflect sorrowfully on the turn m world events
, we pose
m our own minds the essential governmentalproblem of our time. In the
18th and 19th centuries, that problem was how to establish the will of the
majority m representative government. In the world of today, the
problem is how to protect the integrity and civil liberties of minority races
and groups. The humane solution of that problem is now the supreme test
of democratic principles, the test indeed, of civilized government.
We in America have long cherished the picture of a great melting

pot.
That picture, we must all admit, is marred m this State
by
certain manifestations of racial intolerance and prejudice.
The beastly
manifestations of anti-semitism abroad are happily absent from our
national scene. We cannot, however, be blind to the forms of antisemitism prevalent at home. These manifestations have been vigorously
challenged by spokesmen of all creeds, and many notorious instances have
met with effective protest.
Far less effective in marshalling informed public opinion and suffering
from discrimination and prejudice so deep-seated as to be taken for
granted by the community at large, are the half million Negroes in the
State. 102
Wagner then graphically described the discrmmation that victimized African
Americans m New York in the 1930s, concluding that "[ifn the final analysis
the so-called Negro problem, or any other minority problem, is but another
aspect of man's eternal struggle for freedom and justice, a problem that
solves itself when democracy is extended into every phase of our material
life. "103
As of 1938, no one had yet seen the future as clearly as did Wagner in
his convention speech, but others were beginning to develop a coherent
vision. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, for example, had become "deeply
concerned about the increasing racial and religious intolerance which
seem[ed] to bedevil the world" and might "be augmented in this country"
and for this reason had thought it necessary in footnote four of Carolene
Products"° to explain that "the program of 'judicial reform"' on which the
majority of the Court had embarked in giving greater deference to legislation
would not result in diminished judicial enforcement of "the guarantees of
individual liberties."'"5 And, as we have seen, other liberal Democrats at the
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1121 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1123.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Letter from Harlan F Stone to Irving Lehman, April 26, 1938, quoted in ALPHEUS

T. MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 515 (1956).
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New York convention had expressed concerns about the danger of Nazi-like
repression, without, however, placing their concerns in as perceptive a
theoretical framework.
E. EgalitananPropagandaDunng World War I

As the 1930s drew to a close, a modem conception of equality, which
required an end to ethnic and cultural discrimination, was thus beginning
slowly to permeate the societal fabric.106 The New Deal's demand for

economic opportunity was gradually being transformed into a demand for
full legal and social equality not only for Catholic and Jewish children of

immigrants, but even, perhaps, for African Americans.

Even more

important was the impact that continuing events m Nazi Germany would
have on the development of this new egalitarian ideology Indeed, these
events were so important that their impact must be traced m detail.

One historian, at least, finds that a number of organizations, ranging
from the Foreign Language Information Service through the National
Conference of Christians and Jews to the American Jewish Committee, self-

consciously took advantage of the Nazi threat and of a growing American
interest in unity and democracy to promote their own missions.10 7 By

working together to explain to Americans "the true nature, implications,
consequences and dangers of Nazism," 08 these groups and others hoped to

bring about "the education and assimilation of all of us"'0 9 and to produce a
spirit of "unity" in which "all Americans work[ed] and liv[ed] together
harmomously""' and fully appreciated the fact "that an attack on the rights

of any one group in the county

subjects all other groups to similar

attacks.""'
106. For an example of the judiciary's growing sensitivity to issues of religious prejudice,
see Bowen v Mahoney Coal Corp., 10 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1939)
(mention of possibly prejudicial reference to opposing co-counsel being Jewish).
107 See Richard W Steele, The War on Intolerance: The Reformulation of American
Nationalism, 1939-1941, 9 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 9, 14 (1989).
108. Report from the American Jewish Committee, On Plans for 1941 (March 12, 1941)
(in folder entitled Program and Policy, 1940-42, Morris Waldman Papers, Box 34, YIVO
Institute for Jewish Research, N.Y., N.Y.).
109. Quoted in David B. Truman, A Report on Common Council for American Unity and
Recommendations (August 1946) (records of American Council for Nationalities Service,
Immigration History Research Center, St. Paul, Minn.).
110. Council for Democracy, First Annual Report 6 (October 1941) (Lowell Mellett
Papers, Box 10, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y).
111. Report from Maurice Wertheim & David Rosenblum, American Jewish Committee,
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When World War II came a few years later, government propagandists
joined in the effort and made "this a 'people's war for freedom" in a selfconscious attempt to "help clear up the alien problem, the negro problem,
the anti-Semitic problem." ' The central racial doctrines espoused by Hitler
made the propagandists' task easy by illustrating to Americans "where we
end up if we think that the shape of the nose or the color of the skin has
anything to do with human values and culture."I" Egalitarian propaganda
efforts such as these were quite successful, and it became a commonplace
that "in a commonwealth like New York, teeming with every race and
creed," every effort had to be made to undo "the existence of racial or
religious discrimination especially
[during] a war being waged to defend
the American principle that all men are entitled to equal opportunity "114 As
President Franklin D Roosevelt proclaimed, the goal of the War was to
"conquer
racial arrogances" and promote "justice
and tolerance and
1115
people.
all
good-will among
The experience of the millions who served in the military reaffirmed
what American propaganda had been saying. With an army composed of
"Yugoslavs and Frenchmen and Austrians and Czechs and Norwegians,""' 6
"the battlefield
produce[d] a brotherhood" as the "common bond of
death [drew] human beings toward each other over the artificial barriers of
rank.""7 "IT]he caldron of war," in short, tended to "dissolve

all

ethmc, class, and racial enmities. "11 Even for those, especially the young,
who stayed at home, the values proclaimed during wartime, whether or not
shaped by propaganda, left a permanent imprint on their collective psyche." 9
Defense Program, Activities and Budget 2 (October 1, 1942) (in folder entitled Program and
Policy, 1940-42, Moms Waldman Papers, Box 34, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research,
N.Y., N.Y.).
112. Letter from Ulric Bell & William B. Lewis to Archibald MacLelsh (Feb. 3, 1942),
quoted in RICHARD POLENBERG, ONE NATION DIvIsIBLE: CLASS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN
THE UNTrrED STATES SINCE 1938, at 47 (1980).
113. ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 179-

80 (1942).
114.

Wilman v. Miller, 35 N.Y.S.2d 352, 353-54 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).

115.

"Let Our HeartsBe Stout"- A Prayerby the Presidentof the United States, N.Y

TIMES, June 7, 1944, at 1.
116. JOHN HERSEY, A BELL FOR ADANO at vi (1944).
117 ERNiE PYLE, HER IsYOUR WAR 136 (1984).
118. POLENBERG, supra note 112, at 50 (1980).
119. See WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, JR., "DADDY'S GONE TO WAR"- THE SECOND WORLD
WAR INTHE LIvES OF AMrCA's CHILDREN 231-35 (1993) (describing World War I's effect
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The massive postwar American move to the suburbs ratified the war's
dissolution of ethrnc and religious barriers, at least among whites.

Old

ethnic neighborhoods in New York City were depopulated as Italians, Jews,
and Scandinavians moved to the suburbs and became each others'
neighbors.'2 Nassau County, a close suburb of New York City, furnishes

an example. The scene of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic Ku Klux Klan
activities in the 1920s,121 the county witnessed an enormous influx of
Catholics and Jews during the late 1940s and 1950s.11

The resulting

integration of cultures that occurred, together with earlier experiences in
World War II, made ethnic and cultural discrimmation appear increasingly
pernicious.
IlL GradualAssimilation: The InitialMechanism for

Ending Inequality
In short, the years immediately surrounding World War II witnessed

new societal realities and a new ideology, m which ethnic and cultural
discrimination were identified as the paradigms of inequality Elaboration
of this new understanding of inequality did not, however, automatically
generate doctrinal mechanisms for its elimination. As we shall see in the
remainder of tis Article, two dramatically different approaches for curing
inequality emerged.

This Part will elaborate the early approach that

dominated New York case law from the late 1930s into the 1960s.
This early approach, which emphasized the gradual elimination of
distinctions between the WASP mainstream and the minority victims of
ethnic and cultural discrimination followed by the eventual assimilation of
on homefront children).

120. See KENNETH T. JACKSON,

CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE

UNITED STATES 234-38, 278-82 (1985); see also POLENBERG, supra note 112, at 145.
121. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; infra notes 211-15 and accompanying
text.
122. Because census data do not report religious affiliations, the best measure of this
influx is the founding of new houses of worship - a phenomenon that is also a precondition
of suburban migration because without parishes and synagogues, Catholics and Jews would
have had to give up their faiths m order to move into the suburbs. The numbers, in fact, are
striking: more than half of all synagogues in Nassau County and approximately one-fourth of
all Roman Catholic parishes were founded between the end of World War II and the end of
the 1950s. See "THAT I MAY DWELL AMONG THEM"- A SYNAGOGUE HISTORY OF NASSAU
COUNTY (Tobie Newman & Sylvia Landow eds., 1991) [hereinafter "THAT I MAY DWELL
AMONG THEM"]; JOAN DE L. LEONARD, RICHLY BLESSED: THE DIOCESE OF ROCKVILLE
CENTRE 1957-1990, at 331-48 (1991).
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the minorities into the mainstream, did not emerge fullblown overnight.
Three distinct steps, each of which must be examined in some detail, led to
the elaboration of this gradualist, assimilationist approach to equality First,
in the 1940s and even into the early 1950s, New York courts refused to hold
that individual victims of ethnic or cultural discriunation possessed a
judicially enforceable right to immediate equal treatment. Next, the
judiciary began to protect minority institutions, especially churches,
synagogues, and parochial schools m order to ensure the inclusion of the
institutions, and the people belonging to them, in all communities in the
state. Finally, the judiciary made it clear that minorities were entitled to
inclusion into the mainstream only after they had abandoned their own
discordant values and accepted mainstream culture.
A. Early JudicialResistance to the Recognition of Rights
Even as the link between urban immigrant groups and politicallythreatening speech grew increasingly attenuated and new attitudes toward
those groups emerged, New York's judges continued to pursue familiar
patterns of repressing speech and political activity that they found even
minimally threatening to the maintenance of social stability Consider, for
example, People v Vogt," a 1942 case in which the defendant had made the
following statement at a bar and grill to "a uniformed sailor in the United
States Navy"' 4 "What are you doing, fighting? And what are you fighting
for? This is a capitalistic war. Why do you want to go out there and fight
for a bunch of capitalists? Hitler wants his 'new order,' and Roosevelt has
a 'New Deal.' What have you to choose from?"'11 The sailor to whom these
words were addressed immediately and without incident "walked away from
the defendant," but, shortly thereafter, another man who had overheard the
conversation "called a police officer, and caused the defendant's arrest."126
These facts created an analytical problem for the court. Because there
was no evidence of any violence or threat of violence at the bar and grill, the
Supreme Court's rationale in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire27 authorizing
punishment for fighting words could not provide any basis for Vogt's
conviction. The court had to find some other ground on which to rest his
123.
124.
125.
126.

34 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County 1942).
People v. Vogt, 34 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County 1942).
Id.
Id.

127

315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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guilt. In fact, the court did find another ground when it explained, "[c]ourts
may place an mjunction upon the public expression of seditious
statements m a tme of war and of national danger which incite or tend to
"128
incite disloyalty
Almost a decade later a plurality of the Supreme Court, in Dennis v
United States,129 another case arising out of New York, agreed. Speaking

for the plurality, Chief Justice Vinson "reject[ed] any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution" and expressed
no doubt that it was "within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended
to overthrow the Government by force and violence."' 30 In concurring
opinions, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson likewise refused to "hold that the

First Amendment deprive[d] Congress of what it deemed necessary for the
Government's protection" or to "doubt that Congress has power to make"
criminal "advocating or teaching overthrow of government by force or
violence. "131 It thus seems clear that if seditious speech posed even the slight
threat to law and order that Vogt's did in the New York bar and grill in 1942
or that the Communist Party's did in America in 1951, judges were willing
2
to repress it. 11
The Vogt and Dennis cases were not, of course, alone. In In re
Albertson,"' the New York Court of Appeals held that because the
Communist Party had been declared illegal, the Party would not be permitted

to pay unemployment taxes for its office staff and other workers, 134 even
though its employees could collect unemployment compensation if they
found themselves unemployed.' 35 There was also a long line of well-known
128. Vogt, 34 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
129. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
130. Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (Vinson, C.J., plurality).
concurring); accord
131. Id. at 551 (Frankfurter, J.,concurring); id. at 570 (Jackson, J.,
United States v Lebron, 222 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 876 (1955); cf.
United States v Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir.) (holding statute that forbade
communication of secret material connected with national defense to foreign governments valid
under First Amendment), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
132. But see Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1950); ACLU v
Town of Cortlandt, 109 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1951) (striking
down as unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that prohibited "assemblies for the purpose of
breaking down law enforcement").
133. 8 N.Y.2d 77, 168 N.E.2d 242 (1960).
134. In re Albertson, 8 N.Y.2d 77, 82-84, 168 N.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1960), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Communist Party, USA v. Catherwood, 367 U.S. 389 (1961).
135. Id. at 82, 168 N.E.2d at 243. This was probably neither the first nor the last time
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cases upholding denaturalizations and job deprivations on account of
Commniumst affiliations or refusals to answer questions about such affiliations. 3"' 6 The same had earlier been true with regard to Nazi affiliations.' 37

Criminal convictions were also upheld in picketing cases. In one such
case, a group carrying placards declaring "No American shall die for
Churchill's empire" and "No American Sweat Blood and Tears for a
Churchill's World War 3," picketed City Hall during Winston Churchill's
attendance at a 1946 official reception. 3

In another case, a trial judge

convicted two Puerto Ricans for picketing the United Nations and distributing leaflets which declared that the United States had "committed the crime

of genocide" in Puerto Rico, although the Court of Appeals ultimately
reversed. 39 Likewise, a lower court repressed speech when it upheld the
refusal of the Yonkers Board of Education to allow the Yonkers Committee
for Peace to meet m a public school building.'"
41
People v Feiner,1
I believe, can also be seen in the context outlined
above as a case affirming the right of "the State
[to] protect and preserve

that the State of New York found itself subsidizing what it disapproved.
136. See Lerner v Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Damman v. Board of Higher
Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954), rev'd in part sub nom. Slochower v Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Adler v. Wilson, 123 N.Y.S.2d 655 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1953); Thompson v. Wallin, 95 N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 3d Dep't), af4'd, 301 N.Y 476,
95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), ff'd sub nom., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Carey
v Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 178 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aft'd, 6
N.Y.2d 934, 161 N.E.2d 216 (1959); cf. Austin v. Board of Higher Educ., 5 N.Y.2d 430,
158 N.E.2d 681 (1959) (no back pay if reinstated in job); Peters v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 307 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E.2d 529 (1954) (possible loss of public housing); Reiter v.
American Legion, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County) (loss of membership m American
Legion), af4'd, 75 N.Y.S.2d 530 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1947), appeal demed, 77 N.Y.S.2d 391
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 1948). But cf. Hamilton v Brennan, 119 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y
County 1953) (holding that mere sigmng of Communist Party nominating petition is not
enough to justify withholding public job).
137 See United States v. Hauck, 155 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that inquiry about
Nazi afiliation was constituional and relevant m action to cancel naturalization certificates for
fraud); cf. Long v. Somervell, 22 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1940) (involving
employee discharged for refusing to sign statement denying Nazi affiliation), aft'd, 27
N.Y.S.2d 445 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1941).
138. See People v. Nahman, 298 N.Y. 95, 100, 81 N.E.2d 36, 36 (1948).
139. See People v. Carcel, 150 N.Y.S.2d 436, 437 (Magis. Ct. N.Y County 1956),
rev'd, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 144 N.E.2d 81 (1957).
140. See Ellis v Dixon, 118 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1953).
141. 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950).

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (1995)

its existence." 42 Although Femer's conviction was upheld both by the Court
of Appeals and by the United States Supreme Court on the finding that Is
street-corner speech threatened to provoke violence, it has always been
difficult to distingish Feiner on that ground from its compamon case of
Kunz v New York, 143 which reversed the conviction of a speaker whose
street-corner antics had m, in fact, led to "trouble."'" Perhaps what
distinguished the cases was the content of what the speakers said. 45 As we

shall see in discussing the case below,'" Kunz did not attack the government.
Femer, however, did. He called the mayor of Syracuse "'a champaign [sic]
sipping bum and President Truman a bum,""' 47 and, even worse, he "said

that the Negro people did not have equal rights and that they should rise up
in arms and fight for them."14 In addition to attacking government officials,
Femer basically called for a form of political action that some judges, in light
of past and future race riots, might have found threatening to public order.
Such an effort to induce the most repressed of American underclasses to rise
up and subvert the established structure of authority simply could not be

tolerated m the name of free speech values.
142. People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 401, 91 N.E.2d 316, 320 (1950), fft'd, 340 U.S.
315 (1951).
143. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
144. People v Kunz, 300 N.Y 273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1949).
145. I fully appreciate the inconsistency of such an interpretation with the central canon
of today's First Amendment jurisprudence. Judges during the 1940s and 1950s did, however,
exclude broad categories of speech, such as commercial speech, from First Amendment
protection - an exclusion that has since come to be seen as content-based discrimination. See
Limmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977). For New York cases denying
constitutional protection to commercial speech, see Gold Sound, Inc. v City of New York,
89 N.Y.S.2d 860, 866 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1949); People v LaRollo, 24 N.Y.S.2d 350,
354 (Magis. Ct. Bronx County 1940); see also Christie v 46th Street Theatre Corp., 39
N.Y.S.2d 454 (App. Div 3d Dep't 1942) (regulating commercial speech by sustaining
legislation in apparent context in which theater sought to exclude critic from performance),
af'd, 292 N.Y 520, 54 N.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 323 U.S. 710 (1944). Another case in
which New York judges approved regulation of press coverage was United Press Ass'ns v.
Valente, 120 N.Y.S.2d 174, 180 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1953) (upholding exclusion of press
from criminal trial because newspapers and members of public had no implied remedy under
statute), af'd, 308 N.Y 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). But courts would not permit regulation
of political speech under the guise of commercial speech. Cf. People v Skottedal, 104
N.Y.S.2d 583 (Suffolk County Ct. 1951).
146. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
147 People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 395, 90 N.E.2d 316, 317 (1950), aft'd, 340 U.S.
315 (1951).
148. Id. at 396, 90 N.E.2d at 317
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Judges m the 1940s and 1950s were thus no more prepared than their
predecessors to protect the right of minorities to freedom of expression.
Similarly, New York judges were unwilling to create judicially enforceable
equality rights that would provide racial, religious, and ethnic underclasses
with immunity from discrimnation.
Although the judges remained
sympathetic to the goal of equality and would usually enforce legislation
designed to effectuate that goal, they proved unwilling to grant individual
plaintiffs specific rights of equality with others.
In one 1937 case, for example, a resident brought suit to keep a black
purchaser out of his residential subdivision by enforcing a covenant
attached to the land that prohibited ownership by African-Americans.149
Deciding against the black purchaser, 5 0 the court granted enforcement of
the covenant because "the issues in the case [did] not warrant the discussion
of abstract social theories," but only "whether a contractual duty,
knowingly and voluntarily assumed, [could] be enforced.""' The result
was the same in two virtually identical cases brought during the next
decade when, paradoxically, the use of restrictive covenants to exclude
both racial and religious groups from new residential subdivisions was, in
fact, on the rise.152 Although the more extensive of the two opimons
recognized that "[d]istinctions based on color and ancestry [were] utterly
inconsistent with . [the] traditions and ideals" for which Americans had
just been "waging war,"' both judges, as late as one year before the
Supreme Court decided Shelley v Kraemer," relied on precedents holding
that enforcement of racially restrictive covenants involved only private and
not state action and therefore was not subject to the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 As one judge observed, he was "constrained to
149.

Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N.Y.S. 936, 939-40 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County

1937).
150. Id. at 943.
151. Id.
152. See John P Dean, Only Caucasian:A Study of Race Covenants, 23 J. LAND & PUB.

UTiL. ECON. 428, 429-31 (1947) (providing data that attests to rapid spread of race covenants
during 1940s).

153. Kemp v. Rubin, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. Queens County) (quoting
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)), aft'd, 75
N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1947), rev'd, 298 N.Y 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948).
154. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
155. See Kemp, 69 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. Queens County), aff'd, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1947); Duty v. Neely, 69 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1942).
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follow precedent" despite his own "sentiments," 6 especially because bills
to overturn the precedents had been introduced m the legislature but not yet
enacted. 157 The court did "not feel that it should judicially legislate by
reading into the statutes something which the Legislature itself ha[d] failed
58
to adopt."
A 4-3 majority of the Court of Appeals took essentially the same view
in the leading case of Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp.,'59 which was
decided one year after Shelley Despite the fact that Stuyvesant Town had
assembled its land through use of the eminent domain power and had
received tax exemptions on its buildings for twenty-five years, the court held
it to be a purely private entity left free to discriminate under the state action
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 The majority expressed its
concern that "[tiax exemption and power of eminent domain [were] freely
given to many organizations which necessarily limit[ed] their benefits to a
would
restricted group" and worried that a "grave and delicate problem
be posed if we were to characterize the rental policy of respondents as
governmental action. "161 The court also noted that legislation to prohibit the
discrimination occurring in the case had been introduced in the legislature,
but had been defeated. 62 That fact, indeed, had led the trial judge in the
case to declare that, although "from a sociological point of view, a policy of
exclusion and discrimmation on account of race, color, creed or religion
[was] undesirable," the ultimate "wisdom of the policy" was "a matter for
the Legislature," and courts could "not usurp the function of the Legislature"
by adding provisions that "the Legislature [had] refused to enact.""
In his dissent, Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld noted that the
tenants of Stuyvesant Town gained "tremendous advantages in modem
housing
at rentals far below those charged in purely private develop156. Kemp, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
157 Id. at 685.
158. Id. Kemp was reversed only when the U.S. Supreme Court reached the opposite
result. See Shelley v Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y 590, 81
N.E.2d 325 (1948).
159. 299 N.Y 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949).
160. Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y 512, 536, 87 N.E.2d 541, 551 (1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
161. Id. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551.
162. See id. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 549.
163. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 74 N.Y.S.2d 220, 226 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County
1947), aff'd in part and dismissed in part,299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950).
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ments." Because "Negroes as well as white people" had "contributed"
through higher taxation to make such low rents possible, they were, he
added, entitled to "share in the benefits."" 6 Failure to give them their
share amounted to a "[d]istinction
between citizens solely because of
their ancestry," which was by its "very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality "165
In two other important cases in the 1940s, challenges to possibly
discriminatory rulings of public bodies were equally unsuccessful. In
Goldstein v Mills,166 the plaintiff challenged the New York City Tax
Commission's grant of tax exemption to Columbia Umversity The suit
rested on a statutory provision that prohibited discrimination by nonsectarian schools and colleges in the admission of students.167 The plaintiff
Goldstein's specific charge was that the New York City Tax Commission
had failed to find Columbia innocent of discrimnation. Everyone knew,
of course, that Columbia like most other colleges and umversities did
discriminate, especially against Jews, but occasionally against other groups
such as Italian Catholics as well. 68 Nicholas Murray Butler, who was still
president of Columbia at the time of Goldstein, had earlier imposed quotas
that had the effect of reducing Jews from forty to twenty percent of the
student body 169 Moreover, at the time Goldstein filed his suit, a committee of the American Dental Association was accusing Columbia's Dental
School of admitting too many Jewish students, 7 ' and the Columbia
admimstration had decided to merge the Dental School, which had no

164. Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 545, 87 N.E.2d at 557 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 536, 87 N.E.2d at 551 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,

100 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)).
166. 57 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1945).
167 Goldstein v. Mills, 57 N.Y.S.2d 810, 814-15 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1945), af'd,
62 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1946).
168. Paradoxically, discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds had increased between
the mid-1930s and the late 1940s. See AMERICAN JEWISH YEARBOOK: VOLUME 50 (5709)

1948-1949, at 768 (Harry Schneiderman & Moms Fine eds., 1949); Commission on Law and
Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, "Dr. Howard E. Wilson's Report to the New
York State Board of Regents on the Admissions Practices of the Nine New York State Medical
Schools," 18 (July 1953) (manuscript in Blaustem Library, American Jewish Committee, New
York, N.Y.).
169. See E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND
CASTE INAMERICA 211 (1964).
170. See A.D.A. Head Assails Report by Horner, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 9, 1945, at 32.
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quota, into the Medical School, which did have one."' Dental School
alumni were publicly complaining that the purpose of the merger was "to
establish a quota system for dental students restricting Jewish students,""7
and the American Jewish Committee had launched a nationwide campaign
against quotas that discriminated against Jewish and Catholic applicants. 7 3
Meanwhile, a group of educators had asked President Roosevelt to appoint
a committee to work toward the elimination of "quotas and other forms of
racial and religious discrimiations m the nation's colleges," wich one
member of the group had condemned as a "'Nazi practice.'"'

Nonetheless,

the Goldstein case was dismissed on various procedural grounds, among
them that the plaintiff had failed to allege that Columbia had a discriminatory
admissions policy
Another case, Marburg v Cole,17 which perhaps involved antiSemitism m the form of hostility toward Jewish refugees fleeing from
Hitler,176 reached the Court of Appeals m 1941. The court, however,
declined to overturn the refusal of the Commissioner of Education to endorse
an Austrian medical license and thereby permit medical practice in New
York by its holder, who had been Director of the Neurological Institute at
the University of Vienna from 1919 until he fled the Nazis m 1938. Upon
his arrival in New York, he had been appointed Clinical Professor of
Neurology at Columbia and Research Neuropathologist at Monteflore
Hospital. Dr. Marburg, as Judge Desmond noted m his dissent, was
"unquestionably the most prominent of recent emigres" and allowing hinm to
practice would not "let [ ] down any bars or mak[e] possible any great inrush
of emigre physicians."'" Still the Commissioner of Education would not
permit him to practice, and the court sustained the Commissioner's refusal.
People v Bell 7 ' followed Marburg. Four African-American males
were arrested at a suburban railroad station for loitering and later convicted
171. See ColumbiaMerger IsLinked to Fund, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1945, at 19; Dentists
ProtestColumbia Merger, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 8, 1945, at 21.
172. ColumbiaMerger Is Linked to Fund, supra note 171.
173. See NAOMI W COHEN, NOT FREE TO DESIST: THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMM=ITEE,
1906-1966, at 409-11 (1972).
174. Benjamin Fine, EducatorsFight College Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1945, at 32.

175.
176.
calls the
177
178.

286 N.Y 202, 36 N.E.2d 113 (1941).
On the existence of such hostility, see POLENBERG, supra note 112, at 41-42, which
hostility anti-Semitic; see also NEVINS, supra note 14, at 199-200.
Marburg v Cole, 286 N.Y 202, 214-15, 36 N.E.2d 113, 119 (1941).
125 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1953).
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a municipal court on evidence that, after they had been m the station for
thirty-five minutes, they falsely told the police that they had just arrived.
Defense counsel argued "that the defendants were deied equal protection"
in that they "were selected for prosecution 'for reason of the color of their
skin' and that the case ha[d] 'racial discrimination overtones,"' but the
county judge hearing the initial appeal found the defense lawyers to be
"consumed
with indignation over this fancied issue" and also found
"nothing in the record" to support "these serious and startling charges. "179
Although the defendants had plainly violated the loitering ordinance, which
defined the offense as mere presence without a satisfactory explanation, the
county judge reversed their conviction by construing the ordinance as not
applying to "those who are guilty of mere lassitude or indolence, those
overcome by a normal weariness, or indeed those of our citizens who
consider themselves students of human nature and who use station waiting
rooms as their laboratory "I'
The Court of Appeals agreed that the ordinance did not apply to people
present in a station
in

in order to meet or to speed the departure of others, to obtain
information concerning trams, to purchase tickets, to check or call for
baggage or parcels, to buy tobacco, newspapers, magazines or other
articles from concessionaires, to use the toilets for purposes for which
they [were] intended, or to be present on other errands whose
legitimacy can be decided as the case arises.'l
On the contrary, the ordinance had been passed
to prevent persons from infesting subway, elevated or other railway
stations who have no occasion to be there. The danger to the public
is well understood which arises from the congregation of nondescript
characters at such locations, particularly at night, where degenerates,
or even "boisterous, noisy cut-ups," as they are called in the opinion
of the County Court, may easily become anything from a public
nuisance to a serious menace.18

179.
110, 115
180.
181.
182.

People v. Bell, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County), aff'd, 306 N.Y
N.E.2d 821 (1953).
Id. at 119.
Bell, 306 N.Y at 113-14, 115 N.E.2d at 822.
Id. at 113, 115 N.E.2d at 822.
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On the basis of this bright line distinction, the court found the ordinance "not
so vague or indefinite as to render [it] void," and further held that there was
no evidence that the defendants had violated it. 83
The Bell case strikes me as one m which judges, themselves guilty of
egregious racial stereotyping in the reference, for example, to those "guilty
of mere lassitude or mdolence," were unwilling either to condemn such
racism or to allow it to serve as a basis for formal government action. Thus,
they invalidated particular acts of police racism while at the same time
protesting that they were doing no such thing. By such behavior, the judges
were able to achieve justice m the Bell case itself and perhaps even to send
an inarticulate message to police forces to alter their practices. Nonetheless,
it must be noted that the New York courts explicitly refused to recognize the
existence of racism and likewise refused to create an individual constitutional
right to seek judicial relief if one were cast into a subordinate status or
otherwise victimized as a result of racial discrimination.
In sum, the early response of the New York courts to lawsuits brought
to outlaw racism and analogous ethnic and religious discrimination was not
especially uplifting. Although something had happened in the years
immediately surrounding World War II to induce victims of discrimination
to demand judicial relief against the various mechanisms of subordination
used by elites to preserve their hegemony, New York's judges turned a deaf
ear to their complaints. Obviously those judges were aware of the history
of subordination that African Americans, Catholics, and Jews had suffered
and the continuing efforts of some to keep them subordinate. In cases in
which the legislature had created a specific remedy against discrimination,
the courts would dutifully give it effect, 8" and they would also do ad hoc
justice in random cases like Bell. But throughout the 1940s and into the
1950s the New York courts consistently refused to elaborate any legally
enforceable right to equality to which individuals could turn in a search for
judicial relief if they found themselves victims of discrimination or
subordination in the world of prejudice that still surrounded them.

183. Id. at 113-14, 115 N.E.2d at 822.
184. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 293 N.Y 315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944) (holding
that legislation prohibiting discrimination by labor unions on grounds of race, color, or creed
mvalidated provision in association's constitution limiting membership to whites and American
Indians), 4f'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218
(Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1959) (upholding priority of New York's anti-discrimination
legislation over Saudi Arabian anti-Semitism in hirings by Arabian-American Oil Company),
af4'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788 (1961).
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B. Providing Spacefor Minonty Institutions
Although the New York courts refused to respond to mequality by
creating a legalistic right to equality that subordinated groups or individuals
could use to obtain judicial relief, they were frequently prepared to adopt an
alternative approach that achieved at least religious equality without
proclaiming it. In the context of religion, the approach was to confer special
rights and a special status not merely on Judaism and Catholicism, but on all
religion'" - a status that m large part rendered all religion immune from
state power and thereby gave minority religions space within which to
flourish.
This move toward granting a special status to religion began quite
hesitantly and confusedly, however. In one of the earliest cases, People ex
86
the New York Court of Appeals confronted "a
rel. Fish v Sandstrom,"

associated with, the religious order
young girl thirteen years of age
known as Jehovah's Witnesses" who persisted in coming to school every
morning but, once there, refused to take part in "a simple ceremony of
with the other scholars."'8 For her refusal, her parents
saluting the flag
were convicted of violating the provision of the State Education Law
requiring them to send her to school.
Before the Court of Appeals, the parents argued that requiring their
daughter to salute the flag violated the free exercise clause of the state
constitution. Judge Irving Lehman agreed. Although he found "it difficult
to understand how any reasonable and well-disposed person can object to
such a salute on religious or other grounds, ''18 the fact was that "this little
child has been taught to believe otherwise."' 89 Judge Lehman then
continued:
to inculcate love of
The legitimate purpose of the salute to the flag is
country and reverence for the things which the flag represents; it may be
an aid in teaching good citizenship - but surely not where a little child
185. For two cases indicative of the special status granted even to very small religious
organizations, see O'Neill v Hubbard, 40 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1943)
(striking down as unconstitutional recent legislation that had permitted only clergymen
affiliated with religion listed in last federal census to perform marriages); In re Saunders
(Hubbard), 37 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942) (same).
186. 279 N.Y 523, 18 N.E.2d 840 (1939).
187 People ax rel. Fish v Sandstrom, 279 N.Y 523, 527-28, 18 N.E.2d 840, 841-42
(1939) (Lehman, J., concurring).
188. Id. at 534, 18 N.E.2d at 845.
189. Id. at 536, 18 N.E.2d at 845.
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is compelled in fear and trembling to join m an act which her conShe does not refuse to show love and
science tells her is wrong.
respect for the flag.
She asks only that she not be compelled to
recur the wrath of her God by disobedience to His commands. The flag
salute would lose no digmty or worth if she were permitted to refrain
from joining m it. On the contrary, that would be an impressive lesson
for her and the other children that the flag salute stands for absolute
freedom of conscience.
The salute of the flag is a gesture of love and respect - fine when
there is real love and respect back of the gesture. The flag is dishonored by a salute by a child in reluctant and terrified obedience to a
command of a secular authority which clashes with the dictates of
consicence. The flag "cherished by all our hearts" should not be soiled
by the tears of a little child. The Constitution does not permit, and the
legislature never intended, that the flag should be so soiled and
dishonored."9

The majority of the court agreed that "saluting a flag, even an American
flag, [was] of little vital force to the nation unless behind it there is a love
and reverence for the things it represents," 191 and hence it wondered whether
there might not be "a better way for accomplishing the purposes of this law
than immediate resort to disciplinary measures."192 Writing for the majority,
Chief Judge Crane expressed a hope that, if "our fine educational system"
more upon instruction than mere blind obedience,"
placed its "emphasis
and she will be glad
the child would develop "a reverence for our flag
that it is still here to salute. "193 Crane thereupon proceeded to reverse the
conviction of the parents on the ground that they had not failed to send their
daughter to school, as the lower court had found. But on behalf of the
majority, he refused to declare that the legislature lacked constitutional
power to enact a mandatory flag salute statute if it chose to do so.
This same hesitancy about creating constitutional rights also appeared
in cases dealing with religious tax exemptions. Thus, some early cases
continued to adhere to the traditional principle that religious "[e]xemptions
from taxation
[were] to be strictly construed" and granted only if "such
clearly appears to have been the intention of the Legislature. "' I As a result,

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 538-39, 18 N.E.2d at 846-47
Id. at 532, 18 N.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 533, 18 N.E.2d at 844.
Id. at 532-33, 18 N.E.2d at 844.
People ex rel. Unity Congregational Soc'y v Mills, 71 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (Sup.
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entities having both social and religious purposes were denied196exemption 195
along with properties used for both religious and other ends.
Nonetheless, without making any explicit declaration, judges began to

display some awareness that denials of tax exempt status might reflect
religious bias and to act accordingly Thus, one judge granted an exemption
to a Christian summer camp for boys,"9 while someone else in the late 1940s

published a decision from 1920 that had accorded exemption to a Christian
conference center. 9 Likewise an interfaith group consisting of Protestants,
Catholics, and Jews associated with Hunter College, which was organized
to "foster
religious idealism in the students and to serve the educational,
spiritual, charitable and social needs of the students
, without discrimi-

nation," was able to obtain an exemption when it purchased the Sarah
Delano Roosevelt House from President Roosevelt and devoted it to the

quoted purpose.' 99
But substantial change m the willingness of judges to grant tax
exemptions to minority religious institutions came only in the case of
Williams Institutional ColoredMethodist Episcopal Chruch v City of New

York.' ° In Williams, the city maintained its right to tax on the ground that
the church property was owned by an out-of-state corporation - namely, the
parent church - and that only in-state entities could receive exemption.

Suspecting, I believe, that adoption of such a rule would penalize a number
Ct. N.Y County 1947).
195. See In re Pereira, 55 N.Y.S.2d 628 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1945); Great Neck Section,
Nat'l Council of Jewish Women, Inc. v. Board of Assessors, 189 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1959); In re Peace Haven, The House of the New Commandment, R.F.M.M.
Retreat, Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1941).
196. See Interstate Lien Corp. v. St. Paul's African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church of
Buffalo, 91 N.Y.S.2d 228 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1949); In re New York Conference Ass'n of
Seventh Day Adventists, 87 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1949); People ex rel.
Autokefalos Orthodox Spiritual Church of St. George, the Tropeophoros v Hallahan, 105
N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1948), af4'd, 105 N.Y.S.2d 980 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1951); People ex rel. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Mastin, 80 N.Y.S.2d 323
(Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1948); New York Catholic Protectory v City of New York, 23
N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1940).
197 See Christian Camps, Inc. v. Village of Speculator, 88 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div
3d Dep't 1949).
198. See Silver Bay Ass'n for Christian Conferences & Training v Braisted, 80
N.Y.S.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1920).
199. Hunter College Student Soc. Community & Religious Clubs Ass'n v. City of New
York, 63 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338-39 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1946).
200. 89 N.Y.S.2d 300 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1949).
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of African-American ecclesiastical groups, the appellate division rejected the
city's argument and instead enunciated a general principle that to "exempt"
all church "property from taxation [was] 'scarcely less the duty than the
privilege of the enlightened legislator.""' In reliance upon the Williams
rationale, another case then ruled that property held in New York for the
purpose of carrying on overseas missionary work was also exempt. In the
judge's view, Williams and other cases revealed "the modem trend of
thought," which prohibited taxing authorities from reading "into the statute
exempting a non-profit 'charitable corporation' their version of who are to
be the objects of its bounty or where its bounty is to be dispensed." '
Charity, according to this judge, was "not provincial," and it knew "no
boundaries or classes. "20 Coming as close as any to explicitly recognizing
the existence of discrimnation and the danger of subordination, this last case
demanded respect for all claims of religious tax exemption.
Comparable developments occurred in the law of zoning. On the one
hand, there remained an occasional case in which a court upheld a decision
by zomng authorities that was contrary to the interests of religious mstitutions.20 4 On the other hand, the facts of a number of cases suggested that
denials of zoning requests by religious institutions had occurred in the face
of discrimmation; m such cases, although discrimination was neither proved
nor judicially found, the courts had no difficulty declaring actions by zoning
authorities invalid. In one lower court case, for example, a judge found a
municipal ordinance "arbitrary and discriminatory m that it exclude[d]
churches and places of public worship although permitting uses including
village and municipal buildings, railroad stations, public schools and club
houses which
entail[ed] in an equal or greater degree" the same results
that might flow from "the erection of a church. "°5 Likewise, an ordinance
that "precluded" a church-related college "from erecting any school building
in the entire village
, while boardinghouses, multifamily houses,
hospitals and hotels may be erected," although "schools and churches may
201. Williams Institutional Colored Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New York,
89 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1949), aft'd, 300 N.Y 716, 92 N.E.2d 58
(1950).
202. People ex reL Near E. Found. v Boyland, 106 N.Y.S.2d 736, 740-41 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y County 1951).
203. Id. at 740.
204. See Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Board of Appeals of Greece, 60 N.Y.S.2d 750
(App. Div 4th Dep't 1946).
205. North Shore Unitarian Soc'y v Village of Plandome, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1951).
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not," was declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals. 2 6 As another
judge observed in a suit arising out of tie proposed construction of a school
attached to the New Hyde Park Jewish Center, "[n]o difference can be
perceived in relation to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
community by permitting public schools and not parochial schools. " 7
The cases culminated in two inportant 1956 decisions by the Court of
Appeals - Community Synagogue v Bates2o and Diocese of Rochester v
PlanningBoard.1 9 The significance of the cases, as well as their interconnection, is emphasized by the fact that the New York State Catholic Welfare
Committee appeared as amicus curiae in support of the synagogue in the first
case, while the American Jewish Congress appeared as amicus in support of
the diocese in the second. Both cases involved analogous attempts by
established suburban communities to which Catholics and Jews had migrated
m large numbers since World War II to prevent the religious newcomers
from building facilities of worship within their borders and thereby to slow
the newcomers' influx. In Bates, the community sought to prevent a Reform
congregation from purchasing and renovating a twenty-four acre estate that
had been used since 1941 as a home for French sailors, as a merchant
marine rehabilitation center, and as a U.S. Navy Officer's Club.21° In
Diocese of Rochester, the town wished to prevent construction of a Roman
Catholic church and school on "the only suitable property found to be
centrally.located and available" in a portion of town where the population
had "been rapidly increasing" to some 23,000 people, of whom about 6,000
were Catholic."'
Anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism lurked just below the surface m
both cases. The first case occurred in a county where Jews had been
206. Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y 189, 192-93, 93 N.E.2d 632, 634
(1950); accordIn re LaPorte, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1956), t'd, 2 N.Y.2d
721, 141 N.E.2d 917 (1957).
207 Hoelzer v. Incorporated Village of New Hyde Park, 150 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1956) (sustaining amendment to village ordinance that permitted erection
of parochial schools); see also Titus St. Paul Property Owners Ass'n v Board of Zoning
Appeals of Irondequoit, 132 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1954) (upholding
construction of synagogue); In re American Seminary of the Bible, Inc., 104 N.Y.S.2d 660
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (barrng construction of gas station adjacent to seminary).
208. 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488 (1956).
209. 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
210. Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 449, 136 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1956).
211. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 514, 136 N.E.2d 827, 829

(1956).
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kidnapped by Klansmen, 212 where "restricted" commumties with few
Jewish families existed into the 1950s, 213 and where synagogues had been
burned by arsonists or defaced by swastikas. 214 Thus, it takes little
imagination to find anti-Semitism in a chain of events that began when
neighbors sued on alleged restrictive covenants to prevent the Community
Synagogue from buying one piece of land, continued when the Village
Board then adopted a zoning ordinance restricting religious uses after the
Synagogue had decided to buy an existing estate, and ended when, after the
repeal of the restrictive ordinance, village authorities still refused to issue
a certificate of occupancy for the synagogue. 215 At least one resident of the
village, Averill Harriman, in the midst of his successful campaign for
unjust, intolerable
governor, found these actions "hasty and shocking
and un-American" 216 and, although he never explicitly said so, probably
prejudiced as well.
In a similar vein, the Diocese of Rochester sensed danger in the
upstate town of Brighton that zoning restrictions might be used "to permit
a new church of denomination A and to forbid a new church of denommation B, or to allow denomination A to build a church in a desirable
residential location while denomination B was relegated to the wrong side
of the tracks. "217 In its amicus brief, the American Jewish Congress
similarly took note of the danger that a "person or class of persons" might
be "singled out as a special subject for hostile and discriminatory legislation. "218
Needless to say, the Court of Appeals annulled the actions of both
municipal bodies. According to the court, a zoning ordinance could "not
wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any residential district, "219 nor
could it "exclude private or parochial schools from any residential area

212. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
213. See Synagogue Loses L.L Zoning Plea, N.Y TiMES, July 15, 1956, at 33.
214. See "THAT I MAY DWELL AMONG THEM," supra note 122, at 11, 20, 54.
215. See id. at 134-35.
216. Policy of Neglect Chargedto GOP, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 3, 1954, at 37
217 Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 48, Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., I
N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
218. Brief for American Jewish Congress, Amicus Curiae at 25, Diocese of Rochester
v Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
219. Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 522, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834
(1956) (emphasis added).
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where public schools are permitted."I The court, in particular, rejected
the argument of the Brighton Planning Board that new churches should not
be built m areas that were "almost completely built up," but rather should
be constructed only "in areas where future residential development could
accommodate itself to a church," a rule with which all previously built
churches had complied." Although the court did not say so, it must have
recogmzed how such a proposal would disadvantage Catholic and Jewish
institutions, winch m the mid-1950s were in the process of following their
people to the suburbs, while having much less impact on Protestant
entities, most of which were already well-established.
Just as it had m People v Bell, however, the Court of Appeals refused
to pay heed explicitly to the reality of discrimination aimed at keeping
African-Americans, Catholics, and Jews in positions of subordination and
refused to decide the cases before it by granting subordinated individuals
or groups a right to equality Instead, the court established a broad
principle of religious autonomy that "terminated the interference of public
authorities with free and unhandicapped exercise of religion"' by making
it impossible for "a mumcipal ordinance to be so construed that it would
appear in any manner to interfere with the 'free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship.'"'I
The New York Court of Appeals reiterated this principle periodically
in a long line of tax exemption and zoning cases in the years that followed.
In People ex rel. Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc. v Hanng,224
which involved an issue of tax exemption for real property owned by
another frequent victim of discrimnation - the Jehovah's Witnesses, the
local assessors came as close as any litigant in the period ever did to
proclaiming their discriminatory biases openly They attempted to defend
their denial of an exemption on the ground that "the somewhat rudimentary
training of those Witnesses and the unorthodox character of their religious
beliefs and practices remove[d] them from the beneficent aim and coverage
of" the state's tax exemption legislation.? Although it would have been
220. Id.

221. Id.
222. Community Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 458, 136 N.E.2d 488, 496 (1956).
223. Id.
224. 8 N.Y.2d 350, 170 N.E.2d 677 (1960).
225. People ax rel. Wachtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Hanng, 8 N.Y.2d 350, 359,
170 N.E.2d 677, 681 (1960).
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easy for the Court of Appeals to respond to this argument with a powerful
declaration of the unconstitutionality of subordinating the religiously
unorthodox, no one on the court took that approach. Instead, the
unaniuous opinion authored by the chief judge reached the right result of
exempting the Witnesses by intoning a paean to all religion. The court
declared:
The policy of the law has been, m this State from an early day, to
encourage, foster and protect corporate institutions of religious
character, because the religious, moral and intellectual culture afforded
by them were deemed, as they are m fact, beneficial to the public,
necessary to the advancement of civilization, and the promotion of the
welfare of society 226
Nine years later the court again reiterated that "[flirmly embedded in the law
of this State
is the doctrine that real property owned by a religious
corporation and used exclusively for religious purposes is exempt from
taxation," 7 and in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the
United States Supreme Court agreed that "[flew concepts [were] more deeply
embedded m the fabric of our national life. "22
The judiciary's approach of according special status to all religionF9
rather than merely preventing the subordination of unpopular religions had
significant effects on doctrine. For example, it altered the meaning of
statutory language which required that property be "used exclusively" for
religious purposes in order to gain exemption.32 0 Although earlier cases had
relied on this language to deny exemptions for property used in part for
nonreligious purposes, cases by the end of the 1960s were holding that the
226. Id. at 357, 170 N.E.2d at 680.
227 Walz v Tax Comm'n of New York, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 30-31, 246 N.E.2d 517, 517
(1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); cf. 64th St. Residences, Inc. v City of New York, 173
N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1957) (church may purchase from municipality land
taken by eminent domain as part of urban redevelopment project), aft'd, 170 N.Y.S.2d 993
(App. Div 1st Dep't), af4d, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 150 N.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907
(1958).
228. Walz v Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
229. Courts did tighten up somewhat their definition of what constituted a religion. See
Swedenborg Found., Inc. v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 87, 351 N.E.2d 702 (1976); American
Bible Soc'y v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 78, 351 N.E.2d 697 (1976); In re Religious Soc'y of
Families, 343 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. Chautauqua County 1973), aft'd, 429 N.Y.S.2d 321
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980). For an older case defining religion narrowly, see Cummings v.
Weinfeld, 30 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
230. N.Y Real Prop. Tax Law § 420-a(1)(a) (McKinney 1984).

47

CHANGING MEAMNG OFEQUALITY

language required only "that the primary use of the realty must be in
furtherance of the permitted corporate purposes."2 1 The old rule not
exempting parsonages from taxation was also reversed. 2 Finally, courts

required less evidence that land owned by a religious entity was actually
being held for a religious use."
Still suggestions continued to arise that unpopular sects were victimized
by discrimination m cases involving zoning as well as tax exemption.
Congregation Beth El of Rochester explicitly claimed discrimmation,

4

and

the fact that a YM & YWHA was denied a permit to hold music and dance
classes in a building previously used for other, unidentified club purposes by
the Veterans of Foreign Wars suggests that discrimnation may have
occurred in that case as well. 5 Similarly, the occurrence of four reported
cases involving denials of zoning and tax exemptions for Hassidic Jews
during the single year of 1979 from the New York City suburban town of
231. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Town of Dover, 288
N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); accord,Mary Immaculate Sch. of Eagle Park
v. Wilson, 424 N.Y.S.2d 251 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1980); Mount Tremper Lutheran Camp,
Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Shandaken, 417 N.Y.S.2d 796, 798 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1979);
Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 404
N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 n.5 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1978); Shrine of Our Lady of Martyrs of
Auriesville v. Board of Assessors of Glen, 337 N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1972),
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 713, 304 N.E.2d 563 (1973); Gospel Volunteers, Inc. v. Village of
Speculator, 308 N.Y.S.2d 785, 789 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1970), aft'd, 29 N.Y.2d 622, 273
N.E.2d 139 (1971); Rabbi Solomon Kluger Sch., Inc. v. Town of Liberty, 351 N.Y.S.2d 563,
566 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1974); America Press, Inc. v Lewisohn, 345 N.Y.S.2d 396
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973), aff'd, 372 N.Y.S.2d 194 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1975). But see
Crusade for Christ, Inc. v. Town of New Lebanon, 271 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Columbia
County 1966), af4'd, 31 N.Y.2d 765, 290 N.E.2d 440 (1972).
232. See Congregation Kollel Horabomm, Inc. v. Williams, 48 N.Y.2d 301, 398 N.E.2d
515 (1979); Congregation Beth Mayer, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Ramapo, 417 N.Y.S.2d
754 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979).
233. See Congregation K'hal Torath Chaum, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 421 N.Y.S.2d 923
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979).
234. See Congregation Beth El of Rochester v. Crowley, 217 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1961).
235. See YM & YWHA of Mid-Westchester, Inc. v. Town of Eastchester, 201 N.Y.S.2d
622 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1960); see also Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v
Downer, 302 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (rejecting as unreasonable
ordinance that conditioned grant of permit to add classes to parochial school on congregation's
purchase of additional 341h acres of land); Five Towns YM & YWHA, Inc. v. Plaut, 178
N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1958) (allowing YM & YWHA under zoning
ordinance provision for clubs such as golf and yachting clubs), aft'd, 181 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1958).
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Ramapo,"3 6 which a decade earlier had routinely granted a special permit for

the construction of a Masomc Temple,237 is suggestive of anti-Semitism.
The judiciary nonetheless continued to respond to the likelihood of

discrimination not by creating a judicially enforceable right to religious
equality, but with ringing endorsements of the specially exalted constitutional
stature of religion. Thus, in Westchester Reform Temple v Brown,"3
which the Village of Scarsdale imposed restrictions that added $100,000 of

expense to a planned expansion of the temple, the Court of Appeals, in
occupy a
striking the restrictions down, observed that "churches
different status from mere commercial enterprises" 39 and that they "enjoy
a constitutionally protected status which severely curtails the permissible

extent of governmental regulation in the name of the police powers. "I

A

few years later in an analogous case, Jewish ReconstructionistSynagogue of
24 the court
North Shore, Inc. v Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor,

again repeated its rule that "the pre-eminent status of religious institutions
under the First Amendment provision for free exercise of religion"'242
required that "where an irreconcilable conflict exist[ed] between the right to
[police power], the latter must yield
erect a religious structure and the
to the former. "243

Lower courts, of course, took their cue from the Court of Appeals.
Judge Christ held, for example, that a village could not deny a building
permit to a proposed Jewish Center because it would "tend to depreciate the
value of property m the neighborhood and would be detrimental to the
236. See Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (denying
relief to the Hassidim, even while conceding that community groups were lobbying to keep
a Hassidic housing development out of Ramapo); see also the cases cited in notes 232-33
above.
"f'd,
19
237 See Loder v Goodday, 268 N.Y.S.2d 507 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1966),
N.Y.2d 727, 225 N.E.2d 887 (1967).
238. 22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891 (1968).
239. Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 22 N.Y.2d 488, 493, 239 N.E.2d 891, 894
(1968) (quoting Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827,
834 (1956)).
240. Id. at 496, 239 N.E.2d at 896.
241. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534 (1975). A subsequent report of the case at 40
N.Y.2d 158, 352 N.E.2d 115 (1976), struck down an effort on the part of the village to
impose the legal costs of the case on the synagogue.
242. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of North Shore, Inc. v. Incoprorated Village
of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1975), Cert. demed, 426 U.S.
950 (1976).
243. Id.
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neighborhood and the residents thereof."2 4 Another trial judge agreed that
because "of the worthy purposes and moral value, of" churches "mere

pecuniary loss to a few persons should not bar their erection and use. "245
traffic hazards do
The appellate division took the view that even "potential
26
use."
religious
proposed
a
of
not justify the exclusion
At the close of the 1970s m New York, religious institutions thus
enjoyed "a constitutionally protected status which severely limit[ed]
application of normal zoning standards" '

7

and "a legally superior religious

privilege" that trumped any mere "annoyance or financial mconvemence"
that they posed to a commmunity 248 In order to protect "the constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion" from any "chilling application of

zoning laws," ' 9 religion was given "to some extent an immunity from
significant zoning regulation" and accorded an "all but conclusive presumption that considerations of public health, safety and welfare are always
by the policy favoring religious structures. "° The decided
outweighed
cases were solidly in accord with these immunities and presumptions.25'
244. In re Garden City Jewish Ctr,. 155 N.Y.S.2d 523, 528 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1956). The case is also reported at 157 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1956).
245. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh Day Adventists v Miller, 290 N.Y.S.2d 673,
676 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967), 4"d,296 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968),
which is also reported at 282 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
246. Mikveh of South Shore Congregation, Inc. v. Granito, 432 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980).
247 Unitarian Universalist Church of Cent. Nassau v. Shorten, 314 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
248. Slevin v Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 319 N.Y.S.2d 937, 948 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971).
249. American Friends of Soc'y of St. Pius, Inc. v Schwab, 417 N.Y.S.2d 991, 994
(App. Div 2d Dep't 1979).
250. Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of North Shore, Inc. v Incorporated Village
of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 291-92, 342 N.E.2d 534, 540-41 (1975) (Breitel, C.J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
251. See VonKohorn v. Bindamin, 9 N.Y.2d 27, 172 N.E.2d 287 (1961); First
Westminster Presbyterian Church v. City Council of Yonkers, 393 N.Y.S.2d 180 (App. Div
2d Dep't 1977); Seaford Jewish Ctr., Inc. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Hempstead, 368
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1975); Young Israel of Scarsdale v. Board of Standards and
Appeals, 331 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972); In re Faith for Today, Inc., 204
N.Y.S.2d 751 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1960), t'd, 9 N.Y.2d 761, 174 N.E.2d 743 (1961);
Franciscan Missionaries of Mary v. Herdman, 184 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1959);
Methodist Homes for Aged Fund v. Lawson, 305 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. Broome County
1969); Meadows v Binkowski, 269 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1966), aff'd, 279
N.Y.S.2d 1019 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1967); Diocese of Cent. New York v Schwarzer, 199
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The effect which the zoning and tax exemption cases had on eliminating

anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic prejudice and thereby facilitating the upward
mobility of both groups is, however, unclear. Those who watched the
developing case law carefully - namely, municipalities and the lawyers who
represented Catholics and Jews involved in litigation against them - must
surely have understood that houses of worship and parochial schools could
be neither excluded from town nor denied tax exempt status. But the right

to maintain religious buildings did not guarantee the elimination of other
sorts of prejudice that had traditionally supported the subordination of the
two religious groups. At best, the right and the religious structures erected

pursuant to it facilitated the migration of white ethnics from urban ghettos
into suburban communities, where, as they interacted with their neighbors,
the old barriers against them came down. Perhaps, the religious zoning and
tax cases also constituted symbolic statements that all sorts of religious and

ethnie discrimination had gone out of style.
Education constituted an even more important vehicle than zoning and

tax exemption law in facilitating the upward mobility of children of the
immigrant classes and thereby providing the space within which the

descendants of immigrants could move toward assimilation into the nation's
mainstream. Many Catholic and Orthodox Jewish children were educated
in parochial schools, and those who were not often participated in releasetime programs that permitted them to leave public school during class time
so that they could receive religious instruction.

State aid to parochial

schools, together with governmental authorization of the release-time
programs S2 - programs uniformly favored by Catholics and supported by

some though not all Jews' 3 - made an enormous contribution to the upward
N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. Madison County 1960), af4'd, 217 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1961); Brandeis Sch. v Village of Lawrence, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1959); Temple Israel of Lawrence v Plaut, 170 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 177 N.Y.S.2d 660 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1958). But see
Congregation Gates of Prayer v Board of Appeals of Lawrence, 368 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1975); People v. Kalayjian, 352 N.Y.S.2d 115 (App. Term. 9th & 10th Dists.
1973); YMCA of Greater New York v Bums, 207 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1960); cf. Ginsberg v Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div 2d Dep't
1974) (enforcing real covenant prohibiting all nonresidential uses on certain lots), 4'd, 36
N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876 (1975); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc.
v. Altman, 319 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1971) (denying religious entity special
exemption from rent control laws in order to evict tenants from its rent controlled multiple
dwellings).
252. See Zorach v Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
253. See COHEN, supra note 173, at 440-41, 447
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mobility of both these children and their parents. These forms of aid to
religion, like the judicial decisions facilitating the construction of synagogues
and Catholic churches in suburban communities, enabled white ethnics to
pursue secular advancement without abandoning all of their traditional
religious values.
The New York legislature regularly voted considerable sums of money
in aid of religious education. After World War II, it granted financial
support, and the courts upheld the grants, for such purposes as student
transportation,5 provision of textbooks m secular courses,' 5 renbursement
of parochial schools for state-mandated testing and recordkeepmg, 2 6 and
remedial teaching for handicapped or disadvantaged parochial school
students.Y57 The legislature and courts also granted and upheld aid to
religiously affiliated colleges that taught religion as long as it was taught "as
an academic discipline [that focused on] the sources and development of the
Judeo-Chnstian tradition and the religious heritage of the world" 8 and "no
denominational tenet or doctrine [was] taught in the manner of dogmatism
or mdoctrination." 9 The New York legislature was prepared to go even
254. See Board of Educ. v Allen, 192 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1959).
Other cases, however, allowed school districts to place limits on the transportation offered as
long as those limits were equally applicable to public and parochial'schools. See Finkel v
New York City Bd. of Educ., 474 F Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y 1979), af4'd, 622 F.2d 573 (2d
Cir. 1980); O'Donnell v. Antin, 369 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1974),
aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 941, 335 N.E.2d 854 (1975); cf. Mitchell C. v Board of Educ., 414
N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979) (refusing to interfere with change in school bus
scheduling in suit on behalf of handicapped children).
255. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Johnson v New York State
Educ. Dep't, 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 75 (1972).
256. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
Earlier and less carefully tailored legislation for the same purpose had been struck down in
New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), and m Levitt v Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
257 See National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v Harris, 489 F Supp.
1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Greve v. Board of Educ., 351 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div 2d Dep't
1974) (mem.), aft'd, 36 N.Y.2d 673, 325 N.E.2d 168 (1975); Scales v. Board of Educ., 245
N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963).
258. College of New Rochelle v. Nyquist, 326 N.Y.S.2d 765, 770 (App. Div 3d Dep't
1971).
259. Camsius College of Buffalo v. Nyquist, 320 N.Y.S.2d 652, 655 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 928, 279 N.E.2d 868 (1972); cf.Iona College v
Nyquist, 316 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1970) (ordering trial on limited issue
of whether education commissioner had discriminated in denying petitioner aid while granting
aid to other religiously-affiliated colleges).
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further in providing support for religious education when it adopted
programs to help parochial schools maintain and repair their physical
facilities and to grant tuition reimbursement and tax relief to parents who
sent their children to parochial schools, but the Supreme Court ruled that
these programs were unconstitutional. 2'

The state's legal system also displayed symbolic support for religion in
" ' and for Catholics and Jews in particular. A powerful symbol of
general26
the equality of immigrant with WASP religion arose out of the judically

approved construction on public land at Kennedy International Airport of
three chapels - one Catholic, one Jewish, and one Protestant.262 Judges

made other concessions to religious symbolism by approving the addition of
the words "under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance263 and the religious

matching of adopted children with adoptive parents.2 64 Special concessions
to Roman Catholic piety included judicial approval of the placement of
nativity scenes on public property,265 as well as the upholding of the
constitutionality of Sunday closing laws well into the 1970s.26 6 The New
260. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
261. See Toomey v Farley, 2 N.Y.2d 71, 83, 138 N.E.2d 221, 227-28 (1956) (stating
that "all churches in America" are "opposed to communism").
262. See Brashich v. Port Auth., 484 F Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y 1979), af4'd, 791 F.2d 224
(2d Cir. 1980).
263. See Lewis v Allen, 207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1960), af4'd, 14 N.Y.2d
867, 200 N.E.2d 767, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 923 (1964).
264. See Wilder v Sugarman, 385 F Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y 1974); Dickens v Ernesto,
"330 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972); see also Wilder v
Bernstein, 499 F Supp. 980, 988 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
265. See Baer v Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1958);
cf. Impellizerri v Jamesville Federated Church, 428 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1979) (not nuisance to play Christian hymns on church carillon).
266. See People v Friedman, 302 N.Y 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950) (per curiam), appeal
dismissed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951); People v Kaplan, 188 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div 1st Dep't
1959); People v. Federal Builders and Home Modernization Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 942 (App.
Term. 9th & 10th Dists. 1971) (per curiam); see also People v Paine Drug Co., 254
N.Y.S.2d 492 (App. Div 4th Dep't 1964), af4'd, 16 N.Y.2d 503, 208 N.E.2d 176 (1965);
People v. Wegman's Food Mkts., Inc., 362 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Town Ct. Monroe County 1974).
Courts also upheld legislation prohibiting business activity on Memorial Day and Independence
Day See S.E. Nichols Herkimer Corp. v Village of Herkimer, 330 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App.
Div 4th Dep't 1972); People v Leshaw, 316 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1970);
cf. Andrews v. O'Grady, 252 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964) (upholding firing
of Seventh Day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday); Jewish Ctr. of Baldwin v
Winer, 216 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961) (stating that it is unlawful to serve
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York Court of Appeals would also have upheld prayer in the public
schools.67 Finally, in deference to traditional common law and constitutional doctrine, judges continued to look to ecclesiastical law in resolving
disputes between rival factions when a schism or analogous property dispute
arose within a church. 6
C. Assimilation as Quid Pro Quofor Equality
The central conclusion of the two preceding sections, at tins stage, bears
repetition. Section A illustrates that New York judges were unwilling during
the 1940s and 1950s to recognize the existence of a judicially enforceable
right to equality Nonetheless, as Section B indicates, those same judges
decided cases in ways that facilitated efforts by Catholics and Jews, the two
main groups in New York seeking equality, to push their way into the
societal mainstream. The judges thereby advanced the goal of equality even
while denying the right. On what terms, however, did the judges imagine
that egalitarian interaction would occur? It is this question that the present
section must address.
As we shall see, the support that the courts provided religious liberty
did not license religious or other minorities to celebrate or invigorate their
cultural differences. American ideology in the post-World War H era did
not envision a multicultural society in which former immigrant groups would
process maliciously on Sabbath) (dictum). Concessions to Jewish piety, however, were
limited. See Berman v Board of Elections, 420 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970) (allowing Board of Elections to use church as polling place
despite objection by Orthodox Jew to entering building); Otero v New York City Hous.
Auth., 344 F Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (housing authority may not give special priority-to
Jews in housing project located in proximity to synagogue).
267 See Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579 (1961), rev'd, 370 U.S. 421
(1962). Since Engel, both federal and state courts in New York have outlawed not only
mandatory but even voluntary prayer in the schools. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 983 (1982); Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 409 N.Y.S.2d 912
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978).
268. See Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of N. Am.,
363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1950); First
Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v United Presbyterian Church, 430 F Supp. 450
(N.D.N.Y 1977); Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Dunkel, 33 N.Y.2d 456, 310
N.E.2d 307 (1974); In re Presbytery of Albany, 315 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
28 N.Y.2d 772, 269 N.E.2d 918, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Rector
1970), -f'd,
of Church of the Holy Trinity v. Melish, 164 N.Y.S.2d 843 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), aff'd, 3
N.Y.2d 476, 146 N.E.2d 685 (1957).
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perpetuate their distinctiveness. Rather, as a leading cultural historian has
found, public discussion of intergroup relations, reflecting the nationalism
and unity concerns of the war years, was dominated by an outlook that was
tolerant, but at the same time strongly assimilationist.269 Immigrants and
their children were invited to abandon their ethnicity and move upward into
society's mainstream, but only when they accepted the mainstream's values,
melted into the mainstream on its terms, and became in the process "true
Americans." They, in turn, eagerly accepted the invitation; as the American
Jewish Committee declared, what we now call multiculturalism was
"antagonistic to the basic tenets of the American Creed." The "preservation
of all that we cherish," the Committee continued, "all that is summed up in
the word Americanism, depend[ed] upon the achievement of national
unity "270 A leading Catholic theorist agreed that America was "an AngloSaxon country," and he accordingly urged all immigrants "unyieldingly to
stand for" at least two things: "A common language, and a umversal
American Public School for our children.""271 Even if "conformity to
American life
means our racialself-effacement," he urged mingrants
not to "begrudge our gift."2I In short, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews all
agreed, in the language of a popular song, which inquired into what America
meant to its listeners, that the proper answer was "All races, all religions,
that's America to me, "273 at least when the goal of minority races and
religions was "to fit unobtrusively into the American scene. "274
State education law, while subsidizing religion in the many ways noted
above, strongly endorsed this assimilationist and integrationist vision. It
required that every child receive an education meeting mimmum state
standards - standards designed to convey skills essential for participation in
the marketplace, but even more to inculcate the value system of a tolerant,
but nevertheless deeply American America.275 Most significantly, the courts
269. See Steele, supra note 107

270. Brief Submitted on Behalf of the American Jewish Committee as Friend of the Court
at 3, Kemp v Rubm, 75 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1947) (manuscript in Library of
American Jewish Committee, New York, N.Y.); see also COHEN, supra note 173, at 333-44.
271. GINO SPERANZA, RACE OR NATION: A CONFLICT OF DIVIDED LOYALTIES 243,259

(1923).
272. Id. at 266.
273. LEwIs ALLEN, The House I Live In, reprinted in READER'S DIGEST FAMILY
SONGBOOK OF FAITH AND JOY 271-73 (William L. Simon ed., 1981).
274. Memorandum to Dr. Stem 7 (May 1941) (in folder entitled Program and Policy,
1940-42, Morris Waldman Papers, Box 34, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, N.Y., N.Y.)
275. As one educated during the late 1940s and 1950s in a series of New York public
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did not allow any child to be exempted on grounds of religious belief from

state-mandated requirements.
Thus, in Shapiro v Donn,27 in which a group of Jewish families sent
their children to a parochial school that did not give "systematic instruction
[in English] in the ten common branches and other courses of study required
by
the Education Law," the court held that the families had violated the
law 2 The court declared that it was "more unportant
that all children
within the realm of our democratic society shall receive a basic secular
religious convictions"
education in the English language
than that
be honored."B "[S]ecular law" had to "take precedence over the religious
law, where the interests of a democratic society clearly require[d] compliance with the secular law, "279 as they did in the case of "secular education"

which had "become a fundamental part of our system of society "I As the
court explained, secular education was "designed to give equality of
opportunity to all children in a society dedicated to the democratic ideal. "I'
The court added that "[w]ithout equality of opportunity in education there"
could be "no equality among the children of our democratic society, "I- and
to take
some children would be prejudiced in their ability "in later life
their rightful place in civil society "283
Not only did the courts require that all children receive a basic secular
education that would prepare them for the marketplace; they also upheld
curricular requirements that exposed students to established cultural canons,
even when those canons reflected the discriminatory past of Anglo-American
culture. The key case that approved what amounted to cultural indoctrination was Rosenberg v Board of Education.'
In Rosenberg, the plaintiff challenged the Board of Education's adoption
of Dickens's Oliver Twist and Shakespeare's The Merchant of Venice as
schools with a student body that was concidentally one-third Catholic, one-third Jewish, and
one-third white Protestant, I cannot attest strongly enough to the lasting impact of the State

Education Department's liberal, tolerationist ideology.
276. 99 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1950).

277

Shapiro v. Dorm, 99 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1950).

278. Id. at 837

279. Id.
280. Id. at 835.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 835.
92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949).
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approved reading m New York City's high schools.' The plaintiff urged
that these two works were "objectionable because they tend[ed] to engender
hatred of the Jew as a person and as a race."I Even the Board of Education
had recognized tins tendency and accordingly had "expressly required
teachers to explain to pupils that the characters described therein [were] not
typical of any nation or race, including persons of the Jewish faith," and thus
were "not to be regarded as reflecting discredit on any race or national
group. "I One wonders, however, at the effect of this explanation; like a
cautionary instruction to a jury to ignore evidence it ought never to have
heard, the teacher's explanation might have emphasized the religious
stereotyping in which Dickens and Shakespeare were engaging and thereby
further insulted and degraded Jews, especially the Jewish students who had
to listen to it. By being stereotyped, and then by having the stereotype
analyzed and discussed in their presence, Jews were subjected to what was,
at the very least, an unpleasant experience to which Christians were not
subjected, and thereby treated less favorably than and, in a sense, subordinated to Christians. It is, indeed, quite difficult to "see how," especially
after a teacher's admonition, "a Jew [could] read The Merchant of Venice
without pam and indignation."
Rosenberg could thus have been seen as a simple equal rights case, m
wich a victim of discrimination sought to enjoin the state from selecting and
inculcating in the public mind symbols that he found degrading and insulting.
But the court did not .so understand the case. In language as insulting as that
of Dickens and Shakespeare, the court held that the "public interest in a free
and democratic society [did] not warrant or encourage the suppression of any
book at the whim of any unduly sensitive person or group of persons, merely
because a character described in such book as belonging to a particular race
or religion is portrayed in a derogatory or offensive manner. "29 "Removal

from schools of these books," moreover, would "contribute nothing toward
the diminution of anti-religious feeling" ;2' according to the court, "[p]ublic
education and instruction in the home [would] remove religious and racial
285. Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 92 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949).
286. Id.
287 Id. at 345-46.
288. HAZELTON SPENCER, THE ART AND LIFE OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 240 (1940),
quoted in Trenton Committee for Umty, Memorandum on The Merchant of Venice 2 (May 2,
1945) (manuscript in Library of American Jewish Committee, New York, N.Y.).
289. Rosenberg, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346.
290. Id.
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intolerance
more effectively than censorship and suppression of
91
of art.

2

works

Three important lessons can be teased out of the Rosenberg opinion.
First, the case unearthed an unportant issue - essentially today's issue of
hate speech - that had been framed in the struggle between Jews striving to
attain equality in the face of symbolic degradation and a WASP elite intent
on maintaining at least its cultural hegemony through the schools. Second,
this issue was one for which an equal rights jurisprudence provided no
answer. Thus, in the Rosenberg case, either Jewish interests had to be
subordinated to the preservation of the established cultural tradition of which
Oliver Twist and The Merchant of Venice were a part, or the cultural
tradition had to be truncated and subordinated at the behest of Jews. There
was no way for the court to honor equally the established tradition, aspects
of which insulted and degraded Jews, and the entirely accurate Jewish
perception that the tradition was insulting and degrading. Third, insofar as
the result in the case accurately reflected how higher courts would have
acted,29 the outcome made clear what we have already observed: the
maintenance of cultural hegemony trumped the goal of uplifting the urban
minrgrant underclasses. The best that groups like Jews, Catholics, and
African-Americans could expect from the law was the removal of specific
coercive barriers to their participation in the political and economic life of
the society Equality meant that they would be invited to abandon their
ethnicity and move upward into society's mainstream. But they would have
to accept the mainstream's existing values and cultural norms, even if those
values and norms degraded and prejudiced them, for the law, as explicated
in cases such as Rosenberg, lacked any capacity to change culture and
thereby end all racial, ethnic, and religious subordination. Only private
291.

Id.

292. Three decades later in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), a school
district would explicitly "emphasize the mculcative function of secondary education, and argue

that they must be allowed unfetered discretion to 'transmit community values.'" Id. at 869
(emphasis in original). Even m 1982, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion did not reject that
argument in a Rosenberg context, in which a school board merely sought "to establish
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values" and to promote "respect for
authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or political." Id. at 864. But, while
Pico left school officials free to establish a hegemomc curriculum, it denied them the power

to "remove books [from a school library] for the purpose of restricting access to the political
ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the
officials' disapproval of the ideas involved." Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); accord,Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community Sch. Bd. No. 25, 457

F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
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efforts and education and, ultimately, the emergence of a new cultural

tradition that did not rest on racial, ethmc, and religious hierarchies could
eliminate prejudice and result in equality 293

Judges continued to promote upward mobility of religious minorities
into the societal mainstream, conditioned on their surrender of sectarian

religious and cultural beliefs, in a line of cases requiring compulsory
vaccinations as a prerequisite to entering public schools. As one judge
declared, in rejecting a mother's claim of religious conscience and ordering

her child seized and vaccinated, the mother's refusal to vaccinate had made
293. In other cases, state judges were more willing than the judge mRosenberg to provide
legal protection against hate speech. Consider, for example, People v Kunz, 300 N.Y 273,
90 N.E.2d 455 (1949), rev'd, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), in which the defendant had engaged in
"scurrilous attacks on Catholics and Jews," preaching that the "Catholic Church makes
merchandise out of souls" and is "a religion of the devil" and that Jews were "Chnst-killers"
who "should have been burnt in the incinerators." It was, he added, "a shame they all
weren't." Kunz v New York, 340 U.S. 290, 296 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Noting
that religion involved "very tender emotion[s]," a New York City magistrate convicted Kunz
on these facts under an ordinance making it "unlawful for anyone 'to ridicule or denounce any
form of religious belief,'" and a 4-3 majority of the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction. Kunz, 300 N.Y at 278, 90 N.E.2d at 458. Likewise, in upholding censorship
of a "sacrilegious" movie in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y 242, 250, 101 N.E.2d
665, 667 (1951), rev'd, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the New York Court of Appeals observed that
"[i]nsult, mockery, contempt and ridicule [could] be a deadly form of persecution - often far
more so than more direct forms of action," and thus, it was "within the legitimate sphere of
State action," id. at 260, 101 N.E.2d at 673, to make it unlawful "to hurl insults at the deepest
and sincerest religious beliefs of others." Id. In People v. Kieran, 26 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Nassau
County Ct. 1940), however, an appellate court reversed the conviction of a group of Jehovah's
Witnesses who had made remarks "annoying all sorts of religious people" and stated that "here
in this country, which, just now, seems to be the last stronghold of freedom," it was essential
to "fight to preserve that freedom" by requiring authorities to be "tolerant even of
[,] the race question
intolerance," especially m areas such as "[clonflict in religious belief
and the new political ideologies, Communism, Fascism, [and] Nazism." Id. at 308. For later
cases in which judges took stands protecting speakers hostile to religion in general or to
paricular religious beliefs, see Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238
(1973) (refusing to order president of public college to enforce regulations prohibiting
derogatory tacks on religion in student publications), and Rockwell v Moms, 211 N.Y.S.2d
25 (App. Div 1st Dep't) (reversing denial of permit to leader of American Nazi Party to
speak in Union Square), aft'd, 10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913
(1961). For cases in which courts upheld property rights against Jehovah's Witnesses who
were seeking to proselytize their religious beliefs, see Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc.
v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886
(1948); People v Brown, 27 N.Y.S.2d 241 (Suffolk County Ct.), affd sub. nom. People v
Bohnke, 287 N.Y 154, 38 N.E.2d 478 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 669 (1942); People v
Dale, 47 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Utica City Ct. 1944).
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the child a ward of the court, "to be helped, protected, and accorded the
opportunities that an enlightened community affords - provide the child
with the necessary guidance and education to fit him to adjust in society and
carry forward the progress for an adequate life." 29 In analogous cases, in
which parents refused to allow their children to undergo needed medical
treatment, courts routinely ordered provision of the treatment.295 In the one
reported case in which a trial judge refused to compel surgery, a minority
of the Court of Appeals wanted to reverse the judgment below because
' and
"[e]very child [had] a right, so far as possible, to lead a normal life"296
religious scruples could not be permitted to stand m the way of that right and
thereby "rum his life and any chance for a normal, happy existence." 2I The
majority, recognizing that there were "important considerations both ways"
and that it could "not be certain of being right under these circumstances,"
affirmed only because it thought it wisest to defer to the trial judge, who was
closest to the facts.298 In general, though, bureaucratic regularity triumphed
over religious scruples, as in Stark v Wyman, 299 in which a court refused to
grant extra money to a welfare recipient to enable her to buy more expensive
Kosher food. 3"
The constitutional ideology of the 1940s and 1950s reflected in the cases
we have been analyzing - an ideology that might be labelled mntegratiomst
294. In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (Dom. Rel. Ct. Kings County 1944); see
also McCartney v. Austin, 293 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1968), aff'd, 298
N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1969); In re Elwell, 284 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Fain. Ct. Dutchess
County 1967). But see Brown v. City Sch. Dist., 429 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. Steuben
County 1980) (exempting child from required immunization m accord with statutory provision
permitting religious exemption when specified conditions met), af4'd, 444 N.Y.S.2d 878 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1981).
295. See In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Fain. Ct. Kings County 1976); In re
Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fain. Ct. Ulster County 1970), af4'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App.
Div. 1971); cf. Battaglia v. Battaglia, 172 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1958)
(denying custody of child to Jehovah's Witness mother who might refuse to allow blood
transfusion for child).
296. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y.2d 80, 86, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1955) (Fuld, J.,
dissenting).
297 Id. at 87, 127 N.E.2d at 824.
298. Id. at 85-86, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
299. 299 N.Y.S.2d 686 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1969).
300. Stark v. Wyman, 299 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1969); cf. People
v. Woodruff, 270 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1966) (holding that witness cannot
refuse to testify against someone simply because person is of same religion), aft'd, 272
N.Y.S.2d 786 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966), 4'd,21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159 (1968).
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equality - remained dominant as late as the 1963 Court of Appeals
decision in People v Stover 301 The Stover case arose in 1956, when the
Stovers, as a "'peaceful protest' against the high taxes imposed by the
city," hung a "clothesline, filled with old cloths and rags," in their front
yard "in a pleasant and built-up residential district" of suburban Rye." ° As
taxes were increased, so were the number of clotheslines, until by 1961
there were six, "from which there hung tattered clothing, old uniforms,
underwear, rags and scarecrows. "303 The city then adopted an ordinance
that prohibited clotheslines in front yards unless it issued a special permit
because of "a practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship in drying clothes
elsewhere on the premises."" After the city refused to grant the Stovers
a special permit and they refused to remove the clotheslines, they were
convicted of violating the ordinance and their conviction came before the
New York Court of Appeals.
The lone dissent of Judge John Van Voorhis captured one view of
American constitutionalism. Van Voorhis's starting premise was that:
Protection of minority rights is as essential to democracy as
majority vote. In our age of conformity it [ought]
not [be]
the instinct of our law to compel uniformity
The right to be
different has its place in this country The United States has drawn
strength from differences among its people in taste, experience,
temperament, ideas, and ambitions as 3well as from differences m
race, national or religious background. 1
Wisung to protect the rights of minorities and the even more fundamental,
related right to be different, Van Voorhis refused to condone "unlimited
power in government to
compel[ ] conformity" - a "power to rule"
which "open[ed] the door to the invasion by majority rule of a great deal
of territory that belongs to the individual human being."306 Arguing that
the Stovers were a minority who had been bested by "other residents in the
area" in a "dispute
evidently political in nature," Van Voorhis would
have overturned their conviction for their "unusual idea" and their unusual
301. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963).
302. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 464, 191 N.E.2d 272, 273, appeal dismissed, 375

U.S. 42 (1963).
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id. at 465, 191 N.E.2d at 273 (quoting city ordinance).
Id. at 472, 191 N.E.2d at 278 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 472-73, 191 N.E.2d at 278.
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"form of protest." 307
All of the other judges on the. court, in contrast, believed that
protection of the Stovers' "bizarre" °8 conduct was inconsistent with values
central to their understanding of American democracy The vision of the
majority, unlike the vision of Van Voorhis, was not a multicultural vision
that celebrated differences in racial, national, or religious background.
The majority's goal, instead, was to induce underclasses to internalize the
"sensibilities of the average person" and ultimately become fully equal
participants in "an attractive, efficiently functiomng, prosperous community ",309 While the majority appreciated the value of free speech that
furthered "the dissemination of ideas or opinion" resulting in prosperity or
some other enhancement of community, it found nothing inappropriate with
legislation "designed to proscribe conduct which offends the sensibilities
and tends to depress property values." 310 The majority saw no "message,"
but only "offensiveness" in the Stovers' "protest" and therefore refused to
accord it protection under the free speech clauses of the state and federal
constitutions. 3 '
In its approval of efforts to nurture a common sensibility and to
discourage conduct by minorities that might prove offensive to majorities,
the court's opinion in Stover powerfully encapsulated the great egalitarian
event of the prior two decades, when Catholics and Jews shed their
immigrant identities, assumed the sensibility of their former WASP
oppressors, and in the process, became full and equal participants in
political and economic life, at least in New York. The Stover opinion thus
was deeply grounded in a constitutionalism that tolerated-upward mobility
by underclasses into the mainstream elite as long as the underclasses
assumed the elite's values of civility and toleration. But, as neatly as the
constitutionalism of Stover fit with past realities known to judges in 1963,
it was utterly inconsistent with a new world that was about to emerge with
explosive force.
In the end, then, judges in New York responded somewhat strangely
to cases seeking to stop discrimination against Catholics and Jews. They
never took a simple approach of articulating a general constitutional or
307

Id. at 471, 191 N.E.2d at 277

308.

Id. at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277

309. Id. at 467-68, 191 N.E.2d at 275-76.
310. Id. at 470, 191 N.E.2d at 277
311. Id.
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common-law right on which groups or individuals could rely for protection
against religious and ethnic discrumnation or subordination. Instead, they
issued a strong proclamation that all religious groups enjoyed rights to
religious freedom that trumped ordinary police power regulations, 1 2 and
they approved a wide variety of state aid to religion that gave Jews and
especially Catholics important tangible and symbolic support. 3 In the
312. But they did not trump the state's interest in setting integrationist educational
policies.
313. After the cases involving discrimination on grounds of religion discussed in the text
above, and the cases involving race and gender discrimination, to which we shall turn later,
the largest category of reported discrimnation cases dealt with age. In these cases, the courts
again refused to create any legally enforceable, formal principle of equality As a result, the
courts countenanced much discrimination. For example, judges routinely rejected claims of
the illegality and unconstitutionality of mandatory retirement ages or maximum ages for
commencement of employment m particular jobs. See Palmer v Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. dened, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); Johnson v Lefkowitz, 566 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979); New York City Dep't of Personnel v State Div.
of Human Rights, 44 N.Y.2d 904, 379 N.E.2d 165 (1978); Figueroa v. Bronstem, 38 N.Y.2d
533, 344 N.E.2d 402, appealdismissed, 429 U.S. 806 (1976); State Div of Human Rights
ex rel. Kozlowski v. State, 406 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1978), appealdismissed,
46 N.Y.2d 939, 388 N.E.2d 373 (1979); Nurenberg v Ward, 381 N.Y.S.2d 412 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1976); Foran v. Cawley, 354 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1973). But cf.
Weiss v Walsh, 324 F Supp. 75, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (allowing plaintiff to amend
complaint to allege that selective enforcement of age criteria is unlawful); New York City
Dep't of Personnel v State Div of Human Rights; 392 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div 1st Dep't
1977) (holding that age limit unlawful when discriminatorily applied). Some discriminations
aided the elderly, however, as was the case when the Court of Appeals sustained the
constitutionality of legislation imposing a special penalty on juvenile delinquents found to have
inflicted serious criminal violence on a person 62 years of age or older. See In re Quinton A.,
49 N.Y.2d 328, 332, 402 N.E.2d 126, 128-29 (1980). Other cases in which the elderly
received beneficial judicial treatment arose when a court invalidated an exclusion of
grandparents from a Social Security program providing aid to dependent children, see Taylor
v Dumpson, 362 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 37
N.Y.2d 765, 337 N.E.2d 600 (1975), and when another court upheld a complaint against a
municipality for failing to build adequate senior-citizen housing, see Long Island Region
NAACP v Town of N. Hempstead, 424 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1979), aft'd,
427 N.Y.S.2d 861 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1980).
Courts countenanced even more significant discrimination against the young. Thus,
particular day-care centers and nursery schools were denied the right to open, see Murmer v.
Board of Appeals of Auburn, 415 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1979); Rockefeller
v Pynchon, 244 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963); cf. Bernstein v Board of
Appeals of Matinecock, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141, 145 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969) (upholding
imposition of conditions on grant of special permit), and limitations on the use or construction
of summer camp facilities in particular municipalities were upheld, see Town of Huntington
v Park Shore Country Day Camp of Dix Hills, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 61, 390 N.E.2d 282 (1979);
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Town of Hempstead v. Memck Woods Sch., Inc., 177 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1958), even though private schools were clearly permitted, see Creative Country Day Sch.,
Inc. v. Bums, 238 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1963). Also subject to prohibition or
tight control were rentals of private homes to a group of college students, see Village of Belle
Terre v Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), summer rentals to "a group of
unrelated young
adults," Village of Quogue v. Ladd, 337 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1972), and
fraternities, see Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa v. Grosberg, 291 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App.
Div 3d Dep't 1968); City of Schenectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union Chapter, Delta Chi
Fraternity, Inc., 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (App. Div 3d Dep't 1957). In another case, a federal
judge refused to invalidate a curfew on youths under the age of 17 See Naprstek v. City of
Norwich, 405 F Supp. 521 (N.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.
1976). On the other hand, municipalities could not exclude from residential neighborhoods
groups of approximately 10 unrelated foster children living together with two adults. Such
attempts at exclusion were prohibited either on the theory that the state, by approving and
paying for such group home arrangements, had preempted the power of municipalities to
exclude them through zoning, see Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning
& Appeals of N. Hempstead, 390 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1976), modified, 45
N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d 207 (1978); Abbott House v Village of Tarrytown, 312 N.Y.S.2d
841 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1970). But cf. Group House of Port Washington, Inc. v Board of
Zoning & Appeals of N. Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 270, 380 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1978)
(refusing to pass on rationale), or on the theory that such living arrangements could not be
distinguished from a family and, thus, fit within the definition of the word "family" as that
word was used in municipal ordinances, see id. at 270-74, 380 N.E.2d at 209-11; City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, .313 N.E.2d 756 (1974); Committee for Betterment
of Mount Kisco v. Taylor, 404 N.Y.S.2d 380 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); Moore v
Nowakowski, 361 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1974). But see Nassau Children's
House, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Mineola, 430 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1980) (dismissal on ground that village board of zomng appeals lacked power to grant
requested relief). For other cases analyzing the meaning of family in the context of singlefamily zoning, see Town of Henrietta v Fairchild, 279 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1967); Stafford v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 102 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1951); see also McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 497 F Supp. 1217, 1227
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding housing authority rule requiring permission for overnght guests),
aff'd in partand rev'd in part on other grounds, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1981).
A related line of cases dealt with institutions created for people, often children, suffering
from mental or emotional disabilities or from drug addiction. Some cases, of course, upheld
efforts at excluding the disabled or the addicted from the social mainstream, see People v.
Renaissance Project, Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 65, 324 N.E.2d 355 (1975); Brandt v. Zoning Bd. of
Appeals of New Castle, 393 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1977), af4'd, 402
N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978); cf. Maldim v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,487-88, 330
N.E.2d 403, 407-08 (1975) (upholding zoning for retirement communities in which only
people over age of 55 could live), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 993 (1975); Campbell v. Barraud,
394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 910-11 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977) (same); Community Bd. 3 v. State, 420
N.Y.S.2d 607, 608-09 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1979) (upholding temporarily exclusion of
home for mentally retarded until proponents of home had completed procedural steps
mandated by statute), and those that did not followed the same approaches as did the cases
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dealing with discrimination against children. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that an
"institution for the care of emotionally disturbed delinquent, dependent or neglected boys" fit
within the definition of school as that word was used in one municipality's ordinance, see
Wiltwyck Sch. for Boys, Inc. v. Hill, 11 N.Y.2d 182, 190-91, 182 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1962),
while a trial judge held that a "community residence" for eight mentally retarded young
women under the supervision of two house parents was a family for purposes of another
zoning code. See Incorporated Village of Freeport v Association for the Help of Retarded
Children, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), aft'd, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (App. Div.
2d Dep't 1977); accord, Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded
Children, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), appeal denied, 40 N.Y.2d 803, 356
N.E.2d 482 (1976). In another case, the Court of Appeals held that a school for the mentally
retarded constituted a mere continuation of a prior nonconforming use by a convalescent home
for children suffering from cardiac disorders. See Rogers v. Association for the Help of
Retarded Children, Inc., 308 N.Y. 126, 123 N.E.2d 806 (1954). An alternative approach was
to focus on state preemption of municipal power and to hold that local zoning authorities could
not prevent the state or a private agency carrying out state policy from locating a facility
within municipal boundaries, see Little Neck Community Ass'n, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68;
Board of Coop. Educ. Servs. v. Gaynor, 306 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969),
appeal dened,.26 N.Y.2d 612, 258 N.E.2d 729 (1970); Conners v. New York State Ass'n
of Retarded Children, Inc., 370 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1975); see also
Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Assocs., Inc., 423 N.Y.S.2d 982, 995 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1979), af4'd, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), modified, 50 N.Y.2d 1024, 410
N.E.2d 746 (1980), while yet another approach was to strike down a municipal ordinance that
barred the mentally ill from registering at hotels in town as an abridgement of the right to
travel, see Stoner v. Miller, 377 F Supp. 177 (E.D.N.Y 1974). Only one case analyzed the
mentally and emotionally disabled as a weak and insular minority for which the Equal
Protection Clause provided legally enforceable protection. See New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F Supp. 487, 504 (E.D.N.Y 1979); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F Supp. 479, 486 (E.D.N.Y 1978), at'd,
612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979). The one other case in which a jurisprudence of equal rights
emerged at all was a federal suit invalidating New York City's practices in assigning students
with emotional problems to schools, on the ground that those practices promoted racial
segregation and, accordingly, constituted a denial of equal educational opportunity under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act. See Lora v. Board of Educ. of New York, 456 F Supp. 1211
(E.D.N.Y 1978). But even in this case, the finding of segregation was eventually reversed
and the judicial remedy for the violation of equal rights therefore vacated. See Lora v Board
of Educ., 623 F.2d. 248 (2d Cir. 1980). In the absence of proof of racial discrimination,
there was no constitutional right to assignment to any particular public school, even in cases
in which a claim was made that a student was emotionally disturbed. See Johnpoll v. Elias,
513 F Supp. 430 (E.D.N.Y 1980).
Similar patterns emerged m cases concerning nursing and convalescent homes and other
health-care facilities. For example, in one case a judge held that a nursing home constituted
a continuation of a pre-existing nonconforming use of property as a boarding house, see Ganim
v. Village of New York Mills, 347 N.Y.S.2d 372 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1973); see also
Belle Harbor Realty Corp. v. Kerr, 35 N.Y.2d 507, 323 N.E.2d 697 (1974) (dictum) (city can
deny building permit for nursing home on ground of inadequacy of public services only "in
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process, however, the courts and perhaps society at large failed to respond
response to a dire necessity" and as "an emergency measure"), and in another case concerning
half-way houses, the Court of Appeals ruled that a county's decision about the location and
operation of such a facility preempted municipal law so that it could "not be overruled by
application of a local zoning ordinance." People v. St. Agatha Home for Children, 47 N.Y.2d
46, 49, 389 N.E.2d 1098, 1099, cert. demed, 444 U.S. 869 (1979); accord, Hepper v Town
of Hillsdale, 311 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. Columbia County 1970). Contra Cappadoro Land
Dev. Corp. v. Amelkin, 432 N.Y.S.2d 513 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1980); see Ibero-American
Action League, Inc. v. Palma, 366 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1975); cf.Tarolli v
Howe, 355 N.Y.S.2d 689 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 865,.340 N.E.2d 725
(1975); Hepner v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mount Vernon, 152 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1956); Kanasy v. Nugent, 135 N.Y.S.2d 128 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County
-t'd,145 N.Y.S.2d 638.(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1955). Other cases produced rather
1954),
mixed results. On the one hand, several cases upheld the exclusion of nonresidents from
public facilities financed by local tax dollars, see, e.g., People v. Dahlman, 383 N.Y.S.2d 946
(App. Term. 9th & 10th Dists. 1976) (per curiam); Schreiber v. City of Rye, 278 N.Y.S.2d
527 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1967), cf. Jeter v. Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 366
N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County) (local school must admit nonresident student and
receive tuition payment from entity charged with providing for student's education), modified,
377 N.Y.S.2d 685 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1975), aft'd, 41 N.Y.2d 283, 360 N.E.2d 1086
(1977); one case upheld the exclusion of a campsite for temporary residence of the transient
public, see Friedland v. Diamond, 324 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971), and
another lower court opinion directed the police to take action against the "noxious activities,"
and by implication the people committing them, that "cumulatively and collectively [were]
contributing factors to the madness and unhealthy situation which [was] rapidly enveloping
the entire Greenwich Village area." Perazzo v. Lindsay, 286 N.Y.S.2d 309, 310-11
(Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1967). This opinion, however, was reversed. See Perazzo v
Lindsay, 290 N.Y.S.2d 971 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), aft'd, 23 N.Y.2d 764, 244 N.E.2d 471
(1968). Similarly, the appellate division struck down an attempt to exclude a labor camp in
a municipality with a zoning ordinance that did not explicitly exclude labor camps from
industrial zones. See White v. Hartnett, 104 N.Y.S.2d 669 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1951).
Even when judges acted to protect underclasses from municipal discrimination, they
justified their intervention on clearly articulated equal protection grounds only in trivial cases
that never got out of the lower courts, such as one case upholding the standing of low-income
people residing m a town to sue the town's zoning authorities for failing to provide sufficient
land for their housing needs, see Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 397 N.Y.S.2d
302 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1977), modified, 405 N.Y.S.2d 302 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1978)
(mem.), and another upholding an equal protection discrimination suit by people excluded
from public housing because of past criminal activity by children who were not residing with
them, see Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y 1974). But
cf Spady v. Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 341 N.Y.S.2d 552, 554 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1973)
(upholding denial of public housing to individual who had engaged in criminal activity under
different name), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 573, 310 N.E.2d 542, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 983 (1974).
As we have seen, especially in cases that potentially have precedential value, New York judges
justified their intervention on behalf of subordinated classes by strained statutory construction,
by recourse to the principle of the superiority of state over municipal power, and,
occasionally, by recognizing the existence of specific individual constitutional rights.,
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to the demand for legal equality for the old immigrant groups.
Meanwhile, white ethimcs had attained practical economic and social
equality Leading universities were one of the first places in which
customary WASP preserves were breached. By the early 1960s, "no
faculty at any leading university [could] afford to be anti-Semitic in its
hiring policies," and "major umversities" had begun "drawing on a truly
national pool of talent" in faculty hiring.314 Similar developments were
occurring within the student body, as "Jewish quotas" were first "relaxed"
and then eliminated. As a result, the Jewish proportion of Ivy League
students had risen about 50% by the early 1960s, even before the quotas
15
had been fully eliminated.
Consider also statistics on business leadership. According to one
study, business leaders m the early twentieth century were 90 % Protestant,
7% Catholic, and 3% Jewsh, 316 while m the 1950s they remained at 86.5%
Protestant, 8.9% Catholic, and only 4.6% Jewish. 7 But this homogeneity
began to break down in the 1960s. A 1979 study showed that, of
executives just below the level of president and board chairman, only
68.4% were Protestant, with Catholics rising to 21.5% and Jews rising to
5.6% 318 Because the executives studied in 1979 had an average age of
53,319 it is apparent that by 1966, when those business leaders averaged 40
years of age and, thus, had already begun their ascent, many nonProtestants were moving into middle management. Change continued
apace over the next seven years, as demonstrated by a 1986 study that
examined the same category of executives as the 1979 study 31 This 1986
study showed that Protestant representation had declined to 58.3 %, while
Catholic and Jewish representation had risen to 27.1 % and 7 4% respectively 321 The 1986 study also showed that 13% of executives under 40 in
314. BALTZELL, supra note 169, at 336-37, 339.

315. See id.at 341.
316. Frances W Gregory & Irene D. Neu, The American IndustrialElite in the 1870's:

Their Social Origins, in MEN INBUsiNESS: ESSAYS INTHE HISTORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
193, 200 (William Miller ed., 1952).
317 See MABEL NEWCOMER, THE BIG BUSINESS ExEcuTIVE: THE FACTORS THAT MADE
HIM, 1900-1959, at 48 (1955).
318. See KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL'S ExEcuTIVE PROFILE: A SURVEY OF
CORPORATE LEADERS IN THE EIGHTIES 45 (1986).
319. Seeid. at23.

320. See d. at 45.
321. See d.
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that year were Jewish, indicating that Jews began to enter corporate
management in even larger numbers in the 1970s. 31
Impressionistic evidence confirms this statistical data. In a 1979
article, the New York Times reported that "in a cultural, educational and
social explosion, Catholics have brushed aside the old barriers and made
striking gains to reach
positions of power once demed to their
forebears." 3" This article noted that "[m]any [Catholic business] executives would say that they have found little, if any anti-Catholic prejudices
to trip them up." 3 Similarly, a 1980 New York Times article noted that
"proportionately more Jews than m the past ha[d] been taking jobs [as
managers] in corporations," 3" while a 1983 article "showed that Jews are
not underepresented [sic] on the nation's largest public corporations" and
took note of many highly successful Jewish executives and entrepreneurs. 3 6
Another article, published in- 1986, concluded that banks had "begun to
open key jobs to Jews, Italians and others" 327 and that "what ha[d] been
happening in banking ha[d] been also occurring elsewhere," with "[m]embers of ethnic groups who had once been excluded in some heavy industries
beginning to move into top jobs. "3 The article also "predict[ed] that
the ethnic and religious diversity at the top levels
will continue to
increase as .the system [becomes] more competitive, and as more and
more people from ethnic groups fill the pipelines at management's lower
level.

329

We will never fully work out the complex relationship between the
legal doctrines that are the topic of this Article and the socio-economic
developments just sketched. We will never know whether legal change
322.

See id., see also Robert A. Bennett, No Longer a WASP Preserve, N.Y. TIMES, June

29, 1986, at C28.
323. U.S. CatholicsFind PrejudicesWaning, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1979, at A9.
324. Id. at A12.
325. See Robert Lmdsey, Jews in the Thousands JoinMigrationto Sun Belt, N.Y. TImEs,

Mar. 31, 1980, at A16.
326. See G. William Domhoff & Richard L. Zweigenhaft, Jews in the Corporate
Establishment, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 24, 1983, at C2.
327 Bennett, supra note 322, at C1.
328. Id. at C28.
329. See id., see also Marylin Bender, New Names in the BoardRoom: Ethnic Groups
Receiving Recognition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1971, at C3; Eric N. Berg, Jews Move up
Corporate Ladder Here: Shaker Woman Leads Attack on Management's Barriers, CLEV
PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 1978, at B1.
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promoted or responded to soclo-economic change, or whether the two
types of change merely occurred simultaneously as part of some larger
historical configuration. For present purposes, however, two central facts
must be remembered. The first is the judiciary's decision to respond to
ethmc demands for equality by protecting religious rights, applying statutes
m helpful fashions, and otherwise deciding cases when they could to assist
the ethnic cause. Judges persistently refused, however, to elaborate a
formal, legally enforceable right to equality The second fact to remember
is that, even without the help of a legal right, New York's Catholics and
Jews somehow attained their goals of assimilation and equality
IV Brown v Board of Education and the Emergence of
MulticulturalEquality
A. The Brown Case and the Ongins of Rights Jurisprudence
The year 1938 was the first key year in the story that this Article is
relating. In this year of New York's Constitutional Convention, ideologies
came together in new ways. Republicans, as we have seen, articulated
their fears about how urban underclasses might act lawlessly to gain socioeconomic preeminence, while Democrats for the first tune expressed their
fears of Nazi-like police repression and their hopes that the descendents of
the immigrants they represented might some day attain equality The
origins of the drive for white ethnic equality, which ultimately reached full
fruition in the 1970s and 1980s, can to a significant extent be traced back
to the year 1938.
Also in 1938, Senator Robert F Wagner spoke at the New York
Constitutional Convention, and Justice Harlan Fiske Stone penned the now
famous footnote four in United States v Carolene Products Co.,330 a case
in which one-half of the Justices in the majority were from New York.
There was a striking difference, however, between the ideology proclaimed
in Carolene Productsand the fashion in which New York judges deployed
that ideology over the course of the next two decades. Justice Stone's
footnote proposed "searching judicial inquiry" and "exacting judicial
scrutiny" to protect rights that specific provisions of the Constitution
embraced and to overcome "prejudice against discrete and insular
mnorities" unable to protect themselves in the ordinary operations of the
330. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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political process.33 The footnote seemed to envision an activist judiciary
engaged in legal enforcement of formal constitutional rights, especially the
right to equality As we have seen, however, this was not the role that
New York judges would play during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, the
New Yorkjudiciary behaved during those decades as if footnote four had
never been written.
New York judges began to change their approach and become more
rights conscious only in the aftermath of Brown v Board of Education.332
Ultimately, Brown would have a profound impact not only on the subject
of race relations law, but on issues far beyond race by introducing into
New York's law the concept of a judicially enforceable right to which
subordinated individuals could turn to obtain equality Brown's progeny
would constitute the first cases in which New York courts proclaimed a
right to equality as the appropriate means to attain the goal of equality
Brown marked such a striking departure from earlier New York law
dealing with issues of discrimination because racial inequality differed
significantly from the other forms of inequality with which New York had
been familiar. Three factors made racial inequality different. First, the
level of government that committed discriminatory acts was different: in
the Southern cases that led to Brown, state legislatures had discriminated
by statute, whereas mumcipal bodies were the main discriminatory actors
m the New York cases that we have studied. Second, victims of discrimination in New York had access to political power from the highest to the
lowest levels of government, whereas Southern blacks at the time of Brown
were totally excluded from politics.
These two differences led to the third. Because Southern blacks had
to overcome state legislation to achieve equality and had to do so without
deploying any political influence, they had nowhere to seek relief except
the courts. The courts, in turn, had only two choices: either they could
recogmze a judicially enforceable right to equality, or they could allow
perpetuation of the formal legal subordination of African-Americans.
Catholics, Jews, and other victims of discrimination in New York, in
contrast, had broader options. They could publicize their victimization 333
331. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
332. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
333. See, e.g., Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress,
A Survey of the Expenence of Winners ofNew York State Medical and Dental Scholarshipsfor
1951 in SeelangAdmission to New York ProfessionalSchools (unpublished manuscript, on file

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (1995)

and lobby for relief,334 and their publicity and lobbying mattered because
they had the votes and, hence, the power in electoral contests to back up
their other activities. For Catholics and Jews in mid-twentieth-century
New York, lawsuits were only a small aspect of their overall economic,
political, and social campaign for equality They could view "[s]ledgehammer techniques," such as the imposition of "sanctions authorized by
law," as "a last resort" and could hope that "conciliation [would] follow"
any judicial or legislative victory335 so that they would be welcomed into
the oppressors' society and could take full advantage of their victories.
Thus, for the religious and ethnic minorities of mid-twentieth-century New
York, legal victories were a mechanism for providing individuals with
economic and social opportunity For Southern blacks in the 1940s and
1950s, on the other hand, legal rights were all that could be obtained.
Thus, rights jurisprudence took hold somewhat slowly even in race
discrimination cases in New York. Not until four years after Brown did
a New York judge explicitly find the existence of racial discrimination and
grant a remedy in response. Moreover, a whole decade passed after Brown
before state judges entered into the business of remedying racial discrimination with any frequency and thereby began to provide serious enforcement for a formal right of equality
The intital finding of discrimination and grant of a remedy occurred
in an unusual case, in which parents were brought to court for neglecting
their children by refusing to send them to their assigned public junior high
schools. 36 The parents justified their refusal on the ground that the schools
in question, "all of whose pupils [were] either Negro or Puerto Rican,"
offered "educationally inferior opportunities as compared to the opportumwhose pupil population [was] largely white."n'
ties offered m schools
with the Library of American Jewish Committee, New York, N.Y.).

334. See, e.g., Letter from Herman L. Weisman, Chairman, Commission on Law and
Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, to John P Myers, Chancellor, Board of
Regents (June 13, 1953) (on file with the Library of American Jewish Committee, New York,

N.Y.).
335. Lawrence Bloomgarden, Director of Committee on Higher Education of the New
York Chapter of the American Jewish Committee, A PreliminaryAnalysis of Discrimination
againstJewish Applicantsfor Admission to Medical Schools in New York State 6 (May 7,
1952) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Library of American Jewish Committee, New
York, N.Y.).
336. See In re Skipwith, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y County 1958).
337 Id. at 855.
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The court agreed and held that, as a result of patterns of teacher assignment, "inferior educational opportunities" existed in schools with a
predominantly minority student body and thereby deprived students of "the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. "33 The court
continued:
[D]etermmation, resourcefulness and leadership can bring the situation in
the New York City school system into line with the constitutional
guarantee.
Until then, the Board of Education has no moral or legal
right to ask that this Court shall pumsh parents, or deprive them of
custody of their children, for refusal to accept an unconstitutional
condition.
These parents have the constitutionally guaranteed right
to elect no education for their children rather than to subject them to
discrimnatorily inferior education.339

For the next six years, however, state courts did not follow up. Three
years later, m Taylor v Board of Education,3" a federal district court did
find upon a detailed examination of the facts "that the Board of Education
of New Rochelle, prior to 1949, [had] intentionally created
a racially
segregated school,
and that the conduct of the Board of Education even
since 1949 ha[d] been motivated by the purposeful desire of maintaimng
the
racially segregated school. "341 The court therefore directed the
Board to develop and present a plan for desegregation. 4 During the rest
of the 1960s and into the 1970s, analogous federal court decisions arrived
at the same result.343
But it was not until the mid 1960s that the State Education Department
and local boards of education began to redraw school zone boundaries and
reassign students to improve racial balance in schools. Once this occurred,
338. Id. at 872-73.
339. Id.
340. 191 F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
341. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F Supp. 181, 183 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 294 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1961).
342. Id. at 197-98.
343. See Hart v. Community Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Brody-Jones
v. Macchiarola, 503 F Supp. 1185 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F Supp. 206
(W.D.N.Y. 1977); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y 1964). Absent
a finding of intentional discrimination on the part of school officials, however, no federal
constitutional violation existed and injunctive relief would not lie. See Parent Ass'n of
Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979); Bryant v. Board of
Educ., 274 F Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y 1967).
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both state and federal courts routinely upheld the administrative action,344
and a federal court held that the Legislature's attempt to limit the authority
of nonelected administrators to order racial balance was unconstitutional.'
In a clear statement of the right to racial equality, the three-judge court that

invalidated the New York legislation observed that the statute "recognize[d]
and accede[d] to local racial hostility" in a way that would "make it more
difficult for racial minorities to achieve goals that are in their interest. The
statute thus operate[d] to disadvantage a minority, a racial minority," and
thereby constituted a "political" decision for which there could "be no
sufficient justification. "s46
Once New York judges fully accepted equal protection in the mid1960s as a judicially enforceable right, they adhered to it faithfully and
vigorously For example, the equal protection principle came to govern
the New York judiciary's response to affirmative action efforts to recruit
minority students to the state's colleges and universities. Thus, in one
case, a trial judge rejected a request by city authorities to revoke Syracuse
University's tax exemption because the University was teaching a series of
"race relations courses" that were "not open
on an equal basis," but
were available only to "a closed group" composed primarily of local
residents of minority background, many of whom "were undoubtedly
unqualified for admission to the university's undergraduate schools." 347
The judge found these facts to be a "virtue, not
[a] defect" and
concluded that the city's arguments were "irrelevant" to the University's
tax exempt status because the challenged program "fill[ed] a need in the
adult's life or career. "348
344. See Offermann v. Nitkowsla, 248 F Supp. 129 (W.D.N.Y 1965), a'd, 378 F.2d
22 (2d Cir. 1967); Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
825 (1965); Balaban v Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881
(1964); Tinsley v Monserrat, 307 N.Y.S.2d 888 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), rev'd on other
grounds, 26 N.Y.2d 110, 257 N.E.2d 28 (1970); Strippoli v. Bickal, 250 N.Y.S.2d 969 (App.
Div 4th Dep't 1964); Udut v. Nyquist, 314 N.Y.S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1970);
Etter v Littwitz, 268 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966), aff'd, 282 N.Y.S.2d
724 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1967); Van Blerkom v. Donovan, 254 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Sup. Ct. N.Y
County), aff'd, 253 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1964), af4'd, 15 N.Y.2d 399, 207
N.E.2d 503 (1965).

345. See Lee v Nyquist, 318 F Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y 1970), aft'd, 402 U.S. 935
(1971).
346. Id. at 720.
347 In re Syracuse Univ., 300 N.Y.S.2d 129, 135-36 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1969).
348. Id. at 136.
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In Alevy v Downstate Medical Cehter,34 9 a more important case
decided two years before the Supreme Court confronted essentially the
same issue in Regents of University of Californiav Bakke,35 the New York
Court of Appeals also upheld affirmative action as a remedy for past
discrimination. 35 1 The court's unanimous opinion observed that the
Fourteenth Amendment had "been interpreted as permitting, if in fact not
requiring, the correction of historical invidious discriminations" and that
it "would cut against the very grain of the amendment, were the equal
protection clause used to strike down measures designed to achieve real
equality for persons whom it was intended to aid. "352 At the same time,
however, the court expressed doubt about merely "[g]ranting preferential
treatment to some racial groups," which in its judgment "encourage[d]
perpetuate[d] thinking in racial terms and
polarization of the races,
require[d] extremely difficult racial determinations. "I' Eminent federal
judges in New York also struck down affirmative action programs
extending beyond remediation, 314 and the federal courts made it otherwise
clear that "a private organization of blacks" could not use "a public facility
to carry out its discriminatory practices" in connection with improving
education for minority students.355
Still, New York judges remained overwhelmingly committed to
judicial protection of equal rights. Thus they were prepared to hear and
potentially remedy constitutional claims of racial discrimination on the part
of child adoption agencies,35 6 claims alleging discriminatory denials of
membership in volunteer fire departments357 and in clubs operating on
349. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537 (1976).
350. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
351. See Alevy v Downstate Medical Ctr., 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537 (1976).
352. Id. at 335, 348 N.E.2d at 545.
353. Id.
354. See Hupart v. Board of Higher Educ., 420 F Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y 1976)
(Frankel, J.); cf. Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 449 F Supp. 1203 (E.D.N.Y.) (Weinstein, J.)
(refusing to approve agreement made without public hearings between City Board and Office
of Civil Rights of U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare that called for
assignment of teachers to schools on basis of race), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 583 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978).
355. Auerbach v African Am. Teachers Ass'n, 356 F Supp. 1046, 1048 (E.D.N.Y

1973).
356. See Child v. Beame, 412 F Supp. 593, 608-09 (S.D.N.Y 1976).

357

See Everett v. Riverside Hose Co. No. 4, 261 F Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y 1966).
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municipal property,358 and claims that government did not equally fund
municipal services m minority communities.359 There was also a case that
invalidated an airline antihijacking system that relied on a profile of
individual characteristics, including ethnicity 36 Far more numerous were
suits granting enforcement of civil rights legislation, especially fair housing
laws designed to provide relief against discriminatory housing and zoning
362
policies 361 and equal employment laws prohibiting racial discrimination.
358. See Citizens Council on Human Relations v. Buffalo Yacht Club, 438 F Supp. 316,
321 (W.D.N.Y 1977).
359 This was not true for claims that equal funding produced infenor facilities as a result
of community conditions. See Beal v Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972).
360. See United States v Lopez, 328 F Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y 1971).
361. See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1080 (1971); State
Conm'n for Human Rights v Kennelly, 291 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div 2d Dep't), t'd, 23
N.Y.2d 722, 244 N.E.2d 58 (1968); Diona v. Lomenzo, 275 N.Y.S.2d 663 (App. Div 1st
Dep't 1966); Marrano Constr. Co. v. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 259 N.Y.S.2d 4 (Sup.
Ct. Erie County 1965); State Comm'n Against Discrimination v Pelham Hall Apartments,
Inc., 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1958); cf. Fair Hous. Dev. Fund Corp.
v. Burke, 55 F.R.D. 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusing to join additional parties so as to expedite
decision of lawsuit); State Div of Human Rights v New Star Homes Dev Corp., 389
N.Y.S.2d 386 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1976) (measuring damages in housing discrimination
cases); In re Martin, 188 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1959) (affirming power of
New York City Commission on Intergroup Relations to issue subpoenas). But see Acevedo
v County of Nassau, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that county had no affirmative
duty to construct low income housing for minority groups). For two cases in which
insufficient evidence of discrinination was found, see Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v.
Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); English v Town
of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Berback v. Mangum, 297 N.Y.S.2d 853
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County) (upholding constitutionality of exemption from fair housing laws
of owner-occupied two family houses held for rental), aft'd, 306 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div
4th Dep't 1969).
362. See Kirkland v State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975);
Umted States v City of Buffalo, 457 F Supp. 612 (W.D.N.Y 1978), t'd, 633 F.2d 643 (2d
Cir. 1980); Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dep't, Inc. v Civil Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 431 F Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y 1977), af'd in part & rev'd in part, 633 F.2d 232
(2d Cir. 1979), t"d, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Percy v Brennan, 384 F Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y
1974); Richardson v Civil Serv Comm'n, 387 F Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y 1973); State
Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964). For
cases in which courts found insufficient evidence of discrimination, see New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Townsend v. Nassau County Medical Ctr., 558 F.2d
117 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Carrion v Yeshiva Unv., 535 F.2d
722 (2d Cir. 1976); Smith v. Carey, 473 F Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y 1979); see also South Afr.
Airways v State Div of Human Rights, 315 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1970)
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It seems fair to conclude that on the subject of race relations, federal
and state judges in New York not only faithfully enforced, but after the
mid-1960s even welcomed the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate in Brown,
as well as various specific legislative initiatives designed to remedy
discrimination. The judges were even prepared to extend their rightscentered equal protection jurisprudence beyond the race relations area.
They extended it to one case, for example, in which a white attorney "of
Italian ancestry and a Catholic" sued Cravath, Swaine & Moore for
employment discrimination and unlawful termination of employment. 63
Brown v Board of Education and its progeny thus introduced into
New York law a new paradigm of a judicially enforceable right to equality
Over time, courts extended the paradigm to provide a remedy for forms of
nonracial discrimination, until in the 1970s, as we shall see, the new
paradigm became dominant. As it did, the concept of equality was
transformed from an amorphous, but nonetheless real and attainable, goal
to a firm and hearty right that provided a model for all constitutionalism.
The meaning of equality also changed in another important respect.
Whereas early egalitarians had pursued the goal of enabling the urban,
immigrant underclass to adopt elite, WASP cultural norms and thereby
assimilate and integrate into the mainstream of society, newer rights
egalitarians ceased to show respect for traditional norms and instead
demanded that subordinated groups receive the right to develop their own
culture and to live by their own lights on a level playing field with others.
Although Brown itself did not contemplate this shift to multiculturalism,
but merely sought to integrate African-Americans into the mainstream in
the same way that Catholics and Jews were being assimilated, the shift was
implicit m Brown. The Court in Brown demanded that African-American
equality be achieved with "all deliberate speed,"" not as a long-term goal
over an extended period of tine. For this reason, the Court gave blacks
(holding that state agency lacked jurisdiction to consider claim of racial discrimination by
international air carrier); cf. Image Carrier Corp. v Beanie, 567 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1977)

(allowing city to refuse to grant municipal contracts to firms employing nonunion labor), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1979).
363. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F Supp. 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But
see Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that "conclusory"

allegation that plaintiff "was dismissed from Is position because of his race [and] would not
have been dismissed from his position if he were a Negro instead of being white" was

insufficient to state claim for relief).
364. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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a legal right to equality in the short term. The difficulty was that full
assimilation could be achieved only over an extended period, at least if
assimilation was understood, as it had been by Catholic and Jewish
immigrants and their descendants at mid-century, as the abandonment of
minority cultural values and the assumption of the values of the majority "
No group can undergo such a transformation overmght or probably over
a period of less than several decades. Thus, if blacks were to gain equality
quickly, they could do so only by gaining equal recognition for what they
already were rather than by striving successfully over tune to become
something else.
None of this was apparent, however, when the U.S. Supreme Court
issued the Brown opinions. Multiculturalism was a gradual development
that did not fully bloom until the end of the 1960s. And other factors, in
addition to teasing out the implications of Brown, contributed to
multiculturalism's emergence. Thus, a more fulsome understanding of
multiculturalism requires a detailed examination of its emergence.
B. Anger and Protest as New Forms of Equality
The majority opinion in People v Stover," it will be recalled, had
exemplified the classic mid-twentieth-century social ideal of rational and
civil discourse on the part of all groups in society in pursuit of the common
good. Because the Stovers had breached this ideal with their offensive
protest, they had been held subject to criminal liability 367 The offensiveness of their clothesline 68 was tame, however, compared to what would
become commmonplace in the new world that burst forth in the mid-1960s.
Consider, for example, the objects that Stephen Radich displayed in
1966 in his Madison Avenue art gallery, some of which were visible at
least partly from the street.369 The objects were obviously intended to
shock. Among them was "a seven-foot 'cross with a bishop's mitre on the
head-piece, the arms wrapped in ecclesiastical flags and an erect penis
wrapped in an American flag protruding from the vertical standard,"' the
365. See SPERANZA, supra note 271, at 31-33, 257-59, 262-67
366. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963).
367 See supra notes 302-11 and accompanying text.
368. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 463, 191 N.E.2d 272, 273 (1963), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); see supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
369. See United States ex rel. Radich v Criminal Court, 385 F Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y
1974).
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purpose of which was "to express protest against the American involvement
in Vietnam. "370
After Radich was convicted of casting contempt on the American flag
and his conviction was affirmed, both by the New York Court of Appeals
and by an equally divided U.S. Supreme Court, 37' his case came before a
federal district court on habeas corpus.'
In overturning Radich's
conviction, the federal court ruled that his display "did not rape the flag of
its umversal symbolism," but "simply transferred the symbol from
traditional surroundings to the realm of protest and dissent. "3 In language
strikingly different from that used in the many previous cases that had
sanctioned repression of dissent, the district court declared that the First
Amendment afforded citizens "the right
, even, to deprecate those
symbols which others hold dear."374 It was the "birthright [of] Americans"
that "the free dissemination of ideas, the thoughts of all free-thinking men,
even the smallest dissenting voice, might be heard without fear of
prosecution."375 Moreover, this "freedom to differ [was] not limited to
things that do not matter much," but included "things that touch[ed] the
heart of the existing order [and] ideas [that were] defiant, contemptuous or
unacceptable to most Americans. "376

So much for offensive clotheslines. Within five years of Stover, the
character of political discourse on the part of those demanding social
change had been transformed, largely as a result of the civil rights and
antiwar protest movements of the mid- and late-1960s.
By the mid-1960s, the civil rights movement was decades old, Brown
v Board of Education had been the law for ten years, and AfricanAmericans had experienced little, if any, improvement in their lives. In a
widely publicized 1966 speech, Stokely Carmichael, a young militant who
370. Id. at 168-69.
371. See People v. Radich, 279 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Crim. Ct. N.Y County 1967), af'd, 294
N.Y.S.2d 285 (App. Term. 1st Dep't 1968), af4'd, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970),

aff'd by equally divided Court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971); see also United States Flag Found., Inc.
v. Radich, 279 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1967) (denying motion to dismiss civil
action for damages against Radich). But see People v. Keough, 31 N.Y.2d 281, 290 N.E.2d

819 (1972) (reversing conviction for displaying photographs of nude female draped with flag).
372. .See Radich, 385 F Supp. at 167
373. Id. at 178.
374. Id. at 183.

375. Id.
376. Id. at 183-84.
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had just assumed the leadership of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, made this point with the declaration that: "We been saying
'freedom' for six years and we ain't got nothing." In his view, the tne
had come to demand "black power "s3 Malcolm X had made the same
point a few years earlier in a debate at Cornell Umversity, at which he
announced that he could no longer believe in "the American dream"378 of
assimilationist equality He explained:
[Diark mankind wants freedom, justice, and equality It is not a case of
wanting integration or separation, it is a case of wanting freedom, justice,
and equality
[B]ecause we don't have any hope or confidence or
faith in the American white man's ability to bring about a change in the
injustices that exist, instead of asking or seeking to integrate into the
American society, we want to face the facts of the problem the way they
are, and separate ourselves.
We feel, that if integration all these years hasn't solved the problem
yet, then we want to try something new, something different and
something that is in accord with the conditions as they actually exist.379
As another radical added, Ins "fight" was "not to be a white man in a black
skin." 3" Blacks did not want "the right to be like" whites, but "freedom
for us to be black, or brown, and you to be white and yet live together m
a free and equal society." 381 Ultimately, that meant freedom "to inject
some black blood, some black intelligence into the pallid mainstream of
American life. "3
Like blacks, the young antiwar protesters of the 1960s felt that to be
"American [was] to have been betrayed
[and] enraged." 3 3 Privileged
377 Quoted in DAVID BOWEN, THE STRUGGLE WrrIN: RACE RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 158 (rev ed. 1972).
378. Malcolm X & James Farmer, Separation or Integration: A Debate, DIALOGUE
MAGAZINE, May 1962, at 14, reprintedin NEGRO PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 357, 363 (Francis L. Broderick & August Meier eds., 1965).
379. Id. at 361, 363.
380. John 0. Killens, Explanationof the "BlackPsyche, "N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1964, § 6
(MAGAZINE), at 37, 42.
381. Id.

382. Id. See generallyBOWEN, supra note 377, at 149-74; WILLIAM H. GREER & PRICE
M. COBBS, BLACK RAGE 200-13 (1968). For two now classic statements, see ELDRIDGE
CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968); MALCOLM X., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965).
383. TODD GrrLIN, THE SIxTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 286 (1987).
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children of the upper and middle class, they had first grown politically
aware in the opening years of the 1960s - years of "rising hope." When,
m the middle of the decade, they faced "the denial of hope and terror at the
prospect of annihilation," the antiwar protestors did not respond as their
parents had by seeking to perfect the American system; instead, they
concluded that "'America [was] a crime"' burdened with not "simply bad
policy but a wrongheaded social system, even a civilization."3"4 Their
protests had "'no "political" meaning in the old sense
of changing the
country purposively "'I' They were "not [in] the mood to generate ideas
about a reconstruction of politics. "3 Their "only affirmative position was
negation," as they strove to "shatter ordinary patterns of expectation" for
the purpose "of stopping the war by stopping America in its tracks. "I"
As a result of cases arising out of radical 1960s protest, it became
"firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas
may not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are
offensive. "88 In addition to cases involving disrespect for the flag, 89 other
antiwar protest cases in which First Amendment rights were judicially
protected involved a teacher who wore a black arm band, 391 a group of
eighty-six students who held an antiwar meeting in an apartment, 391 and
various individuals who gave antiwar speeches or distributed antiwar
literature on streets, in parks, or in public transportation facilities. 39
384. Id. at 256-57
385. Id. at 256.

386. Id. at 257
387 Id. at 256-257
388. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (overturning conviction of AfricanAmerican who, on learning of shooting of James Meredith, declared while burning flag, "We

don't need no damn flag," and, "[i]f they let that happen to Meredith we don't need an
American flag"), rev'g 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187 (1967).

389. See Russo v Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (reversing
dismissal of suit brought by teacher dismissed for refusing to pledge allegiance to flag), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Cahn, 437 F.2d

344 (2d Cir. 1970) (enjonung prosecution for affixing peace symbol to flag),
906 (1974).

7t'd, 418 U.S.

390. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042

(1972).
391. See Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y 1973).
392. See Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 268 F Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y 1967), af4'd,
392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); People v. Cagan, 304 N.Y.S.2d

856 (App. Term. 1st Dep't 1969) (per curain); People v. St. Clair, 288 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Crnm.
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Likewise, courts ordered the State Athletic Commission to give Muhammad Ali a boxing license even though he had been convicted of draft
evasion,319 directed a local school district to allow Pete Seeger to use a high
school auditorium for a concert despite his "controversial" views,3 94 and
demed the New York City Commissioner of Parks the power to condition
a permit for a poetry reading upon advance disclosure of the contents of the
poetry 195 Other controversial cases in which courts protected First
Amendment rights involved an authorization to black activists to picket
Southern state pavilions at the New York World's Fair,396 an order
allowing an anti-abortion group to march in a Memorial Day parade,3" and
directions to reinstate a corrections officer who had been dismissed and a
school teacher who had been suspended from their jobs for membership m
the Ku Klux Klan398 and for criticizing the school admimstration 39
Ct. N.Y County 1968); People v. Krebs, 282 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998-1001 (Crim. Ct. N.Y
County 1967); People v. Kaufman, 264 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Crim. Ct. N.Y County 1965); cf.
Kissinger v New York City Transit Auth., 274 F Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y 1967) (refusing to
dismiss suit to compel transit authority to accept antiwar advertising). But cf. Cornell Umv.
v. Livingston, 332 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1972); Board of Higher Educ.
v Students for Democratic Soc'y, 300 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969)
(enjoining student and faculty occupation of unversity facilities); see also United States v.
Jones, 244 F Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y 1965) (upholding prosecution for picketing federal

courthouse).
393. Cf. Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 316 F Supp. 1246
(S.D.N.Y 1970). But cf. Muhammad Ali v Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F
Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dismissing complaint for insufficiency of allegations, but granting
leave to replead).
394. See East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 19 N.Y.2d 605,
224 N.E.2d 888 (1967) (per curam). But see County of Sullivan v Filippo, 315 N.Y.S.2d
519, 539-40 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970) (enjoining rock concert expected to draw 50,000
people and last over 18 hours).
395. See Percikow v Morms, 263 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1965) (per
curiam).
396. See Farmer v Moses, 232 F Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y 1964).
397 See North Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhasset Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452
F Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y 1978).
398. See Curie v. Ward, 399 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1977), modified, 46
N.Y.2d 1049, 389 N.E.2d 1070 (1979).
399. See Puentes v. Board of Educ., 24 N.Y.2d 996, 250 N.E.2d 232 (1969) (mem.);
accord Aebisher v. Ryan, 622 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Thomas v Board of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1979) (reinstating students dismissed for off-campus publication of
.morally offensive, indecent, and obscene" magazine), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
But cf Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y 1979) (holding that school principal
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respectively. Courts also prohibited draft boards from punitively
reclassifying registrants who participated in antiwar protests4 and
sustained a civil rights action brought on behalf of a speaker and a member
of the audience at a birth control lecture. 410 Several other cases, decided
both for and against students, arose out of campus protests. 4°2
While the precedents upholding freedom of speech accumulated
in cases in which the protected speech offended many members
of the community, the scope of free speech rights also grew in cases
involving ordinary political speech 4°s and even potentially subversive
may suppress publication of official school newspaper containing libelous or disruptive
material); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F Supp. 238, 241-42 (E.D.N.Y 1969) (holding that
students' First Amendment rights were not violated by dismissal for distribution of "Peace
Strike" materials).
400. See Wolff v Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
401. See Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y 1975); Gordon v
Walkley, 34 N.Y.2d 927, 316 N.E.2d 870 (1974) (permitting distribution of sex education
booklet at state fair), rev'g, 344 N.Y.S.2d 233 (App. Div 3d Dep't 1973).
402. Compare Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (reinstating
student) and Ryan v. Hofstra Umv., 324 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971) (same)
with Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968) (upholding student suspension) and Grossner
v Trustees of Columbia Umv., 287 F Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y 1968) (upholding university
discipline as nonreviewable because no state action). For other student discipline cases
unrelated to protest, see Tedeschi v. Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302
(1980); Oefelein v. Monsignor Farrell High Sch., 353 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. Richmond
County 1974). For cases dealing with free speech and other constitutional rights of faculty,
see Wabba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974);
Jones v Kneller, 482 F Supp. 204 (E.D.N.Y 1979), aft'd, 633 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 920 (1980); Whitaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F Supp. 99
(E.D.N.Y 1978).
403. See Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 838 (1974); New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Village of Roslyn
Estates, 498 F Supp. 922 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); People v. Taub, 37 N.Y.2d 530, 337 N.E.2d 754
(1975); People v Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County), aff'd, 354 N.Y.S.2d
129 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1974) (per cunram); People v. Solomonow, 291 N.Y.S.2d 145 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1968); Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1962);
People v Dominick, 326 N.Y.S.2d 466 (Erie County Ct. 1971); People v Yolen, 267
N.Y.S.2d 925 (Crun. Ct. N.Y. County 1966); cf. Firestone v First Dist. Dental Soc'y, 299
N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1969) (finding regulations of state connected
organization requiring prior approval of members' publications unconstitutional as applied);
see also Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F Supp. 803, 817-18 (S.D.N.Y 1979)
(finding that private group has First Amendment right to organize to influence government
policy); Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of World Christianity v. New York State Congress
of Parents and Teachers, Inc., 408 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1978) (upholding
right of State Congress to criticize plaintiff's activities unless proof of malicious purpose

52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 (1995)

activity I Commercial speech also gamed constitutional protection.' ° As
a result, the nature of public dialogue changed. In four short years in the
mld-1960s, the right to free speech changed from "freedom to speak, write,

print or distribute information or opimon" that would engage governing
elites in discourse affecting policy 6 to the right to be an individual whose
behavior was "non-conforming, whose dress [was] bizarre, and whose

conduct [was] unconventional."

7

It became legitimate, for example; for

protesters to use words such as "'murder"' and "'kill"' on placards outside
shown); Pare v Donovan, 281 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967) (dismissing
petitions to halt dissemination of pamphlets by parents associations). For cases that failed,
often for appropriate reasons of time, place, and manner, to protect free speech rights, see
Concerned Jewish Youth v McGuire, 621 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
913 (1981); United States Labor Party v Codd, 527 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1975); Cavanagh v
Galamison, 297 N.Y.S.2d 651 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1968); Port Auth. v. SST Concorde Alert
Program, 394 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1977); Gibbons v. O'Reilly, 253
N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1964); Pruzan v. Board of Educ., 209 N.Y.S.2d
966 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1960), aff'd, 215 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Div 1st Dep't), af4'd, 9
N.Y.2d 911, 176 N.E.2d 96 (1961); see also People v Stock, 390 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1976) (upholding prohibition against advertising on automobiles riding on
parkways as applied to political sign).
404. See Keyishian v Board of Regents of Univ of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Anderson v. Moses, 185 F Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y 1960). But cf. Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council, Inc. v Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
405. See Quinn v Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 616 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1980); Wright v
Chief of Transit Police, 558 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1977); People v Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d
192, 397 N.E.2d 724 (1979); People v Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355 N.E.2d 375 (1976);
Quinn v Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 409 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978);
Harris v City of Buffalo, 394 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1977); People v State
D.A. Investigators, P.B.A., 428 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1980) (finding that
local ordinance that regulated fundraising and solicitation on behalf of law enforcement
organization violated equal protection); cf. Friedman v Umon Free Sch. Dist. No. 1, 314 F
Supp. 223 (E.D.N.Y 1970) (enjoimng enforcement of regulation prohibiting distribution of
umon literature through school mailboxes); Grayson v Christian, 407 N.Y.S.2d 896 (App.
Div 2d Dep't) (requiring hearing before tenants can be removed from public housing for
criticizing managing officials), appeal dismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 729, 385 N.E.2d 1300, and
appealdismissed, 46 N.Y.2d 705, 385 N.E.2d 1303 (1978). Courts continued, however, to
uphold restrictions on door-to-door solicitations. See Ad-Express, Inc. v. Kirvin, 516 F.2d
195 (2d Cir. 1975); People v. Walkenhorst, 287 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Special Sess. Nassau County
1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 299 N.Y.S.2d 912 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1969). For an early,
but aberrational case providing constitutional protection for commercial speech, see
Chrestensen v Valentine, 34 F Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y 1940).
406. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 469, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276 (quoting Schneider v
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939)), appealdismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
407 People v. Wise, 281 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (Crim. Ct. N.Y County 1967).
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an abortion clime, even though the words were "provocative and controversial. " 8 In parallel fashion, equal protection changed from a concept that
allowed underclasses who assumed elite values to move upward into the
social and economic mainstream to a doctrine that prohibited "exclusive use"

of public space by "any one group to the exclusion of others," even when an
[a] new group" that was
established group "resented the invasion by
"unwashed, unshod, unkempt, and uninhibited. "
These shifts in free speech doctrine represented a more general judicial
recognition of the decline discussed above in public manners, decency, and

civility - a recognition reflected, for instance, m a decision by the New
York Court of Appeals that held the crime of vagrancy unconstitutional.410
As the court observed, the "only persons arrested and prosecuted as

common-law vagrants" were people "whose main offense usually consist[ed]
in their leaving the environs of skid row and disturbing by theirpresencethe
sensibilities of residents of nicer parts of the community "411 In another

decision that had a similar effect, the New York Court of Appeals refused
to enjoin a new 1970s policy of releasing most patients confined in state
mental hospitals. 412 Also under challenge during the early 1970s were
grooming standards for public officials and prisoners - standards that were
designed "to present a favorable image" or "to mspir[e] public confidence"
and "a sense of pride and self-discipline. 413 Traditional proprieties were

finally challenged in cases brought by adoptees asking to have their adoption
records unsealed,414 by transsexuals demanding new birth certificates that
408. O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 903,
906 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1978).
409. Wise, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 543.
410. See Fenster v Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426 (1967).
411. Id. at 315-16, 229 N.E.2d at 429 (emphasis in original).
412. See Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277 (1978). For cases dealing
with earlier policies designed to keep patients confined in mental hospitals, see In re
Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677 (1968); People ex rel. Anonymous v. LaBurt, 218
N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 2d Dep't), appealdented, 10 N.Y.2d 708, 179 N.E.2d 715 (1961).
413. Romano v Kirwan, 391 F Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y 1975) (invalidating grooming
regulations of New York State police); cf. Christman v. Skinner, 323 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1971) (invalidating grooming regulations for detainees awaiting trial). Contra
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976); Klotzbach v Callaway, 473 F Supp. 1337
(W.D.N.Y. 1979); Greenwald v. Frank, 363 N.Y.S.2d 955 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1975). The
constitutionality of regulations designed to promote job safety were never doubted. See
Kamerling v. O'Hagan, 512 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1975).
414. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); Rhodes v. Launno,
444 F Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Linda F.M., 409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (Sur. Ct. Bronx
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would reflect their new gender 41 5 and by various plaintiffs seeking to end
discrimination against illegitimate children.416

With these changes in law, the vision of America changed from a
melting pot, in which all people aspired to live with each other ultimately as
one, to a vision of a divided, pluralist culture, in which groups with
distinctive and even irreconcilable backgrounds, values, and styles competed
for their share of public space and the public good. These changes

transformed New York from a place of opportunity, where the lowliest man
through hard work and abidance by the values of his community could rise

to the top, to an international marketplace, where even foreigners could enter
into its public life as full participants m fields as diverse as law, 417 civil
service,418 taxicab driving,419 shellfishng,4m and the right to bid for and work
on state government contracts. 421 Cases also granted aliens and recent

arrivals from other American states quick access to public housing422 and
gave resident aliens equal rights to receive public educational funding.4"
County 1978); see also In re Ginnan, 422 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Fam. Ct. Steuben County 1979)
(holding that imprisoned parent lacks standing to challenge adoption of child); In re
Anonymous, 359 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1974) (same).
415. See Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1977); Hartin
v Director of Bureau of Records & Statistics, Dep't of Health, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y County 1973); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
416. See C. v. Ingraham, 298 N.Y.S.2d 545 (App. Div 4th Dep't 1969); In re Estate of
Ortiz, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1969); Storm v None, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515
(Fain. Ct. N.Y County 1968).
417 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
418. See Sugarman v Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
419. See Sundram v. City of Niagara Falls, 357 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County
1973).
420. See Hassan v Town of E. Hampton, 500 F Supp. 1034 (E.D.N.Y 1980).
421. See C.D.R. Enters., Ltd. v. Board of Educ., 412 F Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y 1976);
Salla v County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909 (1979). But foreigners could
be excluded from teaching and police work. See Ambach v Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); cf. Mazzo v County of Monroe, 397 N.Y.S.2d 274
(App. Div 4th Dep't 1977) (upholding requirement that deputy sheriff reside in county of
employment).
422. See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (striking
down 5-year residency requirement for admission to public housing); Lopez v White Plains
Hous. Auth., 355 F Supp. 1016, 1025-26 (S.D.N.Y 1972) (declaring citizenship requirement
invalid) (dictum). But see Lane v McGarry, 320 F Supp. 562 (N.D.N.Y 1970) (upholding
one-year residency requirement).
423. See Nyquist v Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). Contra Friedler v University of New
York, 333 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1972); see also Spatt v State of New York,
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With these decisions, New York became more readily accessible to widely
diverse people from all corners of the globe who had little need to learn its
ways before participating m broad aspects of its life.
Judicial approval of enhanced competition, the extension of equal
benefits to all, and a more open style of public debate did not, however,
mean that judges were ready to sanction subversion either of the polity itself
or of enforcement of laws m wich the polity had any substantial stake. In
People v Epton,4 4for instance, the Court of Appeals, over only one dissent,
had no difficulty upholding the defendant's conviction for violating the same
crinmal anarchy statute under which Benjamin Gitlow had been convicted
some four decades earlier.
Indeed, the cases involved remarkably similar efforts to arouse
underclasses to revolution through speech. Like Gitlow, Epton was "a selfacknowledged Marxist and president of the Harlem 'club' of the Progressive
Labor Movement." 4I In the spring of 1964, he had engaged in "formation
of a small cadre of followers, who, presumably, would play leadership roles
426
in the eventual revolution toward which their movement was directed."
When an off-duty police lieutenant killed an African-American youth in the
summer of 1964, and a "spontaneous build-up of pressures within the Negro
ghettoes of New York" resulted, Epton immediately "took to the streets of
Harlem preaching Ins gospel of revolution," and the "Harlem headquarters
of the Progressive Labor Movement became a beehive of activity with the
defendant exhorting those in attendance to organize
to combat the
police.""427 Undercover plainclothes agents infiltrated the movement,
however, and recorded much of what was spoken,428 including the following:
They [the cops] declared war on us and we should declare war on them

and every time they kill one of us damn it, we'll kill one of them and we
should start thinking that way right now
If we're going to be free,
and we will not be fully free until we smash thls state completely and
totally Destroy and set up a new state of our own choosing and of our
own liking. And in that process of making tis state, we're going to have
to kill a lot of these cops, a lot of these judges.

Think about it

361 F Supp. 1048 (E.D.N.Y 1973) (upholding state scheme limiting financial aid to residents
who attend colleges and universities in New York State).
424. 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967).
425. People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 501, 227 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1967).
426. Id., 227 N.E.2d at 832.
427 Id. at 501-02, 227 N.E.2d at 832.
428. Id. at 501-03, 227 N.E.2d at 831-33.
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because no people m this world have ever achieved independence and
freedom through the ballot or having it legislated to them. All people m
this world who are free have got their freedom through struggle and
through revolution.429
On the basis of his speeches alone - without any evidence that there was
"any direct, causal connection between Epton's activities and the Harlem
riots of the Summer of 1964" or, indeed, that anyone other than police
investigators was paying attention to what he was doing - Epton was
convicted of the crime of advocating criminal anarchy 430
In an opinion joined by erstwhile civil libertarians such as Stanley Fuld
and Kenneth Keating, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
criminal anarchy statute that the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld in Gitlow
v New York 3' over the now honored dissents of Justices Holmes and
Brandeis was still constitutional.432 The court recognized that "mere
advocacy of the violent overthrow of the Government" would no longer be
constitutional, but it reinterpreted the statute to require two additional
elements for a criminal conviction: "an intent to accomplish the overthrow"
and "a 'clear and present danger' that the advocated overthrow [might] be
attempted. "43 Despite the absence of any evidence that anyone had acted in
response to Epton's speeches or had even paid attention to them, the court
had no difficulty in finding both elements present.
In the end, Epton should be seen as an unprincipled opinion. The Epton
case shows that the clear and present danger standard does not focus, as it
purports, on the existence of a connection between advocacy and conduct;
proof or lack of proof about the events that transpired or might have been
about to transpire at the scene of a speech is irrelevant. What matters is
46
45
434
whether judges feel threatened. When, as in Gitlow, Denns, Feiner, 1
and Epton,4 7 they do, judges will authorize the use of raw force to preserve
the existing power structure and repress those who are threatening it.
429. Id. at 502, 227 N.E.2d at 832 (emphasis added).
430. Id. at 501, 227 N.E.2d at 831.
431. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
432. People v Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967).
433. Id. at 506, 227 N.E.2d at 835.
434. People v Gitlow, 187 N.Y.S.2d 783 (App. Div 1st Dep't 1921), aft'd, 234 N.Y
132, 136 N.E. 317 (1922), aff'd sub nom. Gitlow v New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
435. Dennis v United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
436. People v Feiner, 300 N.Y 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950).
437 People v Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967).
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The new tolerance during the late 1960s of unconventional, nonconforming, and even shocking speech thus did not reflect any willingness on

the part of judges to authorize political action that threatened destabilization
of the political system. Accordingly, this new tolerance represented much
less change than had at first appeared to be the case. It represented change
from a world in which elites could expect their underlings to emulate them

to a world in which they could expect insult and offense. The new world
was much less pleasant and comfortable than the old, but it was also much

more secure.

Unlike emulation, insult and offense would not produce

upward mobility Insult and offense could be tolerated precisely because of
their irrelevance and because the full coercive power of government would

be brought to bear upon an advocate of criminal activity the moment an
official felt threatened by such advocacy 438
A parallel decline of reverence for traditional symbols and the
substitution, m their stead, of a raucous, competitive marketplace also
occurred in several religious liberty cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

For example, the Sunday blue laws requiring the closing of commercial
establishments fell under immense pressure as the courts first carved a

variety of exceptions into them,439 then interposed procedural obstacles to
their enforcement,' 4 and finally declared them unconstitutional." Another
line of cases sanctioned the unconventional by upholding the right of
members of the Reverend Moon's Unification Church and of the Society for
Krishna Consciousness to solicit and to perform religious ceremomes in

public places, and even door-to-door in residential neighborhoods.

2

438. See Boikess v. Aspland, 24 N.Y.2d 136, 247 N.E.2d 135 (1969) (requiring public
advocates of drug use to appear before grand jury to testify about actual use of which they

knew).
439. See Haroche v Leary, 314 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970) (holding
travel agency exempt from blue laws because work of necessity); Schacht v. City of New
York, 243 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1963) (finding local closing legislation
invalid because of state preemption of field); People v. Kahl, 262 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1965) (permitting display of wares as long as no sales consumated).
440. See People v. L.A. Witherill, Inc., 29 N.Y.2d 446,278 N.E.2d 905 (1972) (holding
that only jury can declare forfeiture of property available for Sunday sale); People v. Star
Supermarkets, Inc., 339 N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1972) (invalidating prosecution
by way of grand jury indictment because breach of Sabbath law is violation rather than
misdemeanor or felony).
441. See People v. Abrahams, 40 N.Y.2d 277, 353 N.E.2d 574 (1976); People v Acme
Markets, Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 326, 334 N.E.2d 555 (1975); Twin Fair Distribs. Corp. v.
Cosgrove, 380 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1976).
442. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d
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Finally, the allowance of religious garb in courtrooms, if it did not devalue
religious symbolism, at the very least reflected judges' understanding that
the symbols had lost much of their sacerdotal force."
Of course, the line between the merely unconventional and shocking,
on the one hand, and the threatening and dangerous, on the other, was not
always clear. Thus, when African-Amencan prison inmates sought to hold
Muslim services in prison under the direction of the soon-to-be famous
Malcolm X, who had "'a previous criminal record,"' the Corrections
Commissioner denied the request as contrary to the "'interests of safety and
[of not]
[and to a] long standing policy
security of the institution
inmates to communicate with or to be ministered to by a
allowing
person with a criminal background.'"'4 In the face of this denal, the New
York Court of Appeals fractured. Three judges voted to sustain the
Commissioner's action, while three voted to honor the prisoners' religious
rights, bizarre as they may have seemed. The chief judge, observing in
a two-sentence concurrence that the state "must extend to petitioner and his
co-religionists all the rights guaranteed" by the correction law and the
Constitution, "subject to necessary security and disciplinary measures,"
cast the deciding vote." 5 The Black Muslims, whom many whites in the
1960s feared as crossing the line from the unconventional to the threatening, would still be litigating their right to religious freedom for several
years to come. 4' And they would receive that right only when it became
clear that, however much they might upset some whites, the Muslims posed
no threat to the polity's stability or to elite interests dependent thereon.

Cir. 1981) (state fair); Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F Supp. 1135 (E.D.N.Y 1980)
(door-to-door solicitation). But activities of such sorts could be regulated even when outright

prohibition was not allowed. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v City
of New York, 501 F Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y 1980) (United Nations headquarters); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v McAvey, 450 F Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y 1978) (World
Trade Center).
443. See Close-It Enterps., Inc. v Weinberger, 407 N.Y.S. 587 (App. Div 2d Dep't
1978) (allowing client m civil suit to appear in court wearing skullcap); People v. Rodriguez,
424 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979) (allowing lawyer who was also Roman
Catholic priest to wear clerical collar while representing criminal defendant). An earlier New
York Court of Appeals case had held that a lawyer-priest could not wear clerical garb m court.
See LaRocca v Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606 (1976).
444. Brown v McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 533-34, 180 N.E.2d 791, 792 (1962).
445. Id. at 537, 180 N.E.2d at 793 (Desmond, C.J., concurring).
446. See Bryant v Wilkins, 258 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Wyoming County 1965).
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C. Gender Equality: ParadigmaticConstitutionalSymbol
for the 1970s
We must turn at last to the overarching constitutional issue of the
1970s - the issue of gender equality By the late 1960s, the efforts of
Catholics and Jews to assume the values of the dominant culture and
thereby enter the socio-economic mainstream had in large part succeeded.
The civil rights movement, with its demand for the elimination of
subordination on the basis of race, was at its height. But virtually nothing
had been done to address the subordination of the largest underclass in
American society - women. This Article cannot even outline the many
forms of discrimination that victimized women as late as 1970, but three
facts must be noted. First, women were virtually excluded from the
professions and other elite occupations. Second, employed women earned
only 41 % of what men earned. 47 Third, 45 % of households with children
headed by women had incomes below the poverty line, whereas only 11 %
of all households with children had such low incomes. 44
The 1962 case of Shpritzer v Lang," 9 in which a policewoman sought
to invalidate a provision of the New York City Admimstrative Code that
barred the promotion of women to the rank of sergeant, represented a small
step on behalf of equality for women. While it was, in the still sexist
words of the court, "beyond dispute that women [could] not perform.all the
functions which male Sergeants may be called upon to perform in the
Police Department," 450 the trial judge found "it unreasonable to conceive
that an organization the size of the New York City Police Department
would not have at least some positions of authority in which women could
perform at the same level of competence as men. "451 In the first case of its
kind, the judge ordered a hearing to determine whether the plaintiff could
perform any of the tasks required of sergeants on the understanding that if
she could, the city's regulation would be "struck down as arbitrary and
capricious. "452

447
STATES,
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
1989, at 449 (1989).
See id. at 456.
224 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1962).
Shpritzer v. Lang, 224 N.Y.S.2d 105, 110 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County 1962).
Id.
Id.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964,453 which prohibited all employment
discrimination based on sex, represented a more significant step toward
ending the subordination of women. Like most equal nghts legislation that
this Article has examined, the 1964 Act was readily enforced by the courts
in relatively straightforward cases like Sontag v Bronsten,454 in which the
issue was whether a dumbbell lifting test that every male passed, but that
Marilyn Sontag failed, bore any relationship to the duties of audio-visual
techmcian, the job for which Sontag had applied. 5 As the New York
Court of Appeals proclaimed with clarity in Sontag, "when a hiring
, adversely affects equal
standard, although neutral on its face
employment opportunity for a protected class of persons," including
women, the employer had to establish that the test was "a valid predictor
[did] not create an arbitrary,
of employee job performance, and
artificial and unnecessary barrier to employment which operate[d]
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of an impermissible classification"
like gender. 456 The court accordingly reversed the trial court's judgment
dismissing Sontag's suit and remanded the case for a fact-finding about the
job-relatedness of the dumbbell test. 457
Sontag and thousands of cases like it merely required the clear and
easy application of assnilatiomst equality principles requiring that women
be given the same opportunities as men. 458 But some other cases were not
so simple. Consider, for example, three cases that were patently related
to women's opportumties for equality of economic opportunity, but could
459
not be resolved merely by assimilating women to men: Ludtke v Kuhn,
453. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e (1988)).
454. 33 N.Y.2d 197, 306 N.E.2d 405 (1973); accordAssociation of Personnel Agencies
of New York, Inc. v Ross, 43 N.Y.2d 873, 374 N.E.2d 363 (1978); United Teachers v. New
York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 414 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1979); New
York State Hairdressers & Cosmetologists Ass'n v. Cuomo, 369 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y County 1975); cf.Walpole v- State Liquor Auth., 356 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Ene

County 1974).
455. Sontag v Bronstein, 33 N.Y.2d 197, 199, 306 N.E.2d 405, 406 (1973).
456. Id. at 201, 306 N.E.2d at 407
457 Id. at 202-03, 306 N.E.2d at 407-08.
458. Procedural obstacles to relief first had to be overcome. For illustrations of those
obstacles, see Board of Educ. v State Div of Human Rights, 44 N.Y.2d 902, 379 N.E.2d
163 (1978); Scott v Board of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 604-05 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1969).
459. 461 F Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
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Seidenberg46v1 McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc. ,40 and Scott v Board of
Education.
In Ludtke, a female reporter sought an injunction to compel the New
York Yankees to grant her access to the team's locker room following
games. 2 The trial court made two key findings of fact. First, it found
that Ludtke was denied "an equal opportunity to get a story or gather news
on the same basis as her male counterparts, thus giving the latter a
substantial competitive advantage. "I Second, the court concluded that the
players could protect their privacy by "wear[ing] towels" or by "us[ing]
curtains in front of th[eir] cubicle
to undress and hide
from these
women. '"4
Accordingly, it found that "exclusion of women sports
reporters from the locker room at Yankee Stadium [was] not substantially
related to
privacy protection" but only "to maintaining the locker room
as an all-male preserve. "I The ultimate purpose of this exclusion was to
"maintamn[ ] the status of baseball as a family sport and conform[ ] to
traditional notions of decency and propriety "I So understood, Ludtke's
attempt to crash the men's locker room, unlike the plaintiff's effort in
Sontag, but like the efforts of anti-Vietnam War protesters, vagrants,
transsexuals, foreigners, and bizarre religious dissenters, stood in
contradiction to traditional standards of manners and decency Thus, in

460. 317 F Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) & 308 F Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y

1969).

Another case, New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d
Cir. 1975), which arose out of the policy of the Jaycees not to admit women into membership,
also raised issues about denying women opportunities m a fashion that adversely affected their
abilites to compete in the economy. The court avoided these issues, however, by finding that
the Jaycees were not discriminating against women as an employer and, hence, were free from
the restraints of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 860. The court also found that the Jaycees
were a purely private entity and were free from any constitutional obligations not to
discriminate. Id. The finding that the Jaycees were private seems odd m light of the fact that
they received nearly one-third of their funding from federal government sources. See id. at
858. It also seems at odds with the Ludtke case, wluch held that the New York Yankees were
not a private entity, and the Seidenberg case, which held McSorley's not to be private.

461.

305 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969); see also Peck v. Stone, 304

N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (App. Div 4th Dep't 1969) (overturning trial judge's order prohibiting

"young female attorney" from appearing in court clad in "mini-skirt").
462. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y 1978).
463. Id. at 97

464. Id. at 97-98.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 98.
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Ludtke, the achievement of equality was at war with the maintenance of
established cultural values, and Ludtke could not gain equal econormc
opportunity by accepting those existing norms. She had to demand that
existing values be changed and that the courts grant equal recognition to her
competing values.
The issues at stake m Seidenberg were ultimately the same. On the one
hand, the continued exclusion of women from McSorley's Bar would "only
serve to isolate women from the realities of everyday life, and to perpetuate,
7 On the other hand, there
exploitation."I6
as a matter of law, economic
was "the occasional preference of men for a haven to which they retreat
pass a few
from the watchful eye of wives or womanhood in general to
an
all-male
urge
for
hours in their own company "468 Lurking behind tis
9
4
preserve was an "ancient chivalristic concept" of "bars as dens of
coarseness and iniquity and of women as peculiarly delicate and impressionable creatures in need of protection from the rough and tumble of unvarrushed humanity "470 Again, equal economic opportunity for women
required transforming deeply held cultural assumptions.
The issue in Scott was whether Lori Scott, a young women of fifteen,
could wear slacks to high school.47 The court made no finding that the
school board's policy of requiring female students to wear traditional
women's dress interfered with their opportunity to function as socioeconomic equals, although plenty of evidence on which it could have based
such a finding existed.472 But the court was clear about the school board's
concerns: the board would not tolerate dress that would "exaggerate,
emphasize, or call attention to anatomical details" or "provoke so widespread
or constant attention as would interfere with teaching and learning
espouse violence, be obscene, suggest obscenity, or call for an illegal act."4
At bottom the board was seeking to impose rules of "style or taste"'474 based
on ancient chivalristic stereotypes about the behaviors and proper roles of
467 Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
468. Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F Supp. 593, 605 (S.D.N.Y

1970).
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

Seidenberg, 308 F Supp. at 1260.
Seidenberg, 317 F Supp. at 606.
Scott v Board of Educ., 305 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
See id. at 606-07
Id. at 607
Id. at 606.
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men and women m society , Again, the attainment of equality was at war
with traditional cultural values.
Unlike Sontag, m which women, like earlier victims of inequality,
merely gamed access to opportunities from which they had previously been
excluded without the nature of those opportunities being changed m any
way, Ludtke, Seidenberg, and Scott sought to do more. The real significance
of the three cases lay m their efforts to transform culture by rejecting "midVictorian concept[s] which females [had] long since abandoned. "45 Unlike

Sontag and the religious equality cases of the 1950s, Ludtke, Seidenberg, and
Scott did not merely expand women's opportunities to interact with men on
men's terms; the three cases also altered the terms of interaction, so that men
and women would henceforth interact on the basis of rules set m favor of
women rather than of men.
In all three cases, adherence to traditional practices could be justified
only on the ground that men were Incapable of controlling their aggressive
impulses, while women were delicate and impressionable creatures who
required protection. Traditionally, of course, women had been protected
through exclusion from situations in which they might confront male
aggression, such as environments involving provocative dress, locker rooms,
bars, and, above all, the world of business and economic competition.
Women, as a result, had remained subordinated. Ludtke, Seidenberg, and
Scott, in contrast, turned the tables when, in the new world of the 1970s,
each was decided m favor of the female plaintiff. The law would no longer
be used to subordinate women, but would instead be deployed to grant
women rights that they could use to "change men"'476 so that men would
possess the necessary control of their own impulses. Once men possessed
such control, women would no longer require protection and could safely
enter former bastions of male privilege where they could compete advantageously with men and thereby end their subordination. It might, of course,
take a good deal of time for men to change, but the important point
symbolically was that during that time, the law in its apportionment of rights
would be on the side of women rather than, as it always had been, on the
side of men.
It is necessary to reiterate what has just been said in a more systematic
fashion that is consistent with the main themes of this Article. Under the
475.
476.

Calzadilla v. Dooley, 286 N.Y.S.2d 510, 516 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1968) (dictum).
Carol Hanisch, A Critique of the Miss America Protest, in NOTES FROM THE

SECOND YEAR: WOMEN'S LIBERATION - MAJOR WRITINGS OF THE RADICAL FEMINISTS

(1970), quoted in JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 124 (1971).
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multicultural vision of equality that Ludtke, Seidenberg, and Scott represented, women no longer had to enter the cultural mainstream on men's
terms; these cases made it clear that women could reject traditional male
value structures m their drive for equality and strive to develop their own
alternative ones. Moreover, by reconceptualizing equality as a right rather
than a goal, these cases transformed equality into an entitlement women
enjoyed in the present rather than as an end at which they would arrve in the
future. Instead of generating hope that women would have the same
opportunities and well-being as men at some future date, equality gave
women a right m each of the cases to interact on terms immediately
favorable to them rather than to men. Equality, m short, was transformed
from a process of pareto Improvement by which less favored groups gamed
something over time that the favored group already enjoyed and would
continue to enjoy Instead, equality became a zero-sum game, m which
judges fixed the rules under which competing groups interacted m specific
contexts, with each group obtaining the right to interact under its preferred
rules on some fair number of occasions.
An appreciation of 1970s feminism as an effort to change culture rather
than merely to give women access to what men already enjoyed can also help
clarify the confusing line of cases dealing with gender issues in insurance,
retirement, and other employee benefits cases. Although some women may
have obtained tangible financial gains as a result of judicial decisions
outlawing gender-based discrimination m the employee benefits context,
most cases affected men as a group and women as a group m a fashion that
did not improve the well-being of either. The reason, of course was that
men and women tended to be married to each other and hence that benefit
payments, at least in traditional marriages, were effectively made to the
family unit, consisting of both sexes, rather than to men or women alone.
Consider Spirt v Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n,4' 7 which
invalidated the use of sex-segregated mortality tables in determining the
amount of retirement benefits payable to retirees. 478 Because women on the
average live longer than men, the consequence of using the tables was that
a woman who made the same contribution to a plan as a man received a
477

475 F Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y 1979). But cf. Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591

(2d Cir. 1968) (upholding similar discriminations in social security benefits).
478. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 475 F Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y 1979), affd
mpart and rev'd mpart, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983) (for
reconsideration in light of Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983)).
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lower monthly benefit upon retirement. In striking down this discrimination
and requiring that women receive the same monthly benefit as men who
made the same contribution, judges did not, however, aid all women at the

expense of all men. The reason is that women in traditional marriages, who
were dependent on their husbands' pensions, were hurt along with their
husbands by the Spirt rule. The women who benefited from the rule were
those who had supported- themselves all or most of their lives and were

dependent on their own retirement annuities for their current support.
Perhaps annuity and insurance companies gamed the added funds needed to

pay these independent women entirely from the pensions and annuities of
single men. But if not, then the funds came from the large number of
workers and retirees in traditional marriages, with no explanation of why the
interests of single women should be preferred to the interests of married
women and widows. Whatever the actual distributional impact of Spirt,

however, it seems clear that the new-found preference for single women
reflected dramatically altered cultural assumptions about the propriety of
women's dependence on men.
The same was true of the cases dealing with maternity leave policies and

pregnancy benefits, which New York courts decided almost uniformly in
favor of women plaintiffs.4 9 But again, at least insofar as pregnant women
were married, the conflict over pregnancy benefits was not between women
and men, but between families that would have children and thereby receive
benefits, and those that would not but would nonetheless contribute to

covering the cost of the benefits.

Only pregnant women who were

479. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Health Ins. Ass'n
of Am. v Harnett, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 376 N.E.2d 1280 (1978); Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v.
New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976); State Div.
of Human Rights v Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 423 N.Y.S.2d 748 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1979). In Delta Air Lines v. Kramarsky, 485 F Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y 1980),
aff'd, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981), a federal court held that federal law, as construed by the
Supfeme Court m General Electric Company v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), preempted the
New York legislation construed m Brooklyn Unton Gas, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
that holding. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983). As a result, Women in City
Gov't United v. City of New York, 563 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1977), which indicated that New
York employers could refuse to provide pregnancy benefits during the interval between Gilbert
and its reversal by Congress under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2003e (1988)), seems in retrospect
to have been wrongly decided. That leaves New York City Bd. of Educ. v. New York State
Human Rights Appeal Bd., 387 N.Y.S.2d 873 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976), which refused to
add a maternity leave period to the statutory period for obtaining a master's degree by a
teacher in the New York City school system, as the only reported New York case in which
a woman plaintiff correctly lost.
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unmarried or not otherwise financially dependent on men, which except for
the umnsured poor was a relatively small group in the 1970s, enjoyed a
tangible economic gain financed to a significant extent by men, when the
judiciary compelled employers to provide pregnancy benefits. Thus, single
women who were economically well-off tended again to benefit at the
expense of families, without any.judicial policy analysis of why a well-todo woman who was unmarried, independent, and about to be a mother was
a proper subject for state solicitude and support at the expense of married
mothers dependent on men for support.
These cases, in short, suggest that one consequence of 1970s
femimsm, whether by madvertance or design, was cultural change that
exalted independent, single women over married women economically
dependent on men. Unlike the egalitarian movements of the 1950s, which
sought only to enable subordinated groups to move upward into the elite
on the elite's terms, the movements of the 1970s, including the women's
movement, sought to alter the cultural terms on which competing groups
interrelated. Efforts to change deep cultural values provoked resistance,
however, and as a result, it proved far more difficult to achieve equality
through cultural change in the 1970s than it had been to achieve equality
through assimilation in the 1950s.
The struggle over abortion - a right essential to women if they are to
achieve equality - is illustrative. Women initially obtained the right to
abortion by statute in New York in 1970,480 and thus the right cannot be
questioned, as it has been in most of the United States, on the ground that
it resulted from the U.S. Supreme Court's alleged usurpation of power in
Roe v Wade.4"' Nevertheless, precisely because of the way in which the
right to abortion conflicted with traditional moral values, recognition of the
right provoked resistance, and New York judges cut back on the substance
of the right, even though it had been granted by the legislature. First, the
judges upheld a legislative addendum to the 1970 Act that required a doctor
to prepare a termination of pregnancy certificate including the name and
address of the person obtaimng the abortion for every abortion done in
New York City 48 Second, they upheld requirements for the separate
480. See 1970 N.Y Laws 127
481. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
482. See Schulman v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342
N.E.2d 501 (1975); cf.State v. Jacobus, 348 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. Cortland County 1973)
(upholding analogous requirement of certificate of fetal death for abortions performed outside
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certification of abortion clinics along with the individual certification of
every doctor having an office therein." Third, despite early cases to the
contraryA the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals
both held that only medically indicated abortions could be funded by
medicaid reirnbursements.4
Taken together, these restrictions tended to limit the availability of
abortions, especially to poor women, thereby depriving the right to
abortion of much of its substance.8 6 While it would be a mistake to
question the real freedom to control their bodies and their life destimes that
wealthy women gained from their right to abortion, it seems clear that on
the subject of abortion, as on most other subjects of gender equality, the
mass of women realized less material improvement in their lives than
abortion's proponents might have hoped. Because of the difficulties of
obtaining an abortion and the trauma associated with it, granting a formal
legal right could not alone create a new social reality
Indeed, the destruction of traditional norms and their replacement by
the law of gender equality even brought tangible benefits on
occasion to men. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated New York
legislation requiring the consent of unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers
to the adoption of their children; the Court observed that the facts before
it "illustrate[d] the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being
invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned
judgment as to the fate of their children." 4s8 Similarly, New York's
"ancient practice of arresting only men" in civil litigation came to an end
"as an unanticipated social dividend" of "the modern insistence on sex

New York City).
483. See State v. Mitchell, 321 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1971).
484. See McRae v. Matthews, 421 F Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y 1976); Klein v. Nassau
County Medical Ctr., 347 F Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); City of New York v. Wyman, 321
N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. N.Y County), af4'd, 322 N.Y.S.2d 957 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1971),
rev'd, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180 (1972).
485. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); City of New York v. Wyman, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281 N.E.2d 180

(1972).
486.

Cf. People v. Baird, 262 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1965) (construing

right to use contraceptives proclaimed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as
narrowly as later courts construed right to abortion). According to the judge in Baird,
Griswoldgave only married couples the right to use contraceptives. Id. at 949.
487 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
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equality, " even m cases m which a woman sought to have a man arrested
in the context of a marital dispute. 8 9 Men gained another important
bargaining chip against women in a divorce context when it was held that
they were entitled to alimony and counsel fees at the expense of their wives
in cases in which they were economically dependent. 49 At the other end
of the marriage continuum, courts declared that rules making it more
difficult for men than for women to obtain marriage licenses were also
unconstitutional. 491 Although a number of gender-based discriminations
harmful to men were preserved, 4 2 the fact remains that in the important
area of marriage and divorce law, men gained important practical nghts
from the requirement of gender equality When one factors in statutory
changes in New York's standards for divorce and for the distribution of
marital property that increased the ease with which a husband in a
traditional marriage could walk away and leave his former wife in
poverty,493 it may be that in its practical, tangible effects, the gender

revolution of the late 1960s and early 1970s favored men at least as much,
if not more, than it did women.
488. Repetti v Gil, 372 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975).
489. See Gould v Gould, 371 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975).
490. See Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County), rev'd on other
grounds, 396 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1977); cf.Bartlett v. Kitchm, 352 N.Y.S.2d
110 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973) (assigning counsel to husband receiving public
assistance and seeking divorce).
491. See Berger v. Adornato, 350 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1973); In
re Ogilvie, 373 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Rockland County Ct. 1975).
492. See National Org. for Women v Goodman, 374 F Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y 1974)
(upholding right of women to claim exemption from jury duty on basis of gender); Mularadelis
v Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1980) (upholding
exclusion of male from school's female tenis team); Carey v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 402 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div 2d Dep't 1978) (upholding refusal to allow male
to take examination for position of female correction officer), aftd, 46 N.Y.2d 1068, 390
N.E.2d 301 (1979); Page Airways of Albany, Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights,
376 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1975) (upholding right of employer to set maximum
hair length for male but not female employees), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 877, 352 N.E.2d 140
(1976); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 361 N.Y.S.2d 380
(App. Div 2d Dep't 1974) (upholding seniority system favoring female cabin attendants),
aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 810, 345 N.E.2d 583 (1975); Vintage Soc'y Wholesalers Corp. v. State
Liquor Auth., 311 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1970) (upholding statute requiring
fingerprinting and photographing of male but not female employees of liquor wholesalers).
But see Schick v Bronstein, 447 F Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y 1978) (holding mimmum height
restriction, which was invalid as to women, invalid as to men as well).
493. This is a topic to which I shall turn in a future article.
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It would again be a mistake, however, to focus on the immediately
tangible consequences of the movement for gender equality rather than on
its long-term conceptual goals. An approach to gender equality focusing
on equality of rights for women rather than on improving women's
material well-being was entirely consistent with the main thrust of
constitutional law during the 1970s. Thus, as one judge declared in
holding that men should have the same entitlement to alimony as women,
it was essential that the law cease its "implicit condescension and maintenance of a protective
attitude" which, although it "may help the
women immediately affected [,]
in the end produces the attitude that
women are not equal to men."4 9 In this judge's view, women could not
be made equal by giving them a series of specific benefits that elevate them
as a group to a preordained legal plateau. The gender revolution, he
believed, could ultimately succeed only as a "movement to raise the
consciousness of women to an appreciation of
their potential as
functioning individuals. "I
This judicial observation leads directly to the questions to which this
Article's comparison of the mid-century movement for ethnic equality with
the subsequent movements for racial and gender equality has been pointing.
In conclusion, those questions need to be fleshed out.
V Conclusion:Rights as the Foundationfor Social Justice
Before turning to the questions that this Article raises, we need to
reiterate briefly the facts that it establishes. One fact that seems clear is
that the New York courts over the past two decades have committed
themselves to a rights-centered constitutionalism. Beginning with the race
relations cases in the late 1950s and culminating in the gender equality
cases of the 1970s, faith in constitutional rights generally has led to a
fulsome judicial creation of rights, including fundamental ones, such as the
right to die 496 and the right to sexual expression,4' and less important ones,
494. Thaler v. Thaler, 391 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977).

495. Id.
496. See In re Storar, 434 N.Y.S.2d 46 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).

497

See Population Servs. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), 4f'd sub

nom. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d

476, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. demed, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); cf. In re A.D., 394
N.Y.S.2d 139 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1977) (denying application of mother for order
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such as the right to play 19 And with the judicial creation of rights,
societal progress seems increasingly to depend on continued rights
expansion. The route to progress has thereby fallen under the guardianship
of lawyers and judges.
An obvious question that some might want to ask is when the shift to
rights-centered constitutionalism occurred. Three dates suggest themselves. The first is 1938 - the year of United States v CaroleneProducts
Co.499 and of New York's Constitutional Convention. The second is
1954 - the year of Brown v Board of Education.500 The third is the mid-

1960s - the years of African-American and antiwar protest and of a solid
liberal majority on the Warren Court.
Important developments in fact occurred at each of these times. In
1938, a new conception of equality focusing on culture and ethnicity rather
than class emerged, and the achievement of such equality became the
central goal of liberal constitutionalism. Brown, in turn, marked the first
clear proclamation of equality as a legally enforceable, formal constitutional right rather than a mere goal. Finally, the mid-1960s marked the
period in which rights-centered rather than goal-oriented jurisprudence
permeated the lower courts, and equality became multicultural rather than
assimilatiomst.
A second, normative question also arises: namely, whether the shift
from goal-oriented, assimilationist equality to rights-centered, multicultural
equality was a positive development. This question cannot be answered
definitively Historical essays need not conclude with definitive normative
judgments, and I am sufficiently conflicted about the trend toward rightscentered, multicultural equality that a fully coherent normative judgment
authorizing sterilization of severely retarded 16-year-old daughter).
498. See Neeld v American Hockey League, 439 F Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y 1977)
(enjoining league from enforcing rule prohibiting person with sight in only one eye from
playing). But cf. Caso v New York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 434 N.Y.S.2d 60
(App. Div 4th Dep't 1980) (refusing to allow student who had violated athletic association
rules prohibiting participation in nonschool sports to participate in school sports). Two judges
even upheld a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle without wearing a protective helmet,
see People v Carmichael, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Special Sess. Genesee County 1967); People
v Smallwood, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Special Sess. Monroe County 1967), although one was
reversed by a higher court. See People v. Carmichael, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Genesee County
Ct. 1968); accord, People v. Newhouse, 287 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968).

499. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
500. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would be beyond my capacity But a few tentative observations can be
made, and with them, I believe, the most difficult issues will be exposed.
One set of observations results from focusing sharply on the remarkably successful efforts of Catholics and Jews to achieve their goals of
equality in the post-World War II decades. Sandwiched between the
Holocaust and ethnic cleansing m Bosma and Rwanda, the upward mobility
of white ethmcs in mid-twentieth century America possesses a grandeur
and singularity that those of us who lived through the movement have
never fully appreciated. May it also be that we have not fully appreciated
the wisdom of New York judges when they declined to provide Catholics
and Jews with judicially enforceable equality rights to overcome their
subordination - rights that by the very necessity of their existence would
have emphasized and thereby reaffirmed Catholic and Jewish inferiority 9 !'
At the same time, we also may have failed to understand the moral
incoherence of the New York judiciary's approach. Living m a culture that
perpetually proclaimed its egalitananism, New York's mid-century judges
themselves joined in the proclamations, but then persistently refused to
render them effective in the cases that they decided. The era's vision of
equality was also less than complete in that assimilation, in a meaningful
sense, was not equality Although those individuals who were willing and
able to shed the cultural identity with which they had been born could
assume a WASP identity and join the WASP elite, they had to change,
whereas existing members of the elite did not. Nor was change always
easy- Jewish children who had to sit through class discussions of The
Merchant of Venmce, for example, undoubtedly experienced a kind of pain
that Christian children did not.
These weaknesses of mid-century, assimilatiomst equality have been
solved by the new rights-centered equality of the 1970s. Rights-centered
egalitarians are judicial activists for whom the Warren Court provides a
model. Unlike New York judges, who often failed to practice the equality
they preached, the Justices who formed the Warren Court's majority
appear in retrospect to have displayed even greater moral virtue than we
have conventionally credited them with having. In its constitutionalization
of rights of equality and autonomy, the Warren Court majority, unlike
mid-century New York judges, took responsibility for transforming
America's ideology into reality Warren, Brennan, and their brethren may
501. Cf STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991);
see also supra text accompanying notes 312-13.
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not have succeeded, but rarely does one find judges striving so nobly to
empower the oppressed.
Today's egalitarian ideology also does not impose on subordinated
classes the special burden of shedding their cultural identities in order to
climb to the top. In today's utopia, all cultures will receive due respect,
and no culture will be the dominant one to which all others must be
assimilated. Indeed, in its most advanced forms, multicultural equality
rejects the very concept of domination or the very idea of rising to the top.
Multicultural rights egalitanans somehow presuppose that every equal
group will retain its own values and culture and will relate to others with
no one culture or set of values becoming dominant. No one has yet
explained, though, how equal groups in a multicultural society would be
prevented from striving to make their values dominant or even how culture
of any kind could exist without some set of controlling values. Hence, it
appears that multicultural equality will lead, if anywhere, to a world in
which new values replace traditional values as culturally dominant, not to
a world in which all domination is eliminated. Such equality could prove
even more inegalitarian than the assimilatiomst equality of the 1950s.
The reason for being conflicted about the current trend toward rightscentered, multicultural equality is thus apparent: like the mid-century's
assimilatiomst equality, today's multicultural equality is conceptually
imperfect and incomplete. Comparison of the two visions of equality does
not disclose the superior one, but only displays the weaknesses and
limitations of each. Especially in light of the conservative counterreactions
it has produced, one therefore wonders how much useful insight our
current conception of equality provides with its emphasis on ethmcity and
culture, as that conception has evolved since it first replaced the classoriented conception of equality in the late 1930s.
This question, in turn, only returns us to an even more basic
normative question: whether it makes sense to conceive of equality
primarily in terms of ethnicity and culture rather than in terms of class
conflict and redistribution. This most basic question, however, is
irrelevant because in America today, if not in the world at large, politics
is driven by ethnic and cultural discrninnation rather than by class struggle.
In today's world, the poor appear to have accepted their fate. They no
longer engage in revolutionary struggle to improve their lot, nor do the
rich fear that the poor will dispossess them. At the same time, the world
bears constant witness to genocide, ethnic cleansing, and religious
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fanaticism, and even m America, intolerance and fear of difference appear
to be increasing.
Whether we like it or not, the central task for anyone who today
believes m equality is to end discrimination based on ethmcity and culture.
Emphasis upon the experience of Catholics and Jews in mid-twentiethcentury New York establishes that this task can be accomplished.
Emphasis, in contrast, upon the intellectual conceptions needed to
accomplish it shows how much work remains to be done.

